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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to assess whether proprietary estoppel, as a deep-rooted tenet in 
English law, is sound in theory and practice and will demonstrate why the recent 
proliferation of cases1 on proprietary estoppel renders inquiry into the origins, nature, 
operation, application and significance of this doctrine so timely.  
Underpinned by its pivotal rationale of curtailing unconscionable behaviour, this 
equitable concept has increasingly been deployed since its inception in circumstances 
where a legal owner of land seeks to renege upon an express or implied assurance 
upon which a promisee has relied to his or her detriment. The doctrine thus appears to 
defy statute2 to compel compliance by a landowner with representations previously 
made to a promisee, capable of engendering a legitimate expectation of the 
acquisition of an interest in land and upon which assurances the claimant has placed 
detrimental reliance.  
Since the genesis of proprietary estoppel, the doctrine has continued to evolve in the 
face of manifold challenges and controversies, recent decisions of the House of Lords 
(now the Supreme Court)3 having attempted to balance consistency and uniformity of 
approach when upholding the inherent purpose of the doctrine, against the perceived 
need for flexibility of factual interpretation in relation to the criteria for estoppel to 
operate.  
The thesis embarks on the unprecedented task of ascertaining whether proprietary 
estoppel is sound in theory and practice against the benchmark of the extent to which 
the courts have achieved correlation between the intrinsic purpose for which 
proprietary estoppel was conceived – the curtailment or prevention of unconscionable 
behaviour where a landowner has reneged on an assurance upon which the claimant 
has placed detrimental reliance – and the unwavering affirmation and fulfilment of 
that purpose. This is accomplished by tracing and reconstructing the historical origins 
and subsequent evolution of the concept of proprietary estoppel, whilst also 
conducting detailed analysis of judicial interpretation of the doctrine, with particular 
emphasis on the significance and impact of recent case law. A comparison is drawn 
between the concepts of proprietary estoppel and other equitable devices such as the 
constructive trust and the principle of unjust enrichment by reference to the English 
and United States legal systems to demonstrate the significance and esoteric qualities 
of proprietary estoppel. Ultimately unveiled is a uniquely formulated perspective of 
the doctrine.   
1
 See Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18; Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3; Lothian v Dixon [2014] Ch D; Moore 
v Moore [2016] EWHC 2202 (Ch); Bradbury v Taylor [2012] EWCA Civ 1208; Suggitt v Suggitt [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1140; Southwell v Blackburn [2014] EWCA Civ 1347; Hoyl Group Ltd v Cromer Town Council 
[2015] EWCA Civ 782; Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ 463; Burton v Liden [2016] EWCA Civ 275; James 
v James [2018] EWHC 43 (Ch); Haberfield v Haberfield [2018] EWHC 317 (Ch); Thompson v Thompson 
[2018] EWHC 1338 (Ch); Gee v Gee (2018) EWHC 1393 (Ch) 
2
 See Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, s 2 which provides that a contract for the sale or 
disposition of an interest in land can only be made in writing, and signed by the parties with all the terms 
expressly agreed upon.   
3
 Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55; Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18
iv 
 
Against the previously articulated benchmark, this thesis contends that proprietary 
estoppel is essentially sound in theory and practice. It acknowledges the inevitability of 
challenges posed by unpredictability of outcome due to the unavoidable judicial 
interpretation of facts giving rise to a finding of estoppel, but asserts that these do not 
detract from its fundamental ‘soundness’. Novel recommendations, including a 
‘proprietary estoppel model’, are then advanced to maximise the practical efficacy of 
the doctrine.  
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PRELUDE 
 
 
Proprietary estoppel is a judicial doctrine which puts “legal clothing on the adage that 
you should not lead people up the garden path”4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, ‘Thoughts on the Law of Equitable Estoppel’ [2010] 84 Australian LJ 
225, 238, cited by Jonathan Morgan, Contract Law (2
nd
 edn, Palgrave 2015) 57  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis embarks on a rigorous exploration and analysis of the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel via case law, with the aspiration of proposing innovative 
recommendations to reform the operation of the concept where appropriate, and to 
facilitate its application by the courts.  
 
According to Lord Hope in Fisher v Brooker5, “there is no concept in our law that is 
more absolute than a right in property”. Proprietary estoppel is now a fairly 
longstanding doctrine within English jurisprudence, capable of creating a proprietary 
interest in land (and, on occasions, intellectual property)6. It invokes scrutiny of the 
question of whether a landowner who promises an interest in his or her land to 
another party who relies on such promise to his or her detriment, should be permitted 
to resile from the expectation thereby created.  
 
For example, a situation may arise in which a farmer, as landowner, makes an 
assurance to a family member that in return for working on the farm for little or no 
pay, a bequest of the farm will immediately follow. When coupled with the subsequent 
detrimental reliance of the family member, perhaps in the form of giving up education 
and forfeiting other employment opportunities, the farmer is estopped from reneging 
on the promise made.  
 
                                                 
5
 [2009] 1 WLR 764 [HL] [8]  
6
 Motivate Publishing FZ LCC v Hello Ltd [2015] EWHC 1554 Ch 
2 
 
Proprietary estoppel is an important concept that enables the creation, acquisition and 
enforcement of rights on the basis of informal promises, assurances or 
representations. It is not a carte blanche for every failed promise. The doctrine 
permeates transactions in land by addressing the “unconscionable conduct” of a 
landowner. To this extent and for this purpose, proprietary estoppel operates flexibly 
by considering and evaluating the circumstances of a particular case to determine 
whether a party has acted “unconscionably” against another. It was and is 
promulgated by the Courts of equity, rather than being a product of statute. It is best 
broadly defined as “one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law”7 as 
it will not allow persons to go back on their promises or representations where it is 
inequitable or unconscionable to do so.  
 
This thesis critically analyses the equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel to 
determine whether it is sound in theory and in practice. Whether it is ‘sound’ is 
assessed in relation to the immanent purpose of the doctrine, and more specifically 
whether proprietary estoppel continues to achieve the purpose envisaged by the 
original architects of the concept as explored and explicated in this thesis, and whether 
its purpose is preserved, honoured and reflected in the decisions of the court. The 
underlying purpose of proprietary estoppel was discernible as early as the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case8 where Lord Ellesmere affirmed that it would be ‘unconscionable’ for 
the lessor to obtain the houses, gardens and orchards of the lessee which he neither 
built nor planted, and which added more value to the land than before. The court 
resolved thereafter “to correct men’s consciences for frauds, breach of trust, wrongs 
                                                 
7
 Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd 
[1984] QB 84 (Denning LJ)  
8
 [1615] 21 ER 485 (Ch) 486 (Lord Ellesmere LC)  
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and oppressions of what nature soever they be and to soften and mollify the extremity 
of the law”9. This principle of unconscionability was approved in Dillwyn v Llewelyn10 
to create a proprietary interest in land where a father (F) had executed a 
memorandum leaving his farm to his son (S) and F encouraged S to build a house on 
F’s land. In reliance on F’s memorandum and with F’s knowledge and approval, S had 
expended considerable monies in building on the land. F died without transferring the 
legal estate to S. The Lord Chancellor Lord Westbury ordered the defendant to convey 
the freehold to the plaintiff. Thus, in the context of proprietary estoppel, the 
prevention of unconscionable behaviour is represented by the intervention of the 
courts via its equitable jurisdiction, to insist that a legal owner of land cannot renege 
upon representations where the claimant has suffered a detrimental reliance thereon. 
This purpose has never materially wavered from its original genesis to the present day.  
 
By way of example, in Crab v Arun District Council11, Lord Denning clearly articulated 
that the purpose of proprietary estoppel is to prevent a person from insisting on his 
strict legal rights where it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the 
dealings which have taken place between the parties. Thereby, proprietary estoppel 
estops a party from enforcing his or her strict legal rights based on the prior dealings of 
the parties. This rationale was amplified in Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees Ltd12 where Oliver J asserted that the purpose of proprietary estoppel is to 
ascertain “whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable 
for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly, or unknowingly, he has 
allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment”. Thus, the underlying 
                                                 
9
 Earl of Oxford’s Case [1615] 21 ER 485 (Ch) 486 (Lord Ellesmere LC)  
10
 [1862] 45 ER 1285 
11
 [1976] Ch 179 (CA) 187-188 (Lord Denning)  
12
 [1982] QB 133 (HC) 593 (Oliver J)  
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purpose of proprietary estoppel is to prevent unconscionable conduct in the dealings 
of parties. Unconscionability invokes equity to act against the conscience of the 
promisor to fulfill what he or she had promised. The purpose of proprietary estoppel 
permeates its every application by the courts and the soundness of estoppel is 
assessible by scrutinising and evaluating the aforementioned purpose and the court’s 
consistent fulfilment of it. This pivotal adherence by the courts to the fundamental 
objective of proprietary estoppel produces a bedrock of certainty in the sense of an 
unwavering insistence on the prevention of unconscionable behaviour when facts 
potentially giving rise to a finding of proprietary estoppel are pleaded. It is the court’s 
consistent realization and affirmation of its purpose in every case that evidences the 
soundness of the doctrine.  
 
The issue of ‘sound’ is also examined by an objective assessment via case law of any 
clear or latent defects, any controversy or challenges, internal contradictions, vague or 
uncertain foundations, or ambiguous implications and the strengths, weaknesses, 
benefits and limitations of proprietary estoppel to determine whether these deter the 
purpose of the doctrine. This critical analysis unfolds in the context of its historical and 
contemporary development, its application and operation by the courts, and also by 
comparison to similar equitable doctrines. The thesis is structured in the following 
three parts to impart clarity and insight into the discourse on proprietary estoppel 
comprised within it.  
 
Part 1 deals with the historical and contemporary development of proprietary 
estoppel. It focuses on concepts such as the nature of the doctrine, the influence of 
social change in the development of common law and equity, the evolution of 
5 
 
proprietary estoppel and theoretical perspectives underpinning proprietary estoppel. 
Scrutiny of the nature and essence of proprietary estoppel enables examination of the 
purpose, benefits and limitations of the doctrine, whereas explanation of the socio-
historical context sheds light on the impact of extralegal factors upon the evolution of 
equity and with it, the concept of proprietary estoppel. Attendant upon this, is 
exposition of the principles of estoppel that depend upon the exercise of judicial 
discretion and signify the subjugation of common law positivism, with its insistence on 
observance of strict technical rules, to the natural law-based approach of equity based 
upon principles of fairness and good conscience. The chapters contained in Part 1 
provide a broad understanding of how and why equity developed, its interrelationship 
with the common law, and the reasons which impelled the evolution of the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel.  
 
Part 1 adopts a number of investigative approaches to formulate a conclusion of its 
objective. The black letter approach provides a descriptive analysis of the nature and 
purpose of the doctrine, how it evolved, and its theoretical underpinnings. The socio-
legal approach is also applied to illustrate how social changes influenced the 
development of equity and its offspring, proprietary estoppel.  
 
Part 2 examines the application and operation of the doctrine by the courts. It focuses 
on issues such as the transition of proprietary estoppel from a traditional to a modern 
doctrine, and the scope and application of proprietary estoppel in the key decisions of 
Yeoman’s Row Management Co. Ltd v Cobbe13, and Thorner v Major14, before 
                                                 
13
 [2008] UKHL 55 
14
 [2009] UKHL 18 
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providing critical review of subsequent case law, with the concomitant challenges to 
the doctrine and then presenting a holistic evaluation of proprietary estoppel from the 
past to the modern day.  
 
Critical scrutiny takes place of the drawbacks and limitations of proprietary estoppel in 
the context of its application within case law. As will emerge, the evaluation conducted 
in Part 2 provides a rich tapestry of the case by case development of the doctrine, and 
the manner in which it climaxed in the landmark decision in Thorner15, heralding an 
arguably more principled approach to the determination of an estoppel. Despite its 
drawbacks, there are about thirteen new cases decided in proprietary estoppel 
following Thorner16, which illustrate that the application and operation of the doctrine 
is more settled than before.  
 
This Part also adopts a number of investigative approaches to determine whether or 
not the doctrine has any latent defects, internal contradictions, ambiguous 
implications, and challenges and controversies in its application and operation by the 
courts. The black letter approach is adopted to explicate and provide descriptive 
analysis of the traditional and modern approach of the courts, the House of Lords 
decisions in Yeoman’s Row17 and Thorner18, the subsequent cases following Thorner19, 
and also in tendering a holistic assessment of proprietary estoppel from the past to the 
present.  
 
                                                 
15
 [2009] UKHL 18 
16
 [2009] UKHL 18 
17
 [2008] UKHL 55 
18
 [2009] UKHL 18 
19
 [2009] UKHL 18 
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A similar approach is applied to assess whether and to what extent, the decisions of 
their Lordships’ in Yeoman’s Row20 and Thorner21, and the cases following Thorner22, 
have influenced the direction of the doctrine, and the courts perception of it in moving 
forward to the future. This analytical assessment enables evaluation of the judicial 
decision-making process in relation to the incremental evolution and refinement of 
aspects of proprietary estoppel on the premise previously articulated. 
 
Part 3 undertakes a comparison between the concepts of proprietary estoppel and the 
constructive trust, and conducts a broad review of estoppel and its interrelationship, if 
any, with the doctrine of unjust enrichment, as conceptualized within the United 
States and English legal systems. Emerging from this analysis is the notion of 
proprietary estoppel as a distinct and independent doctrine.  
 
The comparison between proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts establishes the 
circumstances whereby each doctrine is applied by the courts, accentuates the 
similarities and differences between the two doctrines, and considers the extent to 
which the constructive trust can be pleaded in the alternative to proprietary estoppel. 
The objective is to assess whether or not proprietary estoppel comprises any internal 
contradictions, ambiguity, latent defects, strengths and weaknesses or benefits and 
limitations, vis-a-vis the constructive trust. A combination of investigative approaches 
is applied to distinguish the two equitable doctrines. The black letter approach is 
adopted to provide a descriptive analysis of the two doctrines applied by the courts, as 
well as the court’s approach in dealing with either doctrine. The socio-legal approach is 
                                                 
20
 [2008] UKHL 55 
21
 [2009] UKHL 18 
22
 [2009] UKHL 18 
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adopted in considering the positive and negative aspects of the doctrines in terms of 
their respective impact on those who seek to rely on them, and the comparative 
approach is applied to illustrate their similarities and differences, strengths and 
weakness, and the flexibility and predictability of the two doctrines. Careful analysis of 
case law helps to ascertain whether proprietary estoppel is sound by reference to the 
similar equitable remedy of the constructive trust.  
 
Comparison is undertaken between the concepts of proprietary estoppel and unjust 
enrichment, from which it appears that proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment   
are two distinct and independent doctrines. By highlighting the nature of the two 
doctrines, their application by the courts, and their similarities and differences, the 
objective is to determine whether proprietary estoppel comprises any latent defects, 
ambiguity or internal contradictions, or strengths and weaknesses in comparison to 
unjust enrichment. A combination of approaches is adopted to delineate the two 
doctrines similar to those detailed above in relation to estoppel versus the 
constructive trust.   
 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel, and its gradual evolution, is complex and 
profound. Distinct research methodologies are applied to present clear arguments and 
perspectives on proprietary estoppel. For example, a critical literature review in each 
chapter identifies deficits within the existing state of knowledge; the historical 
reconstruction of proprietary estoppel captures the evolution, development and 
progression of the doctrine through the courts; the survey of the case law highlights 
the principles developed by the courts, and a doctrinal analysis assesses the 
9 
 
application of the doctrine before and following the House of Lords (now Supreme 
Court) decision in Thorner v Major23.  
 
Additional research methods are adopted to provide clarity and insight on the 
evolution of the doctrine and its application by the courts, to identify the issues arising 
from the operation of the doctrine, and also to draw comparison between the doctrine 
and similar equitable remedies.    
 
For example, the black letter approach is beneficial in providing in-depth details and 
exposition of the doctrine in theory. It is defined as a doctrinal analysis of legal rules 
and principles that are disconnected from contextual explanation and analysis.24 It 
clarifies the law on proprietary estoppel by a descriptive analysis of statutes, court 
judgments and other authoritative texts to explain the law.25 This approach utilizes 
legal reasoning to assess and interpret legal rules and to suggest recommendations for 
further development of the law.26 It examines the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and 
deal with such issues as its theoretical framework; its equitable nature; the evolution 
of proprietary estoppel; the requirements of the doctrine; its remedies granted by the 
courts and its effect on statute. This approach provides in-depth details and exposition 
of the development of the doctrine as a topic in its own right, and its application by the 
courts.  
 
                                                 
23
 [2009] UKHL 18 
24
 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 
25
 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press Ltd 
2007)  
26
 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 
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The comparative approach is beneficial to present a broader picture of the relative 
similarities and differences of estoppel in law and practice. It is defined as the act of 
comparing two or more concepts to provide an explanation about the extent of the 
relationship between them.27 The research adopts the descriptive comparison method 
to draw the relative peculiarities, similarities and differences in the case law principles 
of proprietary estoppel.28 It provides the framework whereby conflicts and differences 
between legal concepts can be explained and solutions identified.29 It is utilized to 
compare proprietary estoppel with the constructive trust and unjust enrichment to 
determine its efficacy over the similar equitable remedy. The approach is beneficial to 
illustrate the significance of proprietary estoppel and its advantage over the similar 
equitable doctrine of the constructive trust and unjust enrichment, and will also 
demonstrate the flexibility of the doctrine and how the courts have developed the test 
of proprietary estoppel over the years. It will also help to identify any need for reform 
and further development in the law of proprietary estoppel.    
 
The socio-legal approach is defined as the study of how laws are implemented and 
enforced in society.30 This approach addresses issues that can only be identified when 
we consider the operation of this law in action, and its practical implications for 
different parties, as opposed to mere description of the law in books. It is beneficial 
                                                 
27
 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press Ltd 
2007) 
28
 TJ Scott, ‘The Comparative Method of Legal Research’< 
http://italeem.iium.edu.my/2014/pluginfile.php/155226/mod_resource/content/0/J%20Scott%20-
%20Comparative%20research%20perspectives%20_Private%20law_.pdf> accessed 13 February 2016 
29
 TJ Scott, ‘The Comparative Method of Legal Research’< 
http://italeem.iium.edu.my/2014/pluginfile.php/155226/mod_resource/content/0/J%20Scott%20-
%20Comparative%20research%20perspectives%20_Private%20law_.pdf> accessed 13 February 2016 
30
 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 
11 
 
because it identifies the challenges arising in the application of the doctrine to help 
develop recommendations and solutions to eliminate such in future case law.  
 
Critical analysis of proprietary estoppel is utilized to assess the challenges in the 
operation of proprietary estoppel such as the lengthy and costly litigation involved to 
establish the estoppel, and the lack of definition for proprietary estoppel and its 
requirements. This will help illustrate the controversies arising from case law so as to 
develop recommendations and solutions to enhance its efficacy in law. 
 
Pertinently, while doctrinal research can yield the potential for critical analysis, this is 
limited to technical questions on how clear, precise and determinate a particular 
formulation of legal rules is an embodiment of principles. It does not necessarily 
expose discrepancies between what the law claims to be about, and the impact of how 
it is actually operating in practice, and the impact of this on affected parties. 
 
The thesis also adopts a critical socio-economic historical review to demonstrate the 
evolution and significance of proprietary estoppel against the background of the 
common law, which deficiencies led to the development of equity and its progeny, 
proprietary estoppel. For example, the current application of proprietary estoppel in 
cases like Thorner31 or Suggitt v Suggitt32 is not consistent with the approach which 
may have been adopted on similar facts within the socio-economic climate of the early 
17th century. Evidence in the case law scrutinized and analyzed shows that the 
judiciary who decided these cases, and incrementally made the estoppel into a more 
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principled and accessible doctrine, are influenced by the socio-economic context, and 
other economic or political factors prevailing at the date of those decisions. Further, 
proprietary estoppel in its modern form could not have readily emerged earlier in 
history, as it evolved together with the changing socio-economic tide in society. Both 
economic and socio-economic factors in the late 19th and 20th centuries have acted as 
a catalyst for the development of proprietary estoppel in its modern incarnation. 
 
The thesis presents a holistic assessment of proprietary estoppel throughout the 
entirety of its development, accompanied by incisive case law analysis and review. It 
augments existing literature on proprietary estoppel, by demonstrating the 
significance of the socio-historical and contemporary background against which it has 
evolved and their impact upon the nature, operation and application of estoppel.  
 
Many of the textbooks33 and articles34 on the doctrine possess an inherent tendency to 
deal with the descriptive nature and character of the doctrine and seldom consider its 
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theoretical framework and effect in legal practice. For example, the question of how 
far or to what extent has the theoretical foundation of proprietary estoppel influenced 
its application and the decisions of the courts have not been thoroughly dealt with by 
these scholars. The thesis deals with these novel issues that have not been examined 
to the same extent and depth by other legal scholars.  
 
Each chapter of the thesis introduces a new and fresh perspective of the doctrine 
beginning with its inception and development as a judicial benchmark of legal rights by 
the courts. The exclusive approach of expansive case law analysis adopted in assessing 
its evolution, development and application by the courts, is unprecedented in light of 
existing literature that places more focus on a primarily descriptive analysis of the 
developing case law.  
 
The substantive content of the thesis is also distinct as it fills the gaps in the existing 
literature on the historical evolution of the doctrine. For example, it addresses the 
question of why did the courts find it necessary to develop the doctrine? Why do the 
courts deliberate on the doctrine? Why is it being pleaded in the courts? Why do the 
courts enforce the doctrine? What are the implications of estoppel for legal practice? 
What is the theoretical basis of estoppel, and how is estoppel justifiable both in theory 
and in practice? These are some of the glaring gaps in the existing literature of 
estoppel that need to be addressed to lend greater clarity and insight into the 
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doctrine, and which this thesis has sought to redress. Legal scholars35 have largely 
investigated the holistic nature of the doctrine such as the different forms of 
proprietary estoppel; its development and how it is applied by the courts; discussed 
the decided cases and the future of the doctrine. They have not considered the 
theoretical and practical efficacy of the doctrine by meticulous scrutiny of the decided 
cases from its genesis in the Earl of Oxford’s Case36 to the most recent case in Gee v 
Gee37. Every chapter of the thesis presents a unique perspective of the doctrine that 
has not been explored in the existing literature.  
 
The thesis is a unique presentation of proprietary estoppel to suggest possible avenues 
for reform to assist in the future clarification of aspects of the doctrine. For example, 
issues such as lengthy and costly litigation, or unpredictability of outcome in terms of 
interpretation of facts to determine whether the components of estoppel are factually 
present are just some of the pervasive challenges that befall the doctrine. The thesis 
augments the existing literature by providing the gateway for estoppel to be reformed 
and revolutionized to be more efficacious in legal practice.  
 
The recommendations presented towards the end of the thesis are original, 
unprecedented and significant as they propose a unique proprietary estoppel model 
by which both parties to a claim in proprietary estoppel can be winners.  
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Proprietary estoppel has exerted its influence in English law since 1615 in the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case38, and will likely be of greater influence if appropriate measures are 
adopted to secure its enhanced efficacy for the benefit of claimants who rely on it and 
the judiciary who seek to apply it.  
 
The novelty and relevance of the thesis, compounded with the challenges it seeks to 
elucidate, render it a distinct and significant contribution to legal knowledge. Also, in 
unravelling what has been left unknown and undiscovered about estoppel, the thesis 
will emerge as uniquely relevant, interesting and engaging throughout.  
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Chapter One: The Nature of Proprietary Estoppel 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter elucidates the nature and purpose of proprietary estoppel. It aims to 
provide insight into the function of the doctrine to discern why it is, and has been 
deployed as an equitable concept and remedy since its inception. The chapter is a 
prelude to the ensuing assessment of the development of proprietary estoppel, the 
theoretical perspectives which influenced and underpinned it, the limitations of the 
doctrine and its judicial application. Via the detailed analysis of case law contained in 
this thesis, the essence of and significance of proprietary estoppel will emerge to an 
extent not previously explored in established literature39.  
 
1.2  Definition of Proprietary Estoppel 
According to Lord Denning, “The word “estoppel” only means stopped”40.  This 
connotes varying ideas of restraint, restriction and control. It prevents a party from 
adducing evidence to contradict their previous assertions. 
 
Despite its considerable influence over the past centuries in creating an interest in 
land, proprietary estoppel has not been defined by the courts.  
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In the significant House of Lords decision in Thorner v Major41, Lord Walker remarked 
that there is no definition of proprietary estoppel: 
An academic authority (Gardner: An Introduction to Land Law (2007) 
p.101) has recently commented: ‘There is no definition of proprietary 
estoppel that is both comprehensive and uncontroversial (and many 
attempts at one have been neither).42 
 
Nor is prior case law any more definitive, as proprietary estoppel is more often 
described but not defined.  
 
In Crab v Arun District Council43, Lord Denning construed proprietary estoppel as a 
fundamental principle preventing a party from insisting on their strict legal rights 
whether arising under a contract, a title deed or by statute when it would be 
inequitable to do so having regard to the prior dealings between the parties.  
 
Similarly, Scott L.J. asserted in Layton v Martin44 that proprietary estoppel is 
concerned with the question of whether a landowner can insist on his or her strict 
legal rights to defeat an expectation of an interest in land that was created, and was 
acted upon to the other party’s detriment.  
 
Thus, proprietary estoppel is described as a doctrine of equity, and not of common 
law, concerning the disposition of property based on the dealings of parties. It 
prohibits a party from averring a different state of affairs by words or conduct where 
another has been led to believe in a prior state of fact.   
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Academic commentators have likewise described proprietary estoppel as a doctrine 
devised by the courts to address unconscionable conduct in the transactions of parties. 
 
For example, Gray and Gray45 epitomizes the doctrine of proprietary estoppel as a 
fortress against unconscionable dealings in land in the following terms: 
…[T]he doctrine of proprietary estoppel gives expression to a general 
judicial distaste for any attempt by a legal owner unconscientiously to 
resile from assumptions which were previously understood, and acted 
upon, as the basis for relevant dealings in respect of his land.46 
 
Here, proprietary estoppel is described as a doctrine of equity and not of law, that 
concerns the disposition of property based on the understanding of parties.  
 
John Mee47 also states that proprietary estoppel is a judicial doctrine which creates a 
proprietary interest in land, and which precludes the necessity of a deed, registered 
disposition or written contract for the creation or transfer of an interest in land.  
 
Likewise, John Cartwright48 articulated that proprietary estoppel operates to restrain a 
party from promising, assuring or representing that which they know is false, and also 
to preclude a party from denying that which they had affirmed. 
 
Ben McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins and Sarah Nield49 also interpreted the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel as “a means by which a party (B) can gain some protection 
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against an owner of land (A), even if he or she has no contract with A and even if A has 
not formally given B a property right in relation to A’s land”50. 
 
The various descriptions of proprietary estoppel demonstrate that it is a judicial 
doctrine capable of creating an informal interest in land which would otherwise be 
unenforceable by law. As an equitable doctrine that is driven by conscience and 
unconscionability, it considers the dealings of the parties rather than the strict legal 
rights of the parties. The broad application of the doctrine to enforce informal dealings 
holds a landowner conscientiously liable to satisfy his or her promise for an interest in 
land.   
 
The soundness of the doctrine, as described, is determined by the consistency of 
approach adopted by the courts whereby a party is held to be bound in varying 
circumstances whether it be a contract, a promise or by words or conduct to prevent 
unconscionable behaviour. It prevents reliance on strict legal rights, and also prevents 
a party from resiling from a promise asserted where another has relied thereon to 
their detriment. Also, it enforces the informal dealings or arrangements between 
parties, and is not restrained or constrained by formality.51 Further, proprietary 
estoppel limits or extinguishes the legal right to land in the face of equity for the 
unconscionable or inequitable dealings between parties. Any difficulty in foreseeing 
the precise outcome on the particular facts of a case is attributable to the 
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interpretation by the courts when determining whether each of the requisite 
components of estoppel are satisfied. However, this potential unpredictability in 
outcome is an inevitable by-product of the litigation process and does not impinge 
upon the consistent adherence by the courts to the quintessential purpose of 
proprietary estoppel, that of preventing unconscionable behavior by a legal owner of 
land who seeks to deny the claimant’s “rights” founded upon detrimental reliance on a 
representation by the landowner for an interest in land.   
 
1.3  What is the Crux of Proprietary Estoppel?  
In Cave v Mills52, Wilde B described estoppel as a mechanism that prevents a party 
from affirming and denying their actions as follows: 
A man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold—to affirm at one time 
and deny at another—making a claim on those whom he has deluded to 
their disadvantage, and founding that claim on the very matters of the 
delusion. Such a principle has its basis in common sense and common 
justice, and whether it is called “estoppel”, or by any other name, it is 
one which Courts of law have in modern times most usefully adopted.53 
 
Thus, proprietary estoppel is a principle of common sense and common justice that 
prevents a party from asserting and denying his or her representations, where another 
has acted thereon to their disadvantage.  
 
Lord Denning also described estoppel as a device of equity that prohibits 
unconscionable conduct as follows:   
…is a principle of justice and of equity. It comes to this when a man, by his 
words or conduct, has led another to believe that he may safely act on the 
faith of them – and the other does act on them – he will not be allowed to 
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go back on what he has said or done when it would be unjust or 
inequitable for him to do so.54 
 
Here, estoppel prohibits a party from denying what they have affirmed when another 
has relied on it to his or her detriment. The intervention of equity mitigates the rigour 
of the common law by seeking to address unconscionable behavior on the part of a 
legal owner of land who attempts to renege upon a prior representation to the 
claimant.  
 
Thus, proprietary estoppel may arise in varying circumstances such as: where A has led 
B to believe that A will bequeath his farm to B at death and B works on the farm 
without pay in the expectation of inheriting the farm; but A dies leaving a will for the 
estate to A’s children instead, then proprietary estoppel will intervene to enforce A’s 
promise to B. Similarly, where X moves in with Y on Y’s promise that X will inherit Y’s 
house at death, and X expends money repairing the home but Y dies intestate, then 
proprietary estoppel will intervene to enforce Y’s promise to X.  
 
The role and operation of proprietary estoppel was summarized by Stephen Moriarty 
as follows: 
The role of proprietary estoppel seems self-evident: it provides for the 
informal creation of interests in land whenever a person has acted 
detrimentally in reliance upon an oral assurance that he has such an 
interest. Oral grants of interests by themselves, therefore are insufficient; 
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but act in reliance upon some such assurance, and proprietary estoppel 
will validate what the law of property says has no effect.55  
 
Hence, proprietary estoppel arises where a party suffers a detrimental reliance on an 
assurance of an interest in land, and the landowner has acted unconscionably to 
enforce his or her strict legal rights in denial of the assurance made. Equity acts against 
the conscience of a landowner to enforce the promise made.  
 
Dixon56, also asserts that proprietary estoppel is a method of creating informal rights 
in land. The estoppel in its own right is not binding, but it engenders a proprietary 
right, and this right is binding on the promisor. Proprietary estoppel relies on the 
intervention of equity to alleviate the consequences of the lack of formality 
requirements of the common law or statute such as contracts for the sale of land 
created by Section 2(1) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 198957, 
or by deeds required to convey land under Section 52(1) of the Law of Property Act 
1925 which must comply with the formalities contained in Section 1 of the Law of 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. Hence, proprietary estoppel is the 
exception that sidesteps the formality requisites for the creation of estates and 
interests in land.  Thus, the propensity of proprietary estoppel to bypass the formality 
requisites in creating an interest in land is largely amplified by the courts in case law.  
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In Crab v Arun District Council58, Lord Denning M.R. articulated that the consequence 
of estoppel for the true owner of land may be the loss of title as follows: 
…his own title to the property, be it land or goods had been held to be 
limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been created 
therein and this operates by reason of his conduct – what he has led the 
other to believe – even though he never intended it.59 
 
This illustrates that proprietary estoppel gives rise to a new equitable interest that is 
enforceable against the promisor or representor. The interest created will manifest the 
promise or representation made, the detrimental reliance thereon or the expectation 
created or encouraged. 
 
For example, in Greasley v Cooke60 the plaintiff had assured the defendant that she 
could live in the house for as long as she wished. The defendant remained in the house 
caring for the family without payment. The claimant brought possession proceedings. 
The court held that an equity in the defendant’s favour was raised, and she was 
entitled to occupy the house rent free as long as she wished.  
 
Similarly, in Re Basham61 the claimant had worked many years caring for her mother 
and stepfather in reliance of the promise that she would inherit the stepfather’s house 
at death. The stepfather died without leaving a will, but the court granted the claimant 
a proprietary estoppel on the basis that her stepfather had encouraged her 
expectation and reliance on his assurances of inheriting the house.  
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The above authorities reflect the principle of proprietary estoppel as established by 
Lord Denning in Crab v Arun62 that a landowner is held bound by his or her promise for 
an interest in land where the other party has acted on that promise to his or her 
detriment. Hence, proprietary estoppel not only binds a landowner to his or her 
promise, but also requires the landowner to surrender the interest promised.  
 
Proprietary estoppel is thus a restraint or bar against the words or conduct of a party 
which leads another to alter their previous position. The operation of estoppel as a bar 
to prevent inequitable or unconscionable conduct ensures that parties are not 
prejudiced or suffer loss or damage by the words or conduct of others. However, since 
human nature is so unpredictable, it raises the question of how can a party know that 
he or she may be held liable for their words or conduct. For example, words may be 
said in jest or carelessly or recklessly but may still be binding against a party 
unbeknown to that party. Hence, estoppel binds a party irrespective of whether their 
actions were intended.  
 
1.4  Benefits of Proprietary Estoppel  
Case law illustrates the immense benefits of proprietary estoppel, and its flexibility to 
be applied in a wide range of circumstances: 
First, proprietary estoppel prevents reliance on strict legal rights where it is 
inequitable or unconscionable to do so. The underlying principle of the doctrine 
prevents a landowner from denying his or her assertions or from resiling from the 
promise made for an interest in land.  
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For example, in Lothian v Dixon63 the claimants had moved from their home in 
Scotland to support and care for a family member on the promise of her entire estate 
upon death. The deceased’s will instead bequeathed the estate in half share to the 
claimants and another cousin. The claimants brought a claim in proprietary estoppel, 
and the court ruled that in spite of the deceased’s will, the claimants were entitled to 
the entire estate on the grounds of proprietary estoppel. The promises of the 
deceased were clear, certain and continued until her death, and the claimants had 
suffered a detriment that was substantial in reliance and expectation of those 
promises. This case illustrates the precedence of proprietary estoppel over a 
testamentary disposition contained in a will in circumstances where the promise had 
created an equity in the property. The claimants’ equity in the property was given 
priority over the testamentary disposition of the deceased, and hence the second 
defendant could not enforce her entitlement or strict legal rights to a half share under 
the testamentary disposition. The basis of equity in proprietary estoppel enables 
transactions to be judged on the basis of unconscionability, rather than strict law so as 
to broaden the scope of remedies in a particular case.  
 
Second, proprietary estoppel considers all the facts and circumstances of a case to 
determine whether a party has acted inequitably or unconscionably toward another. 
For example, in Southwell v Blackburn64 an unmarried couple had moved in together 
in a house selected by the respondent. The house was bought in the claimant’s sole 
name. The relationship broke down and the appellant changed the locks to the 
property. The respondent applied to the court for an equal share in the property. The 
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Court of Appeal held that the respondent had an equitable interest arising from 
proprietary estoppel in the home as the appellant had assured the respondent of a 
secure home to which the respondent had given up her accommodation in reliance of 
that promise. The court articulated that although the parties moving in together was 
not specific as to the ownership of the home that they were moving into, it was 
specific as to the nature and commitment of the appellant to provide secure 
accommodation for the respondent. The court also held that it would be 
unconscionable for the appellant to retract from his promise and not return the 
respondent to the position she was in before she gave up her house to move in with 
him. This remedy takes into consideration all the circumstances of the case and the 
conduct of the parties to produce a fair and just outcome. 
 
Third, proprietary estoppel applies where a person has induced another to believe in a 
certain state of affairs, and that person has acted in reliance thereon to their 
detriment. The expectation arises from that person’s reliance on a promise or 
representation made and has thereby altered their position. For example, in the case 
of Bradbury v Taylor65 a young couple moved from their home to that of their elderly 
relative in reliance on a promise that he would leave them his house and land in return 
for their care of him. The defendants argued that no detriment had been suffered, as 
the claimants lived rent free in the premises. The Court of Appeal held that the move 
itself amounted to detrimental reliance even though there were substantial benefits 
for the family arising from the move. The promise was a specific bargain and the 
claimants had kept their side of the bargain. Hence, the court will seek to enforce the 
expectation created where a detriment has been suffered.  
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Fourth, it enforces informal promises or oral arrangements between parties. 
Proprietary estoppel is a remedy against informality in circumstances where the 
defendant relies on formality. It applies principles of conscience and not strict law. For 
example, in Thorner v Major66 David (D) worked on Peter’s (P) farm for thirty years 
being unpaid and working long hours. P had assured D that D would inherit his estate 
at death but had changed his will and disinherited D. The House of Lords (now 
Supreme Court) held that although there was no legally binding agreement, it would 
be unconscionable if the promise or assurance was not kept. An oral assurance or 
representation will bind another party who has acted unconscionably in their 
transaction.   
 
Likewise, in the case of Lester & Hardy v Woodgate & Woodgate67 a neighbour, Lester 
& Hardy (LH) had in 1980 granted another neighbour, Woodgate & Woodgate (WW) 
an easement over a pathway on land owned by (LH). Nineteen years later, LH 
developed the land as a car park without any objections from WW who had the benefit 
of the easement. Both properties were sold and the new owners of WW’s land sought 
an injunction to enforce the easement against the car park. The court held that since 
the previous owners (WW) had taken no action against the owner of the land (LH) for 
breach of the easement, then the easement was no longer enforceable despite being 
recorded by deed. Further, the easement had lapsed as WW had stood by and 
permitted LH to undertake the car park to prevent the use of the easement. It was 
therefore held unconscionable for the new owner to seek to enforce a right that their 
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predecessors had given up. Equitable estoppel will not permit the formality 
requirements of common law or statute to override unconscionable conduct.  
 
Fifth, proprietary estoppel creates substantive rights in property. In such cases, the 
equity of estoppel can only be satisfied by the promised entitlement to be transferred 
or granted to the claimant. For example, in Pascoe v Turner68 the defendant had 
assured the plaintiff, with whom he formerly cohabited, that the house in which they 
lived was hers and the plaintiff had expended her limited resources in repairs and 
improvements to the house. The defendant filed action for possession. The Court of 
Appeal held that defendant’s promise and encouragement to the plaintiff to improve 
the house in the belief that the house was hers had created a proprietary estoppel. 
The court also held that the defendant’s ruthless conduct in seeking to evict the 
plaintiff was a ground for ordering the defendant to convey the fee simple to the 
plaintiff.  
 
Likewise, in Dillwyn v Llewelyn69 a father had promised property to his son. The son 
took possession of the lands and expended monies to build a house and to make 
improvements to the property. The father died and had not bequeathed the lands to 
his son. The court ordered the trustees to convey the land to the son. Thus, the court 
translated the son’s expectation of rights into a proprietary entitlement.  
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Alternatively, to a proprietary right, the court may grant a right to occupy or monetary 
compensation.70 For example, in Greasley v Cooke71, the defendant was granted a life 
interest in the home; and in Inwards v Baker72, the son was granted a licence to 
remain in the bungalow built on his father’s land. In Gillett v Holt73, the claimant was 
awarded compensation in the sum of £100,000, in addition to the freehold of the 
farmhouse being excluded from the defendant’s farm and farming business, and in 
Campbell v Griffin74, the claimant was awarded the sum of £35,000 rather than a life 
interest in the property. In Powell v Benney75, a couple was awarded the sum of 
£20,000 for their detrimental reliance on a promise to inherit two properties in a will. 
In some circumstances, the court has also granted right of way as in ER Ives 
Investment Ltd v High76, and Sommer v Sweet77 and an easement in Crab v Arun 
District Council78. The cases illustrate that the courts have adopted a wide range of 
interests to appropriately satisfy the estoppel equity. As their Lordships expressed in 
Plimmer v City of Wellington Corporation79, in granting a remedy “the court must look 
at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied.”   
 
Sixth, proprietary estoppel grants a remedy that is proportionate to the detriment 
suffered in a particular case. According to Mason CJ in Commonwealth of Australia v 
Verwayen80 “a central element of estoppel doctrine is that there must be a 
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proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to 
avoid”81. Proportionality applies where an equity has arisen on the facts of the case 
and the court will grant the minimum equity to do justice82.  
 
For example, in Jennings v Rice83, J worked as a gardener for R (a childless widow) for 
many years. J and his wife took care of R without payment on R’s promise that R 
‘would be alright’ and that her house (worth over £400,000) would be his ‘one day’. R 
died intestate and J made a claim in proprietary estoppel. The Court of Appeal held 
there was a proprietary estoppel on the facts and upheld the award of £200,000 for 
the costs of care. The court asserted that any larger award would be disproportionate 
to what J might have charged for his services. Robert LJ expressed that “The essence of 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary to avoid an 
unconscionable result, and a disproportionate remedy cannot be the right way of 
going about that”84.  
 
Likewise, in the case of Henry v Henry85 the promise was that the whole of the 
promisor’s share of land would be the promisee’s if he cultivated it and cared for the 
promisor. The promisee’s reliance on the promise to his detriment gave rise to a 
proprietary estoppel but the equity was satisfied by an award of one half of the 
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promisor’s share in the land. The award had been reduced below the promise 
specified to the promisor, as the promisee had not only suffered a detriment but had 
also derived benefits from the land being in occupation rent free and being allowed to 
keep some of the fruits of the land, or to sell any surplus and keep the proceeds. Their 
Lordships pronounced that “Proportionality lies at the heart of the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel and permeates its every application”. Hence, the courts award a 
remedy in proprietary estoppel that is proportionate to the detriment suffered or the 
expectation created or encouraged.  
 
Seventh, that the court exercises a principled discretion in determining a remedy in 
proprietary estoppel to ensure that the defendant is not adversely affected by its 
decision. Robert Walker LJ in Jennings v Rice86, explained the principled discretion in 
proprietary estoppel as follows:  
…once the elements of proprietary estoppel are established an equity 
arises. The value of that equity will depend upon all the circumstances 
including the expectation and the detriment. The task of the court is to 
do justice. The most essential requirement is that there must be 
proportionality between the expectation and the detriment. [..] It cannot 
be doubted that in this, as in every other area of law, the court must take 
a principled approach, and cannot exercise a completely unfettered 
discretion according to the individual judge’s notion of what is fair in any 
particular case.87    
 
Thus, the court does not exercise an unfettered discretion in awarding a remedy 
in proprietary estoppel, but adopts a principled approach to do justice between 
the detriment suffered and the expectation created or encouraged.  
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For example, in Thorner v Major88 the promise made by Peter (P) to David (D) was that 
D would inherit P’s farm upon P’s death. Upon P’s promise, D’s proprietary estoppel 
claim had extended to the whole of P’s net estate. However, since P had revoked his 
will leaving the whole of his residuary estate to D, the House of Lords held that D was 
only entitled to the farm and certain related assets. Since D had not known about P 
revoking the will in D’s favour, the estoppel did not extend to parts of the estate that 
were unconnected with the farm. D was therefore granted the extent of the promise 
by P. 
 
Similarly, in Gee v Gee89 the promise made to the claimant by his father was that he 
would inherit the lion’s share of the farm. The father instead transferred all his shares 
in the farm to another son to disinherit the claimant. The claimant had devoted his 
whole life to the farm, and working for low wages and long hours in the expectation of 
inheriting the farm. The claimant was awarded the lion’s share in the farm in 
proprietary estoppel. The court granted the claimant 52% shares in the company and 
46% in the land with the remainder of shares to his parents. Hence, the claimant was 
granted the lion’s share of the farm as promised. The principled discretion of 
proprietary estoppel grants a remedy commensurate with the promise given and the 
detrimental reliance thereby.  
 
On analysis, the decided cases declare that the benefits of the doctrine are conferred 
by its application both as a cause of action and a defence. It can operate as a cause of 
action where a party has relied on an assurance by a landowner of a right or interest in 
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land and has suffered a detriment in reliance of the assurance. Proprietary estoppel 
can also operate as a defence against a landowner who seeks to enforce his or her 
strict legal rights against another to whom a right or interest in the land was promised. 
Hence, the broad application of the doctrine as a cause of action and a defence 
illustrates its benefit and efficacy in creating an interest in land. Moreover, Cooke90 
articulated that “Estoppel can prevent and accomplish so many things that it defies 
systematic description..”91, thereby asserting that its practical application is beyond 
description.  
 
1.5  Conclusion 
Proprietary estoppel is a doctrine of equity that infuses morality and conscience into 
land transactions. It enables interests in land to arise without legal formalities where 
equity intervenes to preclude unconscionable conduct on the part of a legal owner of 
land. A judgment relying on proprietary estoppel is a judgment of conscience based on 
all the facts and circumstances of a case. The courts have deployed the conscience-
based jurisdiction of equity to arrive at morally well-founded decisions.  
 
Proprietary estoppel has the capacity to hold parties bound by their words or conduct, 
irrespective of whether such outcome was ever contemplated, and confers a remedy 
where none would otherwise be available. For example, where a landowner assures a 
neighbour for a right of way over property but later renege on that promise, then the 
landowner will be held liable; or where a father promises his farm to his son at death 
in return for working on the farm for no wages, but dies without leaving a will to the 
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son, then the son’s equity in working the farm creates an equitable interest that entitle 
him to the farm. Hence, proprietary estoppel enforces a right or entitlement that 
would otherwise be unenforceable by law.  
 
The decided cases show the doctrine is capable of application to a wide range of facts, 
where a landowner has led another to change his or her position in reliance on the 
landowner’s promise or assurance. Mr. Justice Danckwerts in Inwards v Baker92 
articulated that with such change of position, equity protects the party so that an 
injustice is not perpetrated by the landowner. The benefit of proprietary estoppel is 
also demonstrated by its propensity to limit or extinguish rights in land based on words 
or conduct. The interposition of equity creates substantive rights in land. Lord Denning 
M.R. in Crab v Arun District Council93, advocated that the core of the doctrine is the 
intervention of equity so that whatever was assured, promised or represented and was 
acted upon is already done in equity. Thus, proprietary estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine that is designed to redress the insistence of the common law on formality in 
the context of dealings with land.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the influence of historical and social changes on the 
development of common law and equity.  
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Chapter Two: The Influence of Social Change on the Development of Equity against 
the backdrop of the Common Law 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter illustrates how social change has influenced the respective development 
of common law and equity, the corollary being the extent to which common law and 
equity have impacted upon the social order. As will emerge, events such as the Black 
Death (1348-51) and the Industrial or Economic Revolution (1760-1840) indirectly 
accelerated the development of equitable concepts. The consequential analysis 
produces a rich tapestry involving the relationship and interplay between common law 
and equity, demonstrating how social and historic events appear to have influenced 
the development of these two bodies of law.  
 
The ensuing elucidation in the specific context of the interrelationship between social 
and legal change, and the development of common law and equity in response to the 
changing social order, is arguably distinct from the typical methods applied by legal 
scholars94. Existing academic commentary95 tends to provide a discursive account of 
the topics under scrutiny rather than formulating debate about the co-relationship 
between historical events and the development of legal and equitable concepts and 
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principles. This chapter seeks to present a comprehensive compilation of prior 
scholarly exposition of the evolution of common law and equity and the influence of 
social change on the development of these two bodies of law. In contrast, most legal 
scholars96 tend not to identify precisely how, why and which specific social events 
transformed common law and equity.  
 
Also considered here is the doctrine of estoppel in light of, and against the backdrop of 
its historical foundation and subsequent evolution to determine whether or not, the 
concept has ameliorated the strictures of the common law. Established literature97 
tends to provide a descriptive account of the doctrine, rather than assessing the link 
between historical changes in society and their influence on the synthesis of the 
components underpinning estoppel and the increasing prevalence of litigation 
founded on it.  
 
The emergence of equity as a response to the deficiencies of the common law was 
crucial to the development of the doctrine of equitable estoppel which, in turn, led to 
the modern concept of proprietary estoppel, this being the focus of the thesis. This 
chapter explains how estoppel is closely interwoven within the overall evolution of 
                                                 
96
 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Fund Inc. 1986); E.H. Burn, Cheshire and Burn’s 
Modern Law of Real Property (16
th
 edn, Butterworths 2000); Gary Watt, Trusts & Equity (7
th
 edn, OUP 
2016); R. B. Mowat, A New History of Great Britain (OUP, 1992); Ralph V. Turner, Magna Carta: Through 
the Ages (Routledge, 2014); Rod Green, Magna Carta and All That (Andre Deutsch, 2015); Alastair 
Hudson, Understanding Equity & Trusts (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2008); Richard Edwards and Nigel Stockwell, 
Trusts and Equity (11
th
 edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2013); Mohamed Ramjohn, Unlocking Equity and 
Trusts (5
th
 edn, Routledge 2015) 
97
 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Fund Inc. 1986); E.H. Burn, Cheshire and Burn’s 
Modern Law of Real Property (16
th
 edn, Butterworths 2000); Gary Watt, Trusts & Equity (7
th
 edn, OUP 
2016); R. B. Mowat, A New History of Great Britain (OUP, 1992); Ralph V. Turner, Magna Carta: Through 
the Ages (Routledge, 2014); Rod Green, Magna Carta and All That (Andre Deutsch, 2015); Alastair 
Hudson, Understanding Equity & Trusts (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2008); Richard Edwards and Nigel Stockwell, 
Trusts and Equity (11
th
 edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2013); Mohamed Ramjohn, Unlocking Equity and 
Trusts (5
th
 edn, Routledge 2015) 
 
38 
 
equitable concepts. It also seeks to illustrate how the development of estoppel is 
arguably the by-product of the changing needs of society and the requisite legal 
response to the consequential challenges thereby presented. It is artificial, therefore, 
to scrutinize the doctrine of estoppel in isolation from the complex social and historical 
backdrop against which it evolved.   
 
2.2  Historical Change in England  
The period in England spanning the 11th to 19th centuries witnessed momentous 
political, social and economic upheaval sufficient to create the impetus for the 
development firstly of the common law and, secondly, of equity as a corrective, 
supplementary and ameliorative body of law. According to Hogue98, law reflects the 
character of the social order, such that societal changes precipitate a commensurate 
response from those responsible for making and applying the law.99 Hence the events 
that transpired in the 11th-19th centuries influenced the evolution of the prevailing and 
developing legal and regulatory framework and jurisdiction. For example, the Norman 
Conquest (1066) led to the rise of feudalism and the inauguration of common law, 
whilst the deficiencies in the common law in turn led to the emergence of equity. 
Likewise, the decline of feudalism precipitated by events such as the Black Death 
(1348-51) and the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453) created a society and economy 
founded on trade and commerce. Historical events, leading to the decline and 
eventual abolition of feudalism, together with other political and legal reforms created 
a new social order: the “socio-economic evolution of society”. Further, the deficiencies 
inherent in the common law acted as a catalyst for the development of equity and its 
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paradigm concept, the trust. Both the socio-economic evolution of society and the rise 
of equity illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the social order and the legal 
system which co-exists with it.  
 
2.3  Socio-economic Evolution of Society  
The gradual transition of English society, precipitated by key events such as the 
Norman Conquest (1066), the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), the Black Death 
(1348-51) and the Industrial Revolution (1760-1840), witnessed the birth of the 
common law, the genesis of equity and the subsequent development of both bodies of 
law.  
 
2.3.1  Feudalism 
Social change in England began with the Norman Conquest (1066) and the introduction 
of feudalism. It created a localized system of governance, justice and security. 
According to Jupp100, the feudal system was imposed in England following the Norman 
Conquest as follows:  
In England, following the Norman Conquest in the eleventh century, the 
continental feudal system was super-imposed on the existing Saxon 
tenure of land, which had already developed some of its 
characteristics.101  
 
Thus, the Norman Conquest heralded the imposition of the feudal system in English 
society. Feudalism comprised a system of exchange of land for military service 
introduced by William the Conqueror (William I) to reward his supporters for their 
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support in the conquest of England.102 The monarch held all land and estates, and the 
land was granted to the lords or nobles who in turn sub-divided the land to peasants 
(tenants).103  It created a pyramid or hierarchy of tenure whereby the medieval nobles 
or lords provided trained soldiers to fight for the king and clothes and weapons for the 
soldiers.104  Medieval peasants worked the lords’ lands and paid dues in exchange for 
the use of the land.105 The dues were in the form of labour on the lord’s land.106 The 
lords or barons governed the estates, administered justice and levied taxes on the 
peasants.107 The medieval feudal system created a land-based economy with 
production for subsistence and with no land rights for the peasants.  
 
It gave rise to a socio-economic relationship and interdependence whereby land was 
the exclusive union between the nobles and tenants. According to Burn108, “feudalism 
implied a reciprocity of rights and duties. The lord gained in dignity and entitled to 
personal services, while the tenant obtained security.”109 The land-holding relationship 
was binding in providing security and obligations. He described the relationship thus: 
A state of society in which the main social bond is the relation between 
lord and man, relation implying on the lord’s part protection and 
defence; on the man’s part protection, service and reverence, the service 
including service in arms. This personal relation is inseparably involved in 
a proprietary relation, the tenure of land – the man holds of the lord, the 
man’s service is a burden on the land, the lord had important rights in the 
land.110 
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Thus, the feudal system involved an asymmetric relationship whereby the lord held the 
rights to the land, and the bondsman was tied to the land in exchange for protection.  
Burn111 also asserts that one of the effects of feudalization was the system of land 
tenure it created whereby land became the exclusive bond in society as follows: 
When the country settled down after the upheaval of the Norman 
conquest, the social bond which both on the public and on private side of 
life united men together in a political whole was the land. Broadly 
speaking, land constituted the sole form of wealth, and it was through its 
agency that the everyday needs of governing and the governed classes 
were satisfied.112  
 
Thus, feudalism propounded a system of personal and proprietary subordination 
founded on the land which maintained the social order and mutual sustenance.   
 
In commenting on the feudal system of land tenure, Jupp113 similarly states that:  
Land everywhere was held in return for payment in service – military, civil 
or personal – or in money. […..] The basis of contribution to the revenue 
of the Crown was the land which provided the subject with the means 
with which to pay.114 
 
Hence, land was the most significant form of revenue and of wealth in feudal society.  
Jupp115 explains that the major effect of the Norman Conquest was the creation of the 
system of Crown ownership of all lands which characterizes English land ownership. He 
describes the influence of the Norman Conquest on English land law as follows: 
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William regarded the whole of England as his by conquest, whence the 
doctrine of present day English law that all land is owned by the Crown 
and   that the highest estate a man may have is a tenancy in fee simple.116  
 
Thus, the Norman Conquest established a system of land ownership within the 
absolute dominion of the Crown. The concept of Norman kingship permanently 
influenced English property law by its recognition of the sovereign as the supreme 
landlord of the realm.117 “Socage tenure”118 survived into the twentieth century and, 
since 1925, became predominant in England.119  
 
The decline and eventual abolition of the feudal system by the Tenures Abolition Act 
1660, was promulgated by a catalogue of haphazard events that occurred between the 
period 1337 to 1660, including the Black Death (1348-51), the Hundred Years’ War 
(1337-1453) and a series of political and legal reforms (1215-1660).  
 
2.3.2  The Hundred Years’ War 
The ravages caused by the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453) shifted the power from 
the feudal lords to the common people.120 It involved a series of wars for the control of 
lands in France led by the English kings: Edward III (1327-1377), Richard II (1377-1399), 
Henry IV (1399-1413), Henry V (1413-1422) and Henry VI (1422-1461).121 The English 
had claimed lands in France as their fiefs, but the French disputed the claim, and when 
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King Phillip VI of France declared that the French fiefs of England were part of the 
realm of France, war broke out.122 During the conflicts, the King no longer relied on the 
nobles to supply knights for the armies, but instead collected taxes and raised armies 
from the common folk.123 The impact of nobles and knights on the battlefield was 
eliminated, as the peasants were directly engaged on behalf of the sovereign.124 The 
Hundred Years’ War marked the ‘turning point’ or ‘watershed’ that established 
nationalism and nationalist concepts in both England and France.125   
 
Postan126 discusses how the impact of the Hundred Years’ War on the feudal system 
led to the demise of feudal tenure. He asserted thus: 
It began with a break in prices in the opening decades of the fourteenth 
century, and was accentuated by shortage of labour and of tenants in the 
second half of the century. The falling profits of cultivation led to the 
leasing out of demesne lands and of customary holdings, and this 
produced a fall in land values ...127  
 
Thus, the labour shortage, falling profits and loss of revenue from the land led to the 
decline of feudalism and the dependency on land as the source of wealth.   
 
Significantly, the Hundred Years’ War also influenced the development of the common 
law in that, following the Norman Conquest, French was the primary language of the 
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English courts whilst by the end of the Hundred Years’ War, this had changed to 
English.128 England was defeated in this War, and because the French language was 
considered that of the enemy, it had to be discarded.129  
 
2.3.3  The Black Death 
The Black Death (1348-1351) caused by the bubonic plague, infested many towns and 
villages causing widespread death.130 There were insufficient people to work the fields 
and the peasants who survived demanded more wages and rights for their labour, 
thereby reducing the landowners’ profits131. This weakened the feudal system by 
reducing the power of feudal lords. Hence, the Black Death shifted the power from the 
feudal lords to the common people, who controlled the labour supply. The effect of 
the Black Death on the feudal holdings is described as follows:  
So terrible was the visitation that in the rural districts it may be estimated 
from the evidence that not less than one-third perhaps a full half of the 
population was swept away. The fields were left untilled and there was a 
terrible scarcity of food. The demand for labour greatly exceeded the 
supply while the price of provisions rose. The labourer demanded higher 
wages. High wages and high cost of living reacted on each other; the men 
would not work except at prices which from the landowners’ point of 
view were extortionate.132 
 
Thus, the Black Death decimated the peasant population and created a labour 
shortage with demands for higher wages to work the land.  
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According to Robbins133, the Black Death also led to the peasants’ abandonment of the 
manors134 to the neighbouring towns to escape serfdom: 
The English villien lured by the prospect of high wages in neighbouring 
towns must sooner or later have deserted his manor. The plague and the 
attendant disorder furnished him an excuse. And in so far as it furnished 
him an excuse for desertion, it played its part in the breakdown of the old 
manorial system.135  
 
Hence, the Black Death not only caused a severe labour shortage, but also occasioned 
the commutation to the towns and cities in lure of high wages in industry, and greater 
opportunities for deriving a livelihood.   
 
Following the Black Death and the labour shortage that ensued, the lords considered 
the higher wages demanded by the peasants as insubordination.136 In response, King 
Edward II passed the Ordinance of Labourers 1349 followed by the Statute of 
Labourers 1351, which returned the wages of the peasants to those of the pre-plague 
era and ordained that food be sold at prices established before the Black Death.137 The 
peasants were also being heavily taxed on their low wages, and were precluded in 
practical terms from migrating from their locality to seek higher wages elsewhere.138 
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The imposition of these rigid laws, following the Black Death, caused grievance 
amongst the peasants.139   
 
Notwithstanding the hardship which the Black Death and its aftermath engendered, 
this post Black Death era was an effective catalyst for the development of equity. 
According to Watt140, the high volume of litigation caused by the Black Death led to 
the evolution of equity as an independent body of law as follows: 
By the end of the fourteenth century, the Chancellor was dispensing 
justice on his own authority from his base at Westminster Hall (in the 
middle of that century, litigation caused by the Black Death had caused 
the common law courts to be overwhelmed). As petitions to the 
Chancellor grew in number throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, the Court of Chancery expanded and records of the 
Chancellor’s decisions gradually acquired the status of a separate body of 
legal authority distinct from the common law.141 
 
Hence, the volume of litigation spawned by legislative measures enacted after the 
Black Death, inadvertently contributed to the burgeoning role of the Lord Chancellor in 
the dispensation of a new body of law called ‘equity’.  
 
2.3.4  The Peasants’ Revolt 
Apart from the Black Death, adding further to the grievance of the peasants was the 
poll (head) tax introduced in 1380 by King Richard II to support the wars. The poll tax 
required the population over the age of fifteen to pay one shilling in cash and not farm 
produce, which appeared to be an intolerable and unjust burden affecting the poor 
than the rich nobles.142   
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In Kent, a peasant, Wat Tyler clashed with a tax collector who insulted his daughter.143 
Other peasants converged together in support of their comrade which resulted in a 
revolt in Kent, that followed to other counties in north-east London.144 Peasants from 
Kent on the South, and from Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex and Hertfordshire on the North 
had marched to London where revolt and violence ensued in 1381.145 The outbreak 
was in protest against serfdom, the poll tax and the right to occupy land at a 
reasonable rent.146 Richard II agreed to the demands of the peasants, specifically to 
abolish serfdom.147 However, serfdom was not immediately abolished as King Richard 
failed to honour the concessions made to the peasants, and Parliament equally 
favoured the repudiation of the promises made to the peasants. Parliament ruled the 
promises made to the peasants were invalid and illegal until confirmed by legislation, 
which it refused to enact.  
 
Although the Peasants Revolt did not abolish serfdom, it created an awareness 
amongst the nobles of the peasants’ opposition to it. Mowat148 argues that this 
gradually led to a new system of land tenure that contributed to the decline of 
serfdom as follows:  
In spite of its apparent failure, the peasants’ revolt in the long run 
contributed greatly to put an end to villeinage. To avoid the continual 
friction caused by trying to keep his villeins to their labour services, the 
lord began again to accept quit-rents. This meant that the labour services 
of a villein were ‘commuted’ for a fixed annual payment, for instance, 
seven pence an acre. The agreement was recorded in the rolls of the 
manor, and a copy of it was given to the villein, who thenceforth held his 
land by ‘copy’. So long as he held his copy, and paid his dues, the 
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copyholder was in a secure position, and almost as good as a 
freeholder.149 
 
Thus, the Peasants Revolt inadvertently contributed to the decline of serfdom and also 
led to a new system of land tenure characterized by a landlord-tenant relationship 
instead of lord and villein.  
 
2.3.5  The Agricultural Revolution 
Hogue150 asserts that the decline of feudalism was evident as early as the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, as “… agriculture flourished in an epoch of good markets and 
rising prices”151. There was growing prosperity in trade and commerce as the economy 
was being transformed by the industrialization process.  
Hogue152 describes the technological advances in agriculture as follows: 
…a revolution in agricultural techniques producing crop yields unknown 
to medieval cultivators. Innovators enclosed blocks of land, removing 
them from open fields; they added legumes and root crops to old 
rotation schemes; new horse drawn implements replaced hand hoeing; 
selective breeding improved cattle, sheep, horses, and swine which 
benefited from a new abundance of forage.153 
 
Thus, the agricultural revolution eliminated the reliance on feudal labour as new 
technology and techniques created more profits.  
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Postan154 also asserts that the decline of feudalism was caused in part by the 
agricultural revolution as follows:  
The closing hundred and fifty years of the Middle Ages were marked by a 
profound transformation of agriculture. The manorial system was 
breaking up all over the country. […] By the end of the fifteenth century, 
labour services, villeinage and cultivation by landlords or estate bailiffs 
were nearly everywhere replaced by copyholds, leaseholds and rent-
collecting land ownership.155 
 
Hence, the agricultural revolution considerably contributed to the decline of 
feudalism, as more revenue was being derived from the land by increased crop 
production and the collection of rents for farming from land ownerships.   
 
2.3.6  The Abolition of Feudalism  
Royal intervention finally heralded the demise of feudalism. King Edward I (1239) 
introduced legislation, which altered land rights, such as the Statute of Westminster II 
(1285) which regulated estates or interest in land and the Statute of Westminster III 
(1290) which created the alienation or sale of a tenure and prohibited sub-infeudation 
of land.  
 
The Statute of Westminster II created various estates in land such as the fee simple 
and fee tail for the succession of property, and also created two property interests 
namely: tenure by statute merchant and tenure by elegit for the protection of land and 
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chattels of debtors.  On the other hand, the Statue of Westminster III regulated the 
buying and selling of estates or tenures, protected feudal property interest and 
eliminated the addition of new links to the types of tenure by subinfeudation.  
 
The reign of Charles II (1660) introduced the Tenures Abolition Act (1660), which finally 
ended all vestiges of feudalism in England. Tenures were converted from feudal 
holdings to free and common socage involving taxation on the general public to 
provide an income for the monarch as a monetary replacement for the abolition of 
feudal tenures.   
 
2.3.7  Political and Legal Reform 
Political developments also led to the creation of parliamentary supremacy rather than 
monarchial rule. King John, in 1215, had signed the Magna Carta whereby the king was 
subject to the common law, as were his subjects. The barons rebelled against the high 
taxes imposed to support the French war156, and the invention of new writs by the king 
for new causes of action reduced the fees, fines and amercements obtained from the 
administration of justice.157 The king’s council created new writs or new remedies for 
new and difficult cases for which there was no existing writ, and as litigants sought the 
king’s justice, the business from the medieval royal courts administered by the nobles 
was curtailed. The rebellion by the barons led to the Magna Carta which protected 
their privileges, reduced taxes and provided that no new taxes could be imposed 
without the barons’ consent.   
                                                 
156
 Chris Berg and John Roskan, Magna Carta: The Tax Revolt That Gave Us Liberty (Institute of Public 
Affairs, 2015) 
157
 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Fund Inc. 1986)  
51 
 
King Edward I (1239) had also established a Model Parliament in 1291, which included 
commoners, low ranking clergy, church officials and nobles. This gave the common 
people an equal voice in government on par with the nobles. King Henry VII (1485) 
passed laws terminating the military power of the lords to raise armies to support their 
side. The English Civil War (1642-46), in part due to the King’s absolutist rule by Royal 
Prerogative led to the subsequent overthrow of King Charles 1. The King purported to 
use the discretion vested in him by equity/natural law principles to undermine the 
authority of the legislature (Parliament). Freeman158 articulates that the civil war led to 
a constitutional monarchy as parliament had overturned the absolutist power and 
right of the King. Power was vested both in the executive branch (monarchy) and the 
legislative branch (parliament) under the governance of a constitution.   
 
Following the Glorious Revolution (1688), William of Orange established a new 
legislature by allowing Parliament to pass the Bill of Rights which guaranteed 
Parliamentary sovereignty and supremacy over the King. Thus, a new Parliament 
signalled the development of new legislation for land ownership in England which, was   
ultimately manifested in statutes such as the Law of Property Act 1925, the Settled 
Land Act 1925, the Land Charges Act 1972 and the Land Registration Act 2002. These 
are very diverse pieces of legislation with differing objectives for property rights and 
interests.  
 
Legal reform by royal intervention in England also led to the establishment of the 
common law. King Henry II (1154) established the system of common law as the law of 
England. A writ system was established to create rights in property and rights against a 
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person. He created the court of King’s Bench to hear all matters of his subjects 
throughout the country. The principles of the common law emanated from these 
courts, and judge-made common law was the primary source of law applied 
throughout the country. Thus, the nobles no longer controlled the administration of 
justice in feudal strongholds as the royal courts took charge.  
 
According to Turner159, King Henry II transformed England’s law from customary norms 
to the common law which greatly undermined the feudal order as follows: 
Henry’s legal innovations transformed England’s law from customary 
norms into a legal system, a common law for the kingdom. They 
threatened magnates’ traditional control over their vassals or tenants, for 
knights and other free landholders could purchase royal writs transferring 
their lawsuits from their lords’ courts to the king’s court. The shire courts 
became temporary royal tribunals when justices from the king’s court 
arrived on their circuits about the counties. Wider access to royal justice 
began to undermine freeholders’ dependent relationship with their lords 
and to change their relationship into a reciprocal one of landlords’ and 
tenants’ rights.160  
 
Hence, the evolution of the common law also weakened the feudal system, and led to 
its decline and eventual abolition by the Tenures Abolition Act 1660. The wider access 
to the royal courts for justice undermined the dependency on the lord’s courts, and a 
reciprocal relationship of landlord and tenant evolved. Thus, the common law not only 
transformed the legal system, but also altered the social relationship between the 
nobles and peasants.  
  
2.3.8  The Industrial Revolution 
An Industrial Revolution (1760-1840) that created wealth by trade and commerce 
rather than the production of goods and services represented a radical departure from 
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the feudal system. It altered the system of wealth-holding from land, to wealth in 
money derived from trade and commerce. According to Burn161, the feudalistic society 
that satisfied the needs of a society based on the land had evolved into a commercial 
society based on money. He articulates that English society had progressively evolved 
from land to money, or land to trade.  
 
Hogue162 describes how commerce flourished with manufacturing and trade as 
follows: 
…in the eighteenth century, English sea power protected a volume of 
commerce with the Orient and America yielding profits unknown to 
medieval merchants. Inventors designed steam engines to pump water 
from coal mines and to supply power for machinery in factories where 
English workers turned out an incredible flow of goods for a world 
market.163  
 
Thus, trade and commerce yielded more profits than the land could have produced. 
Trade created a system of production for market in exchange for money, whereas 
feudalism was a system of production for use.164 Trade transformed wealth from land 
to the exchange of goods and services. The growth of trade gave rise to a money 
system which in turn created a middle class. Rod Green165 described the economic 
revolution and the rise of the middle class as follows: 
London was by far and away the largest and most important city in 
England, but there were new cities blossoming all over the country as 
trade within the country and with foreign territories expanded at a rate 
never before known. Merchants, tradesmen and professionals began to 
form a new, growing tier of society – the middle class …..166 
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Hence, as trade and commerce expanded in England, the engaging merchants, traders 
and professionals emanated as a middle class.  This middle class were paying taxes to 
the king and in return were provided with banking services, were offered protection 
and expanded territory for trade. The newly emerged middle class also helped the king 
to diminish the power of the nobles. The businessmen and traders provided the king 
with money to raise independent armies which eliminated the need for the king to rely 
on the nobles to provide military support. Also, new discoveries for weapons of war 
such as gun powder and the cannon reduced the King’s subjection and dependence on 
the nobles.   
 
Glassman167 describes the relationship between the king and middle class as follows: 
The kings gained money revenue from the city merchants and used this 
capital to fund huge palaces and a vast staff of bureaucrats, professional 
soldiers and war equipment. In return the king granted the city 
merchants land for commercial development and eventually the titles 
that went with such land-holdings.168  
 
Thus, a symbiotic relationship developed between the king and the middle class 
whereby the merchants obtained commercial holdings and title in exchange for 
revenue. 
 
With the growth of trade and commerce, and the conversion of the land from feudal 
to commercial use, new cities and towns grew which provided fresh employment 
opportunities. However, Glassman169 asserts that the Industrial Revolution did not 
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provide economic opportunity for all peasants, as those who could not find 
employment in the towns lived in poor conditions as follows:  
The poor peasants displaced relentlessly from their lands were absorbed 
in small numbers into the flourishing artisan trade of the free cities. 
However, the majority of them could not find work in the cities or the 
countryside. In Britain, France, Germany and other commercializing areas 
of Europe, these ex-peasants accumulated as vagrants and vagabonds 
living in squalor in both urban and rural settings.170  
 
Hence, the Industrial Revolution did not create prosperity for all the peasants, as some 
could not be gainfully employed to reap the benefits of the money economy.  
 
However, despite the hardship it created for many, the Industrial Revolution was 
instrumental in the development of equity, as the common law could not adequately 
deal with the commercial transactions of the industrial era. For example, the common 
law did not provide for the specific performance of a contract, but only provided for 
damages in breach. Hogue171, articulates that “… the common law of the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries is in large part the law of land and tenures, the law of property 
rights and services together with rules for procedure for the administration of 
justice.”172  He elaborates on the common law thus:   
Medieval common law was principally land law. Rules of land law first 
enforced in the reign of Henry II were later elaborated especially in the 
time of Edward I who provided for the alienation of freehold and for the 
creation of long term family property arrangements by means of 
conditional gifts. Land was the principal source of wealth in the middle 
ages and so continued until the commercial and industrial revolutions 
created alternative sources of personal property which in their turn fell 
under common law rules.173 
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Hence, the industrial revolution created challenges with which the legal system had to 
cope and adapt, not least in the formulation of appropriate rules to regulate 
commercial transactions.  
 
Hudson174, argues that the Industrial Revolution acted as a catalyst for the 
development of specific aspects of the common law, arising in the context of these 
commercial transactions, accompanied by the emergence of new equitable devices:  
….the common law developed to regulate commercial transactions and 
so forth. At the same time, equity was required to develop to provide a 
means of resolving disputes which arose out of that commercial activity 
but which the common law was not able to manage.175  
 
Thus, the common law was unable to deal adequately with the commercial disputes 
arising in the industrialized economy.  
 
Dobbs176 also stresses that the common law was inadequate to cope with an industrial 
economy:  
As England moved from an agrarian to a commercial economy, the pace 
of economic development overtook the legal system’s ability to provide 
new writs together with new remedies to meet new situations.177  
 
Hence, the industrialized society had moved ahead of the common law, creating the 
need for a new system of law to provide remedies for new transactions and disputes 
arising in a commercial economy.  
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Hogue178 asserts that the industrial economy created the impetus for the evolution of 
equity as follows:  
These changes in agriculture, commerce and manufacturing all 
demanded the organization of capital in new patterns. As new 
technology created wealth largely in the form of personal property, 
feudal land law obviously required additions.179 
 
Hence, the development of equity was significant in dealing with the challenges of the 
industrial era as social change required the concretization of equitable principles to 
facilitate trade and protect often newly-acquired family wealth.180  
 
Hudson181 also argues that the Industrial Revolution influenced the development of 
the trust as follows: 
…the trust became a more rigid institution in the 19th century as it was 
used by commercial people to develop the means of holding property 
and conducting trade during the social and industrial advances in Great 
Britain.182 
 
Thus, as the industrialized society advanced, it contributed to the utilization of the 
trust in relation to the creation of new initiatives to preserve wealth and property for 
future generations.   
 
Viewed retrospectively, the type of static socio-economic system, epitomized by the 
feudal system, propagated a related legal order conducive to the interests of the 
privileged classes. There was a rigorous class system whereby the nobles controlled all 
the land, whilst the peasants worked the land. Also, the feudal system provided armies 
                                                 
178
 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Fund Inc. 1986) 
179
 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Fund Inc. 1986), 248 
180
 Alastair Hudson, Understanding Equity & Trusts (2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2004) 5 
181
 Alastair Hudson, Understanding Equity & Trusts (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2008) 
182
 Alastair Hudson, Understanding Equity & Trusts (3
rd
 edn, Routledge 2008) 
58 
 
for war, meaning that the king was not bound to establish an independent army. 
However, the gradual decline and abolition of feudalism created a new system of land 
tenure such as leaseholds and copyholds, and a free market for the buying and selling 
of land. Further, the industrial economy changed the source of wealth from land to 
money, and to trade and commerce. Thus, society progressed from a feudal to an 
industrialized society, in parallel with the evolution of the common law and the 
development of equity to deal with the defects of the common law.  
 
2.4  The Rise of Equity 
Legal change in English society cannot be attributed to a single event, as it was the 
amalgam of the historic events including the Norman Conquest, the Hundred Years’ 
War, the Black Death, the Industrial Revolution and political reform which bestirred 
the modernization of England, and witnessed legal change via the evolution of 
common law and equity. The transformation of English law and society reflects that 
the progression of law is mobilized by a changing society and vice versa. As society 
evolved from feudalism to industrialization, the common law was inadequate to meet 
the changing needs of the society. Hence, the ongoing deficiencies of the common law 
influenced the evolution of equity.  
 
2.4.1  The Problems of the Common Law  
Following the Norman Conquest (1066), the common law became instilled as the law 
of England. Milsom183 describes the evolution of the common law as follows: 
The common law is the by-product of an administrative triumph, the way 
in which the government of England came to be centralised and 
specialised during the centuries after the Conquest.184 
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The use of writs was the machinery of the justice system of the common law.185 A writ 
created the concise formula for every private right or interest that was recognized by 
the royal courts.186 It was made at the instance of the complainant or plaintiff who 
alleged that a legal right had been infringed, and ordered the defendant to appear in 
the royal courts or other inferior court for justice, for the court to make a 
determination of the parties’ rights.187  
 
Over time, the common law operated repressively. It was dominated by procedure and 
formality that created oppression in the law.188 For example, the writ system became 
formal and technical as claims would be allowed only if they could fit into an existing 
writ. If there was no writ to match the circumstances of a particular case, then there 
was no remedy. Also, the failure to select the proper form of action or writ resulted in 
the dismissal of the suit. Even where a writ was obtained, the judges examined the 
validity of the writ rather than the merits of the claim. The plaintiff was also forced to 
select a remedy in advance, and could not later amend the pleadings to conform to the 
evidence presented.  
 
There was also a stultification of the writ system as the English feudal barons 
restrained the legal inventiveness of the King’s Council to create new writs or to 
recognize the propriety of a new cause of action.189 The creation of new writs by the 
king meant the baronial and local courts were in danger of losing the fees and fines 
obtained from the sale of writs in the administration of justice. In 1258, the Provisions 
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of Oxford restricted the King’s power to issue new writs without the consent of the 
King’s Council. The feudal barons considered that the power to make new writs and 
forms of action was also the power to make new law and therefore limited the King’s 
power to invent new remedies by writ. If a cause of action did not fit within an existing 
writ, then a plaintiff had no remedy at the common law courts, so that the common 
law became rigid and the new laws operated unjustly. Further, in the Magna Carta of 
1215, King John was forced to promise that a writ would not be issued in such a way 
that a feudal lord would lose jurisdiction.  
 
Hogue (1986)190 describes the hardship created by the writ system of the common law 
as follows:   
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the tendency was in England 
to create an appropriate writ for the protection of every private right or 
interest recognized by the royal courts. Then, at the end of the thirteenth 
century the lush growth slowed and the time soon came when the 
plaintiff whose case could not be brought within the scope of one of the 
common law writs might be compelled to seek a remedy elsewhere than 
in a common law court, perhaps by means of a petition to the king’s 
council, perhaps by a petition to the chancellor. For the writ system 
hardened and set forth in the fourteenth century. Thereafter a plaintiff 
might brood on the maxim, “No writ, no remedy.”191  
 
Hence, the hardening of the writ system created grievance and oppression that led to 
petitions to the king in council for a remedy not provided by the common law.  
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Watt192 similarly asserts that by the early fourteenth century, the writ system and 
common law had become rigid and inflexible, as claims were allowed only if they could 
fit within an existing writ.  
 
The abolition of the Eyre193 also reinforced the strictness of the common law. The Eyre 
was a circuit court consisting of four itinerant judges appointed by the king to 
centralize control over local courts. The judges in Eyre had administered an equitable 
jurisdiction that ensured justice to the parties who had a good ground of complaint. 
The General Eyre was replaced by itinerant judges who tried cases according to the 
strict procedure of the common law.  
 
Also, damages were the only remedy at common law and were often inadequate.194 
For example195, where A had a contract with B and B had acted in breach of the 
contract, A was only entitled to damages at the common law courts. A could not 
obtain an order such as specific performance to compel B to perform the contract as 
such remedy was not available at common law. Similarly, where C had trespassed on 
D’s land, the only remedy available was damages caused by C. D could not obtain an 
order such as an injunction to restrain the unlawful entry on D’s land as such remedy 
was not available at common law.196  
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Further, the petitioner seldom obtained relief because of the power or influence of the 
defendant;197 or the plaintiff was the victim of the corrupt jury which heard the 
case.198  Also, the common law did not recognize oral agreements or informal relations 
in the dealings of parties. For example, where two parties had entered into an oral 
contract, which was required at common law to be in writing, then the common law 
would not recognize the contract nor grant any remedies on it.   
 
Such defects of the common law led to the development of a new body of law called 
“equity” to overcome the harshness of the common law.  Arguably, the common law 
initially met the needs of feudal society, but as society evolved with the socio-
economic and demographic impact of the Black Death, the Hundred Years’ War, the 
Peasants’ Revolts, the Agricultural Revolution, political and legal reform and the 
abolition of feudalism, the common law became too rigid and inflexible to meet the 
changing needs of the society. The early quest for justice also influenced the 
development of equity as persons sought to petition the king against the hardship 
caused by the common law. 
 
According to Bryson199, litigants who were prejudiced by the common law system 
sought justice from the king as follows: 
 It was a period during which the rich and the powerful of the county 
could manipulate or intimidate juries and thus pervert the course of 
justice. Frequently, weak and poor litigants had to resort to the court of 
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the Lord Chancellor, the most powerful political figure in the country, to 
obtain justice against their strong neighbours.200  
  
Hence, the petitions made to the Chancellor led to the evolution of equity as the 
common law could not provide a remedy, or the remedy provided was inadequate to 
address the perils of social injustice.   
 
Hogue201 emphasizes that the “medieval society in which the common law took form 
was feudal and agricultural, and was rapidly changing”202 as society evolved. As social 
changes occurred, the law was adapted by judicial interpretation to meet new 
conditions.203 For example, petitions were made to the King where the common law 
was thought to be unjust or unfair. The king was considered the fountain of justice and 
hence invoked the power of the Lord Chancellor to whom the king delegated his 
discretion and who determined claims by conscience. Hence, the deficiencies of the 
common law created the gateway for the law to adapt to the changing needs of 
society and the social order.  
 
2.4.2  The Development of Equity 
According to Edwards and Stockwell204, “the origins of equity lie in the deficiencies in 
the common law”.205 Where the common law did not provide a remedy, a plaintiff 
petitioned the King in Council for justice and a remedy to his or her case. These 
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petitions pleaded for the king's conscience or mercy, and were heard by the King’s 
Council of which the Chancellor was a member206. It was the deficits of the common 
law and the changing social order that created the rationale for the development of 
equity.  
 
Watt207 likewise advocates that equity emerged due to the royal prerogative of the 
English king to do justice between his subjects, as he was accountable to God for his 
laws as follows: 
…the King was accountable to God for the righteousness of his laws and 
the Chancellor as ‘keeper of the king’s conscience’ would act in particular 
cases to admit ‘merciful exceptions’ to the king’s general laws to ensure 
that the king’s conscience was right before God.208  
 
Thus, where the common law had not provided justice, petitions were made to the 
King’s Council. The Lord Chancellor was the keeper of the king’s conscience, and 
sought to do justice to the king’s subjects in good faith to God.  
 
Hogue209 similarly advocates that equity emerged from the ad hoc intervention of the 
Lord Chancellor, as the keeper of the king’s conscience, into a body of precedent 
administered by the court of Chancery as follows:  
In the thirteenth century, the English king and his council, including his 
judges and great officers, were able to exercise the royal duty and right 
to develop new remedies for new wrongs. Thus, new forms of action, 
new writs such as Trespass and new royal courts such as Common Pleas 
and King’s Bench were all ‘equitable’ in the thirteenth century. The 
emergence of the Chancery as a court of ‘equity’ in the fourteenth 
century is worth noting because its procedures ultimately led to a 
                                                 
206
 Richard Edwards & Nigel Stockwell, Trusts and Equity (11
th
 edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2013)  
207
 Gary Watt, Trusts & Equity (6
th
 edn, OUP 2014) 
208
 Gary Watt, Trusts & Equity (6
th
 edn, OUP 2014) 5 
209
 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Fund Inc. 1986)  
65 
 
widening distinction between what were later called the common-law 
courts and the equity courts.210 
 
Accordingly, the Chancellor developed new forms of actions and new remedies that 
were not available at common law. These actions and remedies were designed to 
meet the changing needs of society and the people within it.   
 
Edwards and Stockwell211 describes how the equitable jurisdiction of the Lord 
Chancellor arose as follows:  
It was considered that a residuum of justice resided in the king, and 
petitions were directed at tapping in to this as a last resort if the common 
law had not provided justice. If a subject believed that the common law 
would not provide an appropriate solution to his case, he could petition 
the king and the Council asking that justice be done and that a remedy 
should be ordered. These petitions were referred to the Lord Chancellor 
and eventually the Chancellor was petitioned directly. Cases brought 
before the Chancellor were called suits. The Chancellor was making 
decrees by the end of the fifteenth century.212  
 
Hence, equity provided the flexibility for the Lord Chancellor to mete out appropriate 
justice where the common law proved too rigid to achieve what equity would have 
regarded as a “fair” outcome.   
 
Edwards and Stockwell213 further articulate that the petitions to the Lord Chancellor 
appealed to the king's mercy or conscience, and were heard by the King’s Council of 
which the Chancellor was a member. The Chancellor was usually a clergyman, the 
king's confessor, and the keeper of the king's conscience.214 As an ecclesiastic, he was 
learned in civil law and well versed in moral and canon (church) law, and resolved 
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disputes based on his ideas, belief and conscience, and not by law.215 The resolution of 
disputes by conscience developed into a system of law known as equity.216    
 
Watt217 asserts that by the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, petitions to 
the Chancellor became routine as a means of escaping the harshness of the writ 
system and the judgments of the common law courts. The Chancellor was able to issue 
subpoenas to compel defendants to attend before him to answer the complaint of the 
petitioner. Non-attendance could be punished by imprisonment.  
 
The Chancellor’s power to resolve disputes by the prohibition of unconscionable 
conduct gained popularity, and his deliberations gradually evolved as an independent 
body of law called equity.  
 
According to Thompson218:  
Such a system which gave a seemingly unfettered discretion to the 
Chancellor could not be tolerated as a rational system of law and so the 
principles upon which the Chancellor would intervene became 
established and developed into a coherent body of law known as 
equity.219  
 
Later reliance on a body of substantive precedent and fixed principles addressed this 
type of criticism that “equity varied with the length of the Chancellor’s foot”, as John 
Seldon has also claimed.220  
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In the case of Dudley v Dudley221, Lord Cowper articulates a most explicit summary of 
the nature and purpose of equity thus: 
Equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, 
moderates, and reforms the rigor, hardness and edge of the law, and is a 
universal truth. It does also assist the law, where it is defective and weak 
in the constitution (which is the life of the law), and defends the law from 
crafty evasions, delusions and mere subtleties, invented and contrived to 
evade and elude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted 
right are made remediless. And thus is the office of equity to protect and 
support the common law from shifts and contrivances against the justice 
of the law. Equity, therefore, does not destroy the law, nor create it, but 
assists it.222 
 
Thus, equity intervened not only to redress the defects of the common law, but also to 
enforce obligations based on conscience and morality. It created a new form of justice 
based on the dealings and the conduct of the parties, rather than the strict and formal 
legality of a case. Hence, the limitations of the common law to provide for the 
changing social order was manifested in the growth of equity to ensure that the legal 
system, as a whole, was meeting the evolving needs of society.  
 
Edwards and Stockwell223 affirms that equity operated in tandem with the common 
law thus:  
Equity might well provide a remedy where the common law provided 
none or provide a more suitable remedy than the common law. Equity 
might also intervene to ensure that the available common law remedy 
was actually enforceable. In other words, equity worked alongside the 
common law and provided different solutions to problems.224 
 
Hence, equity eventually operated harmoniously with the common law to provide a 
remedy, or more suitable remedy than the common law.  
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Sometimes in conflict with equity’s own maxim that “equity follows the law”, it sought 
to complement the common law by application of notions of fairness and good 
conscience. It provided a remedy where the common law would not, or it granted a 
more suitable remedy than the common law, exemplified by the maxim that “equity 
will not suffer a wrong without a remedy”. As seen, the transition from a society which 
depended on land as the sole or primary source of wealth, to a money economy based 
on trade and commerce attracted new types of legal claim which could not be 
substantively or procedurally remedied by the common law, but only in equity.  
 
According to Bryson225, the equitable jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor remedied 
defects in the procedural operation of the common law courts. For example, the 
common law rule of evidence that a party could not testify in court as a witness meant 
that a person could not testify against himself and neither for himself.226 The court of 
equity provided a remedy whereby a party with a common law grievance could sue in 
equity to force the defendant to respond under oath so as to discover the truth, and to 
use the sworn statement as a binding admission in the common law court.227  
 
Another example identified by Bryson228, is the trial by jury in common law courts. Civil 
juries were seldom sufficiently educated or experienced to determine a party’s liability 
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in damages.229 In the case of multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the common law jury 
was inadequate to decide on complex issues relating to financial liability such as the 
proportion of damages to be paid to each defendant.230 Conversely, in the courts of 
Chancery, the judges heard all the issues of the case and were capable of determining 
them in an informed manner, drawing upon their experience and training.231   
 
Hudson232 describes the operation of equity as mitigating the strictness of the 
common law to prevent injustice in individual cases. He states that: 
An expression which has been commonly used to describe the way in 
which equity functions is that equity ‘mitigates the rigour of the common 
law’ so that the letter of the law is not applied in so strict a way that it 
may cause injustice in individual cases. English equity does this by 
measuring the behavior of the individual defendant against the standards 
which the law requires in a process which is described as ‘correcting 
men’s consciences.233 
 
Hence, the goal of equity is to apply conscience to prevent unconscionable dealings 
between parties, so as to ensure an equitable outcome of a case.  
 
Hudson234 also describe how the courts arrive at a decision in equity as follows:  
Conscience is the key concept at the heart of equity. Equity then is that 
part of English civil law which seeks either to prevent any benefit accruing 
to a defendant as a result of some unconscionable conduct, or to 
compensate any loss suffered by a claimant which results from some 
unconscionable conduct, and which seeks to ensure that the common 
law and statutory rules are not manipulated unconscionably. At its 
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broadest, equity appears to imbue the courts with a general discretion to 
disapply statutory or common law rules whenever good conscience 
requires it.235  
 
Thus, conscience is the heart of equity whereby the court always has a discretion to 
produce an equitable outcome even where it involves non-compliance with statutory 
or common law rules, sometimes in violation of equity’s own maxim that “equity 
follows the law”.   
 
However, despite equity’s intervention to remedy the common law, its operation by 
the courts was not without confusion and uncertainty. Watt236 articulates that:   
….it was a frequent criticism of Chancery in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries that the Chancellor’s discretion to dispense justice 
ad hoc on the ground of ‘conscience’ produced justice that varied 
markedly in quality from one Lord Chancellor to the next.237 
 
Since equity is based on conscience, then words or conduct that may be adjudged 
unconscionable by one Chancellor may not have been similarly viewed by another, 
thereby causing inconsistency and unpredictability for litigants.  
 
John Selden, a 17th-century jurist, also criticized equity for its lack of fixed rules and 
unfettered discretion.238 Seldon made the observation of conflicting judgments being 
made by the Lord Chancellors in every case. He stated that: 
Equity is a Roguish thing: for Law wee have a measure, know what to 
trust too; Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, 
and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should 
make the Standard for the measure wee call A foot, to be the 
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Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One 
Chancellor has a long foot, another A short foot, a third an indifferent 
foot: 'tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.239 
 
John Seldon’s critique deals tellingly with the confusion that was engendered by 
decisions of the Lord Chancellor determined on an ad hoc basis with little recourse to 
established precedent. Conversely, however, it illustrates the unfettered discretion of 
the Lord Chancellor to have referred to the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case, rather than being constrained by prior authority decided on similar facts. This 
highlights the historical flexibility of equity and its attendant capacity to produce new 
doctrines such as proprietary estoppel (which is the theme of this thesis). 
  
Holdsworth240 highlights the difference between the type of equity administered by 
the common law courts, and the equity administered by the Lord Chancellor as 
follows:   
The equity administered through the common law courts was 
administered on the broad basis that justice must so far as possible be 
done to parties who had a good ground of complaint. The equity 
administered by the chancellor, on the other hand, rested on the more 
restricted idea of the canon lawyers that the court ought to compel each 
individual litigant to fulfill the duties dictated by reason and conscience. It 
followed that the examination of the litigant was absolutely essential to 
the administration of equity. Obviously, the judge could not ascertain 
what course of action conscience would dictate in any given case unless 
by this examination he elicited all the facts.241 
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What is clear however, is that in spite of any inherent shortcomings in terms of 
unpredictability, the Lord Chancellor did seek to enforce obligations between parties 
on grounds of good conscience, mindful of all the facts and circumstances of the case.  
  
Holdsworth242 articulates that “… the whole system of equity was to a large extent 
governed by a rival system of the common law”243, whereby successive Lord 
Chancellors supplemented and complemented the common law. Hence, the purpose 
of equity was not to subvert, but to mitigate the harshness of the common law.  
 
Bryan and Vann244 assert that the early distinction between common law and equity 
was procedural rather than substantive: 
The real differences between the common law and equity in its formative 
stage concerned not substantive law but the procedures applied by 
chancellors to obtain evidence. The action was begun not by writ but by a 
simple summons to appear before the Chancellor. Failure to comply with 
the summons would render the defendant liable for contempt of court. 
Evidence was taken by interrogatories (questionnaires) or written 
dispositions. The Chancellor did not work with a jury. In practice he 
collected evidence until he had obtained enough to justify taking 
action.245 
 
Thus, equity originally varied from the common law in terms of evidence-gathering 
mechanisms and the Chancellor’s power to secure the defendant’s attendance before 
him on threat of imprisonment. The legacy of this still endures in the modern day 
subpoena which if disregarded, constitutes contempt of court.  
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Historically, therefore, the role of equity was to redress the procedural frailties of the 
common law, rather than seeking to alter its substance. However, equity came to 
adopt a more substantive position. In this regard, Watt246 emphasizes that the 
distinction between equity and the common law is aptly described by the legal 
historian, J.H. Baker who observed that: 
If, for reasons of history, equity had become the law peculiar to the Court 
of Chancery, nevertheless in broad theory equity was an approach to 
justice which gave more weight than did the law to particular 
circumstances and hard cases.247 
 
Hudson248 similarly states that the “conscience” underpinning equity created the 
divergence between equity and the common law as follows: 
Whereas the common law was concerned with the application of legal 
rules and principles to individual set of facts, equity as administered 
through the Courts of Chancery was concerned to consider the 
conscience of the individual defendant.249 
 
Hence, one incontrovertible distinction between common law and equity is the 
application of legal rules or precedent by the common law versus the conscience-
based and discretionary approach of equity.  
 
The function of equity was to deal with hard cases that could not be resolved by the 
common law, and to intervene to provide a remedy where the common law would 
not. Hence, equity departed from the common law on grounds of fairness and good 
conscience, and it is on this basis of preventing unconscionability that remedies in 
equity were conceived and granted.  
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The role of good conscience is enshrined in the equitable maxim that equity acts ‘in 
personam’ in contrast to the ‘in rem’ jurisdiction of the common law.250 This was 
explained by Lord Ellesmere in the Earl of Oxford’s Case,251 whereby “equity corrects 
men’s consciences for fraud, breaches of trust, and wrongs and oppression of all 
nature they may be, and mollifies the extremity of the law”.  
 
In essence, therefore, political and social change led to the evolution firstly of common 
law and secondly of equity. As English society progressed from an agricultural to an 
industrial economy, equity provided a wellspring of justice predicated on notions of 
good conscience. Equity emerged as a crucial response to the deficiencies of the 
common law, having its origins in petitions for “justice” to the king. The flexibility of 
equity, affording a remedy where the common law could not, enhanced the utility and 
impact of equitable principles. Whereas the common law was steeped in formality and 
rigid procedure, equity was able to devise a range of new remedies for new causes of 
action, including its capacity to deal with disputes arising from informal dealings 
between parties. For example, in the absence of a formal agreement between parties, 
equity considers that there is an agreement based on the prior dealings of the parties.  
 
With the changing socio-economic structure, equity was called on to administer  
mercantile dealings including mortgages, bankruptcy, partnerships, the chartering and 
ownership of ships, and the relations between merchants and factors, principals and 
sureties.252 It provided remedies non-existent to the common law such as specific 
performance of contracts, relief from fraud, relief from mistake and injunctive relief 
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from nuisances.253 Hence, as society evolved, so did equity develop to satisfy the needs 
of the changing social order.  
 
According to Burn254, “law will wither unless it expands to keep pace with the 
progressive ideas of an advancing community.”255 Hence, the emergence of equity to 
complement the common law was necessary and instrumental to maintain the 
continuing function of the law to provide remedy and relief from wrongs. For example, 
whereas the common law developed to regulate commercial transactions, equity was 
required at the same time to resolve disputes that arose from commercial activities 
that the common law could not manage.256  Megarry & Wade257 also maintain that 
equity provided “the means needed in every legal system of adapting general rules to 
particular cases,”258 to facilitate the changing social order. Thus, equity acted as a gloss 
on the common law to meet the challenges posed by increasingly complex socio-
economic conditions.  
 
In commenting on the historical evolution of the law, Tarchila259 remarked that law 
adapts to the changing social order as follows:  
It has been set that law is a social phenomenon incidental to human 
society; thus, Romans have expressed this statement through the phrase: 
“ubi societas, ibi jus”, namely law occurs along with the society. Law, like 
society is not a static, immutable entity issued once and for all; they are 
under constant development and social-historical evolution. As social 
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phenomenon, social law experiences a constant historical evolution, 
bearing the mark of historical periods and cultural, spiritual and religious 
features of nations.260             
 
This reflects the symbiotic interrelationship between law and society, as illustrated by 
the development of equitable concepts and principles, including the modern doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel.  
 
2.4.3  The Development of the Trust  
According to Hudson,261 “one of the most sophisticated instruments in equity’s 
armoury is the trust …”.262 In effect, equity created the trust to facilitate the changing 
needs of society and the inadequacy of the common law to provide an appropriate 
remedy. 
 
Thompson263 also emphasizes that the development of the trust was the hallmark of 
equity as follows: 
The original basis on which equity intervened was to enforce obligations 
of conscience and to redress defects in the common law. What also 
emerged from the intervention of equity was its most important and 
practical development: the trust.264  
 
A trust arises when assets are transferred by a settlor to one party to hold on behalf of 
another. For example, A may be required to hold property on trust for B, A being the 
trustee and B the beneficiary. The trustee holds the property for the benefit of the 
beneficiary. Equity does not permit the trustee to deny the trust, that is, to hold the 
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property for his or her personal benefit, as it imposes on the trustee a fiduciary duty of 
the utmost good faith and confidence towards the beneficiary.   
 
Historically, the common law did not recognize this division between the ownership of 
property and the enjoyment of it. Therefore, the common law would not provide a 
remedy to the beneficiary where the trustee had used trust property for personal 
benefit or had used the proceeds thereof for personal gain.  
 
Thompson265 asserts that the inadequacy of the common law created the trust as 
follows:  
From the early days, the practice developed of land being conveyed to a 
person, T for the use of another person, B. At common law, T was the 
legal owner of the land, and the obligation accepted on behalf of B was 
disregarded by the common law. However, in equity, since T had 
accepted the undertaking to hold the land to the use of B, it was 
considered unconscionable for T to renege on that obligation. T’s 
conscience was affected and equity compelled T to comply with the use, 
so B could enjoy the benefit of the land.266  
 
Hence, the trust accorded the beneficiary a right to equitable relief against the 
trustee for breach of trust, enforceable by a proprietary remedy (specific 
performance) or a personal action against the trustee’s own resources.  
 
Similarly, Bryson267 affirms that the absence of a common law writ to enforce the trust 
had led to its enforcement by the Lord Chancellor as follows:  
A trust or use was a type of contract usually in reference to land, which 
was invented after the common law writs (which controlled the 
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jurisdiction and procedures of the common law courts) had become fixed 
and unchangeable. Since there was no common law writ available to 
enforce a trust, and since the chancery clerks and the common law 
judges could not change the law by inventing a new one without 
unconstitutionally usurping the legislative power of Parliament, the 
Chancellor enforced them.268 
 
The development of the trust in equity protected the beneficiary’s right to the 
property. The trust of a legal estate in land involves two owners namely, the trustee 
who holds the legal estate and the beneficiary who holds the equitable interest. The 
common law, on the other hand, requires both the legal and equitable interest to be 
vested in the same party to constitute absolute ownership of the legal estate. Thus, 
the common law could not provide a remedy in trust.  
 
Bryan and Vann269 articulate that the trust evolved from the interrogatories held by 
the Lord Chancellor in discovering the informal agreement by which the trustee held 
the land for the beneficiary.  
The fifteenth century, when these procedures were developed, was the 
period in which uses (or trusts) of land were enforced by chancellors. 
Disputes typically arose when the feoffee (trustee) of land who was 
bound to hold the land for the benefit of the cest que trust (beneficiary) 
claimed the land for himself. The common law courts could do little to 
prevent the trustee from obtaining a personal advantage from the trust 
because its methods for obtaining evidence were not suited to 
discovering the terms on which the trustee had agreed to hold the land. 
They could be ascertained however, as a result of interrogatories 
administered by the Chancellor.270  
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Hence, the trust provided a safety net when the trustee was holding the legal 
title but refused to honour his equitable obligation to hold it for the beneficiary. 
The Lord Chancellor utilized the trust to establish the true owner in equity and 
by conscience. The trust maintains that the use or benefit of the property does 
not necessarily belong to the holder of legal title, thus drawing a distinction 
between the legal and equitable owner of land.  
 
Bryan and Vann271 continue that the Lord Chancellor’s method of collecting 
evidence by testimony determined the trust as follows:  
Upon proof of the terms of the trust, the Chancellor made orders to 
protect the beneficiary’s interest in the land. The basic features of the 
law of trusts therefore emerged from the orders made by the chancellors 
to protect the interest of beneficiaries.272 
 
Thus, where land was held by a trustee for the benefit of another, the Chancellor 
recognized the beneficiary as the true owner in equity.  
 
Hudson273 describes the development of the trust from the use as follows: 
So the trust grew out of this system of equity as a means of recognizing 
that in some circumstances it would not be just if the common law owner 
of property were able to deny that other people ought to be recognized 
as also having rights in that property. For example, if two people bought 
property together it would be wrong if one person sought to deny that 
the other person also had rights in that property.274 
 
Hence, the essential characteristic of the trust was the separation of the title to 
property, from the right to use and enjoy it. Equity devised the trust to safeguard 
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the beneficiary’s interest, being an interest which manifested itself as an 
equitable proprietary interest in the asset concerned.  
 
Thomas and Hudson275 describe the importance of the trust as follows: 
The essence of a trust is the imposition of an equitable obligation on a 
person who is the legal owner of property (a trustee) which requires that 
person to act in good conscience when dealing with that property in 
favour of any person (the beneficiary) who has a beneficial interest 
recognised by equity in the property. The trustee is said to “hold the 
property on trust” for the beneficiary. There are four significant elements 
to the trust: that it is equitable, that it provides the beneficiary with 
rights in property, that it also imposes obligations on the trustee, and 
that those obligations are fiduciary in nature.276   
 
Thus, equity acts upon the conscience of the trustee to perform the duties imposed by 
the settlor, or to deal with the consequences of unconscionable conduct. Further, the 
trust not only preserves the beneficiary’s rights in property, but also compels the 
trustee to act in good faith. The utilization of the trust enabled new forms of personal 
property such as stocks and shares to be brought into settlements.277  
 
2.4.4  The Development of Equitable Estoppel 
Equitable estoppel is derived from the ethos of equity to redress unconscionable 
behaviour.278 It precludes enforcement of strict legal rights where it is inequitable or 
unconscionable to do so.279 In Crab v Arun District Council280, Lord Denning described 
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equitable estoppel as a judicial doctrine that is designed to protect a party from the 
detriment which arises from a party’s change of position, in circumstances where the 
assumption or expectation that it created were proved to be inequitable. Likewise, in 
Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd281, Oliver J explicated that an 
estoppel arises where Y has by words or conduct led Z to believe that a state of facts 
exists, and Z has acted upon that belief to Z’s detriment, then Y will not be permitted 
to aver that a different state of facts existed at the time. Thus, equitable estoppel 
precludes the inequitable enforcement or assertion of rights that may otherwise have 
existed at law282.  
 
Equitable estoppel encompasses the two distinct forms of estoppel that exist in equity, 
namely promissory and proprietary estoppel. The principal difference between the 
two forms of estoppel depends on the function of equity that each performs. In 
promissory estoppel, the equity binds the holder of the legal right who has induced 
another party to believe that a right will not be enforced against that other party. In 
contrast, with proprietary estoppel the equity binds the owner of property who has 
induced another to expect an interest in land. Hence, estoppel is a mechanism devised 
by equity which applies conscience to prohibit inequitable or unconscionable conduct 
in the dealings of parties.   
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Proprietary estoppel is the embodiment of equity which developed as a necessary 
adjunct to the common law system with its strict adherence to formality. It is the 
inherent flexibility and discretion of equity which enabled it to be applied to create 
property rights based on the prior dealings of the parties. Property rights are 
determined according to the conscience of the parties, rather than the enforcement of 
strict legal rights. This determination to prevent unconscionable behavior enables the 
court to grant the most appropriate remedy to the claimant. For example, if the 
claimant establishes an assurance supported by a detrimental reliance, then the 
estoppel generated may be satisfied by awarding a fee simple to the claimant as in 
Dillwyn v Llewelyn283 and Pascoe v Turner284; the grant of an easement as in Crab v 
Arun District Council285 and a right of way in Ives v High286; a licence to use the 
property as in Inwards v Baker287, or the payment of a cash sum as in Campbell v 
Griffin288. Thus, the equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel is able to provide a 
remedy based on the informal dealings of parties, where a landowner has informally 
promised an interest in land to another party, who has suffered a detrimental reliance 
on that promise. The capacity for equity to be applied in diverse circumstances 
thereby created the latitude to give rise to the equitable doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel, providing a remedy where the common law would not.  
 
Because equity does not suffer a wrong without a remedy, it acts against the 
conscience of the landowner to bind him or her to fulfil his or her promise. The 
rationale of proprietary estoppel is that equity and conscience will not permit a party 
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to be deprived of his or her home, livelihood or a promised interest in land based on 
the informal dealings of the parties. Equity and the need to act in good conscience do 
not consider social class or wealth, but are intent on prohibiting unconscionable 
conduct.   
 
Arguably, when land represented the sole or primary source of human existence, as in 
feudal England, estoppel was less likely to have been embraced by equity because 
estoppel possessed the capacity to strip a legal landowner of his livelihood. However, 
as the commodity of land became subordinate to greater industrialization and 
urbanization, the judiciary was, perhaps, more inclined to apply and develop 
proprietary estoppel since they were no longer depriving a landowner of his only 
source of income. This implicitly changing judicial perception possibly opened the 
opportunity for the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to evolve and develop, as the 
continuing chapters of this thesis will illustrate.  
 
Interestingly, the courts are now using proprietary estoppel to vest land in a claimant 
who relies on that land for his or her livelihood, as in Thorner v Major289. Whilst the 
judiciary may have been resistant to accepting so radical a doctrine as estoppel prior 
to the modern era, the current application of estoppel perhaps echoes the rationale 
underpinning the original development of the trust from the 13th century onwards. 
Integral to the trust was equity’s desire to protect the interests of beneficiaries 
notwithstanding the deprivation of a purported landowner of the legal title to land. 
The inception, evolution and modernization of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
resonates throughout this thesis, and it is the extent to which the courts ensure that 
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estoppel achieves its inherent purpose of preventing unconscionable behaviour that 
enables the soundness of the doctrine to be assessed.  
 
2.4.5  The Conflict between Common Law and Equity 
According to Bryan and Vann290, the jurisdictional conflict between the common law 
and equity culminated in the Earl of Oxford’s Case291:  
The period from the sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century 
in England was one of jurisdictional conflict and jealously between the 
common law courts and chancery. The Chancellor’s court was caught up 
in the great constitutional struggles of that age. Chancery jurisdiction 
rested on the sovereign’s prerogative power to administer justice which 
was challenged by a parliament increasingly inclined to test the limits of 
the prerogative. The resolution of the dispute between the chancellor 
and the common lawyers established the basis of the relationship 
between the common law and equity which still exists today.292  
 
Chief Justice Coke thus challenged the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Ellesmere, to grant common injunctions. This case was referred to King James 1 in 
1616 to rule on the competing jurisdiction of equity and the common law. The king, in 
preserving the status of the throne as the arbiter of justice, exercised the Royal 
Prerogative by decreeing equity’s primary status in English Law whereby when equity 
and law conflict, equity shall prevail. Equity’s primacy in English Law was later 
enshrined in the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, which served to fuse the courts of 
equity and the common law via the jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce legal and 
equitable claims, defences, rights and remedies.  
 
Clearly, equity continues to alleviate the shortcomings within the common law and, by 
dint of its primacy over the common law, enables its unique concepts, devices and 
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remedies, including the trust and proprietary estoppel to be deployed to prevent 
inequitable conduct in the dealings between parties. The development of equitable 
principles signifies the law’s response to the changing needs of society, a key aspect of 
which is the determination of disputes by conscience-based doctrines, such as 
estoppel rather than by strict adherence to the formalities of the common law.  
 
Conversely, one possible criticism of equity is that, at least until the development of a 
body of precedent by the Chancery Court from the late 1400’s onwards, equity lacked 
settled principles and was overly dependent on the ad hoc exercise of discretion by the 
Lord Chancellor. Though equity remains a discretion-based body of law, its 
unpredictability has now been largely mitigated by the entrenchment of enduring 
principles, albeit still characterized by innovative remedies and concepts, such as 
proprietary estoppel itself.  
 
2.5  Conclusion 
Historical events not only transformed socio-economic conditions within England, but 
also led to the evolution of common law and equity, and the genesis of English land 
law as it now exists. As Dixon293 articulates:  
Land law is a subject steeped in history. It has its origins in the feudal 
reforms imposed on England by William the Conqueror after 1066, and 
many of the most fundamental concepts and principles of land law spring 
from the economic and social changes that began then.294 
 
Thus, land law is the product of the changing social order, as the law develops in 
response to social and economic pressures. Specifically, equity evolved in response to 
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the deficits within the common law, and the trust evolved in response to the failure of 
the common law to protect the beneficiary’s interests. Therefore, as society evolves, 
so does the law and both co-exist in an interdependent, symbiotic relationship.  
 
The essence of equity is aptly reflected by concepts such as the trust and equitable 
estoppel, the latter of which ultimately metamorphosed into promissory and 
proprietary estoppel. Further, equity introduced a natural law-based concept of 
conscience that not only tempered the strictness of the common law but held parties 
bound by their previous assertions and conduct in informal relations.  
 
The complex interrelationship between law and socio-economic change is succinctly 
expressed by Burn295, who asserts that real property law falls into three categories in 
order of its historical development. First, is the “purely common law which was 
designed to meet the needs of a feudal society”296. Second, is the “equitable system 
which gradually evolved in certain directions with a view to adapting the common law 
rules to a society moved by different ideals and possessing a more commercial outlook 
on life”297. Third, are the “various legislative enactments by which judge-made law of 
the land was rendered more adequate to meet the needs of society”298. In essence, 
real property rights are derivative of the historical development of the common law, 
equity and legislation. Therefore, the English legal system continues to reflect and 
embody the gradual evolution of common law and equity, and the bodies of law they 
respectively comprise, which together with legislation, strive to meet the changing 
needs of modern day society.  
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The next chapter will focus on the evolution of proprietary estoppel as an equitable 
doctrine.  
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Chapter Three: The Evolution of Proprietary Estoppel 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents a critical analysis of how equitable estoppel originated in the 
Courts. Equitable estoppel is founded in equity and embraces the precept of 
prohibiting unconscionable or inequitable conduct in the dealings between parties. 
The chapter focuses on how the principle of equitable estoppel evolved in land 
disputes in the Earl of Oxford’s Case299 until being gradually eclipsed by the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel in Dillwyn v Llewelyn300. It traces the development from 
equitable estoppel into proprietary estoppel – by prohibiting the enforcement of strict 
legal rights to land, to the capacity to create an interest in land. For example, where a 
party expends monies in building on land without any objection from the landowner, 
then equitable estoppel precludes the enforcement of the landowner’s strict legal 
rights against that party, as the land owner had acquiesced in the party’s expenditure 
and mistaken belief of title.301   
 
Similarly, where a land owner encourages a party to build on land and that party 
expends money on the land with the knowledge of the landowner, and without any 
objection from him or her in the expectation of obtaining a right or title in the land, 
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then the landowner may be bound by proprietary estoppel to convey title to that 
party.302   
 
The discussion and analysis of the evolution of equitable estoppel via case law as 
described in this chapter, is distinctive, as unlike existing academic literature303, it uses 
decided cases to describe and trace how an equitable estoppel in land arises. It delves 
into the early case law to discover how equitable estoppel has evolved to a point 
where it is capable of creating a proprietary interest in land. For example, it considers 
how the concept of equitable estoppel emerged over four hundred years ago in the 
Earl of Oxford’s Case304 and which principle was followed in successive cases in 
relation to dealings with land.  
 
It also traces how the Courts transitioned from the general principle of equitable 
estoppel to prevent the reliance on strict legal rights by the landowner, to the more 
specialized doctrine of proprietary estoppel for the creation of an interest in land. For 
example, it demonstrates that the early cases were not focused on the expressed 
determination of an estoppel, but rather sought to prevent the enforcement of a 
landowner’s strict legal rights where it was unconscionable to do so. Proprietary 
estoppel, on the other hand, emanated as an offspring of equitable estoppel to create 
a proprietary interest in land where the representee had suffered a detriment in 
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reliance on the landowner’s representations, that the claimant should acquire an 
interest in the land.   
 
The chapter also explicates the courts’ approach to an estoppel in land in the early 
case law that is distinctive to other academic literature305 which focus on the 
developing case law, and it tends not to investigate how the decisions of the past have 
influenced the decisions of today. It illustrates that the courts tended to focus on the 
detriment suffered by the claimant in reliance on the defendant’s representations, and 
the application of estoppel to prevent the landowner’s enforcement of strict legal 
rights. It also demonstrates how proprietary estoppel emerged from the landowner’s 
promise for an interest in land based on the prior dealings of the parties. It was the 
evolution and development of equitable estoppel that evolved into the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel in later cases.  
 
This chapter also addresses the question of whether the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel is sound in terms of the evolutionary principles developed by the courts. For 
example, have the courts consistently upheld the quintessential purpose of estoppel in 
redressing unconscionable behaviour on the part of a landowner who would otherwise 
be free to deny the claimant’s entitlement arising from detrimental reliance on the 
landowner’s representations? Other legal scholars306 have not engaged in discussion 
on its evolution via case law, but focus instead on the developing case law.  
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The chapter explicates the evolution of proprietary estoppel to clarify its genesis in 
English law, which then flows into the further chapters of the thesis dealing with its 
development and progression in the courts.  
 
3.2  Case Law Development in the 16th-17th Centuries 
Proprietary estoppel is a form of equitable estoppel devised by the courts for the 
creation of informal rights to land based on the prior dealings of parties, indicative of 
the underlying purpose of estoppel. The case law of the 16th to 17th centuries 
illustrates the evolution of equitable estoppel to prevent the reliance on strict legal 
rights where it was inequitable or unconscionable to do so. It was this principle of 
equitable estoppel that was in later centuries developed by the Courts as giving rise to 
a proprietary interest in land by the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  
 
The genesis of equitable estoppel can be traced back more than four hundred years to 
the Earl of Oxford’s Case307 which laid the foundation of equity in English law. The 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Ellesmere, had to determine the equity of the plaintiff in the land 
against the Defendant’s legal title. It concerned a lease which was void as the 
conveyance of the land was prohibited by statute. The lessee had occupied the land 
for many years and expended monies in improvements believing that he had title to 
possession. The lessor sought to void the lease to recover the land. The lessee desired 
the value of the building and planting since the conveyance, with the option for 
purchase.  
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The Lord Chancellor defended the equitable jurisdiction of the Court against the 
strictness of the common law for the enforcement of title. He established that the 
expenditure in the land was an equity against the lessor and the enforcement of the 
lessor’s legal title without relief was adverse to the law of God, and to both equity and 
law as follows: 
The law of God speaks for the plaintiff (Deut. 28); and equity and good 
conscience speak wholly for him; nor does the law of the land speak 
against him, but that equity ought to join hand in hand in moderating and 
restraining all extremities and hardships. By the law of God he that builds 
a house ought to dwell in it; and he that plants a vineyard ought to gather 
the grapes thereof (Deut. 28. V. 30). And yet here in this case, such is the 
conscience of the Defendant that he would have the houses, gardens and 
orchards which he neither built nor planted: But the Chancellors have 
always corrected such corrupt consciences and caused them to render 
quid pro quo; for the common law itself will admit no contract to be good 
without quid pro quo or land to pass without a valuable consideration 
and therefore equity must see that a proportionable satisfaction be made 
in this case. […] and equity speaks as the law of God speaks ... for 
conscience and equity is always ready to render to everyone their due.308  
 
The Lord Chancellor’s arguments rest on the basis that neither equity nor the law 
would permit the lessor to obtain possession without recompense. The arguments 
prayed for equity against the conscience of the lessor who sought to obtain the 
lessee’s gardens and its profits which had added more value to the land than before, 
and pleaded for the Lord Chancellor to correct such corrupt conscience. The Lord 
Chancellor maintained that equity does not seek to overrule the common law but 
prevented a party from enforcing a common law right where it was unconscionable to 
do so, and that equity does not act against the law but against the conscience of the 
defendant, that is ‘in personam’.  
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The plaintiff’s expenditure in the land had created an equity therein which manifested 
as an equitable estoppel against the defendant. The Court held that the void lease did 
not prevent the lessee from obtaining equitable relief, as to allow the lessor to enforce 
his title for possession would also allow him to unjustly profit from the investment of 
the lessee which was contrary to conscience. Equity was applied as an estoppel against 
the lessor who was made to compensate the lessee.  
 
The decision of the Lord Chancellor speaks to the nature and purpose of equity to 
correct mens’ consciences and the harshness of the law. He stated thus:  
….as a right in law cannot die, no more can equity in Chancery die ….the 
cause why there is a Chancery is for that mens’ actions are so divers and 
infinite that it is impossible to make any general law which may aptly 
meet with every particular Act and not fail in some circumstance; the 
office of the Chancellor is to correct mens’ consciences for frauds, breach 
of trust, wrongs and oppressions of what nature soever they be and to 
soften and mollify the extremity of the law.309    
 
This case was referred to King James 1 in 1616 to rule on the competing jurisdiction of 
equity and the common law. The King, in preserving the status of the throne as the 
arbiter of justice, exercised the Royal Prerogative by decreeing equity’s primary status 
in English Law, whereby when equity and law conflict, equity shall prevail. Equity’s 
primacy in English Law was later enshrined in the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 
which also served to fuse the courts of equity and the common law with the 
jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce legal and equitable claims, defences, rights 
and remedies.     
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The application of equity as an estoppel to prevent the reliance on strict legal rights in 
land was therefore, first enunciated by the Court of Chancery in the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case310. This case affirmatively established a landowner’s liability for acquiescence in 
another’s mistaken belief of title; also the primacy of equity over the common law in 
land disputes between parties, and to prevent a landowner from enforcing his or her 
strict legal rights where it is unconscionable to do so, or where the landowner had 
acquiesced in another party’s expenditure in the land. The case embodies the court’s 
willingness to consider all the circumstances of the case and to intervene by deploying 
equity and conscience against a landowner’s unconscionable conduct, or acquiescence 
in another party’s conduct. Whether and to what extent this pivotal rationale of 
redressing unconscionability has been subsequently upheld by the courts is crucial in 
assessing the inherent soundness of the doctrine of estoppel.  
 
The principle of equity in the Earl of Oxford’s Case311 was followed in Hunt v Carew312, 
where the Lord Commissioners held that the purchaser was entitled to possession 
based on his reliance of a valid title from the vendor. This case involved a father who 
held land as a tenant for life with remainder in tail for his son. The plaintiff, believing 
the father had owned the inheritance, had sought the assistance of the son to acquire 
a lease from his father. The son helped the plaintiff and was paid for his assistance by 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff later discovered the father was only a tenant for life and the 
lease was void. The plaintiff filed suit for the lease to be confirmed by the father and 
son. The court held that since the plaintiff was unaware that the father had exceeded 
his power, but relied on the son’s affirmation and reassurance of the validity of the 
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lease together with the money received, that both the father and son should confirm 
the lease to the plaintiff.  
 
This case affirms the principle in the Earl of Oxford’s Case313 that where a landowner 
has acquiesced in another party’s mistaken belief of title, then equity is applied as an 
estoppel against the landowner. The son’s encouragement and assistance in obtaining 
the lease had created an estoppel against him. Equity intervened to prevent the 
enforcement of the strict legal rights of the father and son, as both had acted 
unconscionably toward the plaintiff in their acquiescence and encouragement of the 
transaction.  
 
Similarly, in Hobbs v Norton314 the Court of Chancery held that the purchaser was 
entitled to the annuity purchased by the encouragement of the true owner. In that 
case, the defendant’s young brother had an annuity on land from his father’s will. The 
claimant was desirous of purchasing the annuity and sought confirmation on the 
validity of title from the defendant. The defendant encouraged the claimant to 
purchase the land. The annuity turned out to be void as the father was not the true 
owner of the land, and the defendant’s brother did not have good title. The father had 
sold the land before death. The defendant later acquired the land and sought to have 
the annuity made void. The claimant filed suit to have his annuity decreed. The court 
ruled for the payment of the annuity by the defendant to the claimant based on the 
defendant’s encouragement to the claimant to undertake the purchase, and failing to 
disclose his ownership upon the claimant’s enquiry of him.  
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This case exemplifies the principle in the Earl of Oxford’s Case315 whereby equity was 
applied as an estoppel against the defendant who acquiesced in the claimant’s 
purchase of the annuity and was estopped from claiming its invalidity. The Defendant’s 
encouragement and non-disclosure of ownership upon enquiry had created the 
estoppel against him. Equity intervened to prevent the defendant’s reliance on his 
strict legal rights where he acted unconscionably towards the claimant in actively 
encouraging the purchase of the annuity and non-disclosure of his ownership thereof.  
 
Further, in Huning v Ferrers316 the claimant had accepted the lease of some mills from 
a tenant for life. The life tenant’s son knew about the lease but failed to warn the 
claimant. Upon the death of the life tenant, the son (defendant) became entitled to 
the property and sought to evict the claimant. The claimant obtained an order for the 
quiet possession of the mills as the defendant had failed to warn of his interest in the 
property. 
 
This case follows the principle of the Earl of Oxford’s Case317 as equity was applied as 
an estoppel against the defendant who acquiesced in the claimant’s ownership of the 
mills, and was estopped from claiming ownership upon the death of the life tenant. 
The defendant had failed to disclose his ownership of the mills to the claimant, which 
created an estoppel against him. Equity intervened to prevent the defendant enforcing 
his strict legal rights, as he acted unconscionably towards the claimant in his 
acquiescence of the purchase of the mills. 
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On further analysis, although the above cases per Hunt v Carew318, Hobbs v Norton319 
and Huning v Ferrers320 do not expressly state an estoppel was raised against the 
defendant, they nonetheless illustrate the principle of equitable estoppel to prohibit 
inequitable or unconscionable conduct to dealings in land. These cases also illustrate 
the intervention of equity as an estoppel to prevent the enforcement of the strict legal 
rights of the landowner, where the landowner acquiesced in the other party’s 
mistaken belief of title, or led another to believe in a state of affairs that turned out to 
be false.  
 
The cases also illustrate the application of equity as an estoppel in varying 
circumstances. For example, equity was applied as a defence where a party had acted 
in reliance of the assurance or encouragement of the landowner as in Huning v 
Ferrers321, and also as a cause of action where a party had suffered a detriment in 
reliance of the assurance made as in Hunt v Carew322.  These cases focus on the 
detriment that arises from the landowner’s acquiescence of a party’s expenditure on 
land, or misapprehension of title as the basis of the estoppel.  
 
Although the doctrine of estoppel was not specifically dealt with by the Courts in 
either of these cases, they nonetheless demonstrate the requisite elements of 
proprietary estoppel, including the representations or assurances of the landowner 
and the detrimental reliance by the plaintiff on these representations for the 
establishment of an estoppel. They also demonstrate the Court’s intervention with 
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equity to prevent the enforcement of the landowner’s strict legal rights based on the 
prior dealings of the parties.  
 
The benefit of the above cases per Hunt v Carew323, Hobbs v Norton324 and Huning v 
Ferrers325 is that they augment the principle of equity established in the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case326. They demonstrate that an equity arises against a landowner who 
acquiesces in another party’s mistaken belief of title or expenditure on land; or where 
the landowner has by his or her words or conduct induced a party to believe in a state 
of affairs, and that party has suffered in detrimental reliance thereon. The cases also 
illustrate that equity intervenes to prevent the landowner from enforcing his or her 
strict legal rights to land on the basis of unconscionability in regard to the dealings of 
the parties.  
 
The limitation of these cases is that they do not specifically mention the term ‘equity’ 
or an ‘estoppel’ arising against the landowner. An estoppel can only be inferred from 
the courts’ decisions and the principle of equity established in the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case327. Also, another limitation is that these Courts merely applied the principle in the 
Earl of Oxford’s Case328 rather than adopt a fully-argued rationale for enforcing an 
estoppel or equity against the landowner. These cases are very short and relate the 
facts and decision of the Court without argument on how and why the Court arrived at 
their decision. For example, the cases do not explain why the Courts decided to 
deprive the landowner of their legal title in the land. Was it because the landowner 
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had falsely represented the truth, or acted unconscionably or inequitably towards the 
other party? Exactly what motivated the Courts to arrive at their decision by estoppel 
or by equity remains uncertain, and is left to be inferred from the facts of the case.  
 
3.3  Case Law Development in the 19th Century 
Following the above litany of cases in equity, the courts continued to apply the 
principle of the Earl of Oxford’s Case329 whereby an equity arises against a landowner 
who has acquiesced in a party’s expenditure in the land. Equity was applied as an 
estoppel against the landowner. It was this principle of equitable estoppel that was, in 
later centuries, developed by the Courts as giving rise to a proprietary interest in land 
by the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  
 
The principle of the Earl of Oxford’s Case330 was cited in Dann v Spurrier331, a decision 
of the Lord Chancellor’s Court. The plaintiff (tenant in possession) filed claim for the 
specific performance of an agreement for the lease of a dwelling-house for seven, 
fourteen or twenty-one years, and to compel the defendant (lessor) to execute a lease 
for twenty-one years. The plaintiff also sought an injunction against the defendant for 
proceedings of ejectment following the first seven years, and also compensation for 
monies expended in improvements undertaken whilst the defendant stood by without 
objection. The defendant insisted on the right to determine the lease at the end of the 
seven years, and stated he had no knowledge of the repairs until August and, in 
September, notice was given to the plaintiff to prevent further expense. The Court 
ruled that it was not satisfied that the defendant knew of the repairs and, therefore, 
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his conscience was not affected by that knowledge to allow the Court’s intervention by 
equity.  
 
The issue of the construction of the lease agreement was remitted to the Court of 
Common Pleas. As to the plaintiff’s expenditure for improvements to the land, Lord 
Eldon LC asserted that equity acts against the conscience of a landowner who had 
acquiesced in a party’s expenditure on land under a mistaken belief of title. He stated 
that:   
…this court will not permit a man knowingly, though but passively to 
encourage another to lay out money under an erroneous opinion of title, 
and the circumstance of looking on is in many cases as strong as using 
terms of encouragement.332 
 
Lord Eldon LC thus reaffirmed the principle of the Earl of Oxford’s Case333 that the 
expenditure on land creates an equity in the land, and that the Court will not permit a 
landowner to enforce his or her strict legal rights where the landowner had acquiesced 
in the other party’s expenditure in the land.  
 
In Rochdale Canal Company v King334, cited with approbation in Yeoman's Row 
Management Limited and Another v Cobbe335, Sir John Romilly MR reiterated the 
principle in Earl of Oxford’s Case336 and Dann v Spurrier337:  
The principle on which the Defendants rely is one often recognized by 
this Court, namely, that if one man stand by and encourage another, 
though but passively, to lay out money, under an erroneous opinion of 
title, or under the obvious expectation that no obstacle will afterwards be 
interposed in the way of his enjoyment, the Court will not permit any 
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subsequent interference with it, by him who formally promoted and 
encouraged those acts of which he now either complains or seeks to take 
advantage. This is the rule laid down in Dann v Spurrier338, Powell v 
Thomas339, and many other cases, to which it is unnecessary to refer, 
because the principle is clear.340 
 
Thus, where a landowner acquiesces in, or encourages another to expend monies on 
land under a mistaken belief of title, an equity will be raised against the landowner.  
 
The Court elucidated the clear principle of equity exemplified in the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case341 and Dann v Spurrier342 arising from the expenditure on land either by the 
mistaken belief of title or by the encouragement of the landowner. It predicates the 
Court’s intervention with equity, where a party had altered his or her position on the 
faith of the dealings with the landowner, or the acquiescence of the landowner in the 
party’s expenditure on the land. Moreover, this statement by Sir John Romilly MR 
affirms and approves the principle of an ‘equity’ arising from the expenditure on land 
as established in the Earl of Oxford’s Case343 and Dann v Spurrier344.  
 
The principle in Earl of Oxford’s Case345 and Dann v Spurrier346, was applied in Dillwyn 
v Llewelyn347 by Lord Chancellor, Lord Westbury. A father had placed his younger son 
in possession of land and issued a memorandum in conveyance of the land to his son. 
The son expended his monies in building his house on the land with the knowledge 
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and encouragement of his father. Upon his father’s death the elder brother sought his 
eviction from the land.  
 
The plaintiff contended that the intention was to give the whole fee simple, whereas 
the Respondent contended that the terms of the memorandum give an equitable 
estate for life.  
 
The court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable interest in the 
property, and the freehold conveyance was ordered to the plaintiff. Thus, the 
plaintiff’s expenditure on the land, with the father’s encouragement, created an equity 
in the land that gave rise to an equitable interest which in turn was manifested as a 
proprietary interest whereby the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the estate 
comprised in the memorandum. The Court considered that the original intention of 
the father, per the memorandum, when added to the son’s expenditure on the land 
with the approval of the father, had created an equity in the son’s favor and the Court 
ordered the father’s estate to convey the land to the son.  
  
Here, equity was applied via estoppel to compel the conveyance of the fee simple to 
the plaintiff.  
Lord Westbury LC stated that: 
…the subsequent expenditure of the son with the approbation of the 
father supplied a valuable consideration originally wanting the 
memorandum signed by the father and son must be regarded as an 
agreement for the soil extending to the fee-simple of the land. […] the 
son’s expenditure on the faith of the memorandum had supplied a 
valuable consideration and created a binding obligation. On this I have no 
doubt, and it, therefore follows that the intention to give the fee simple 
103 
 
must be performed, and that the decree ought to declare the son the 
absolute owner of the estate comprised in the memorandum.348  
 
This case, as in the Earl of Oxford’s Case349, shows that an equity arises against the 
landowner where a party has expended monies on land on the mistaken belief of title, 
and where the landowner has acquiesced in that party’s expenditure.  However, this 
case goes further by establishing that the equity in the land may give rise to a 
proprietary interest against the landowner based on the prior dealings of the parties. It 
reflects the proprietary character of proprietary estoppel against the landowner.  
 
In Dillwyn350, the Court had advanced a number of principles that form the basis of 
proprietary estoppel such as the expenditure on land created an equity in the land; the 
priority of an equity in land over the legal title of the landowner; the primacy of equity 
in land against statute (Wills Act 1837) as the father had not bequeathed the land to 
the son; that the informal dealings of parties can give rise to a proprietary interest in 
land, and also that the lack of formality in land transactions will not defeat a 
proprietary interest in land.   
 
On further analysis, the case of Dillwyn351 advances the principle that where a party 
has acted in detrimental reliance on the assurances of a landowner, then the Court will 
intervene via equity to enforce the state of affairs which the landowner had knowingly 
created or encouraged. It establishes the underlying principle of proprietary estoppel 
that holds a landowner bound by his words or conduct for a proprietary interest in 
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land. Further, it illustrates that an equity arises by a party’s expenditure in land, where 
the landowner’s encouragement created an expectation of title to the defendant.  
 
The case also illustrates that the Court will intervene via equity to enforce the state of 
affairs which the parties had informally agreed to and acted upon, and that equity 
prevails over the formality requirements of the common law in land transactions. For 
example, the concept of proprietary estoppel overcomes the strict formality of the 
common law for the creation and transfer of land in Section 52 (1) of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 that states all conveyances of land or of any interest in land are void 
for the purpose of conveying, or creating a legal estate unless made by deed; also 
Section 53(1)(a) which relates that no interest in land can be created or disposed of 
except in writing and signed by the person creating or conveying the same;352 and 
further in Section 2 Law of Property (MP) Act (1989) that require contracts for the sale 
or of other disposition of an interest in land to be in writing, and signed by the parties 
with all the terms upon which they have expressly agreed. Hence, equity ‘tempers’ the 
rigidity of the common law in land transactions. Thompson353, asserts that equity 
recognizes the position of the common law, but intervenes to modify its effect in the 
exercise of its jurisdiction.  
 
As in the prior cases on equity such as the Earl of Oxford’s Case354, the case of Dillwyn 
v Llewelyn355 deals with the equity created in the land giving rise to an equitable 
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interest in the land, which in turn creates an estoppel against the landowner. It is 
therefore uncertain why the Courts, including the Court of Appeal, Privy Council and 
House of Lords (Supreme Court), have cited and continue to cite the case of Dillwyn v 
Llewelyn356 as a case of proprietary estoppel but have not also relied on the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case357. Moreover, the term ‘proprietary estoppel’ or ‘estoppel’ is neither 
expressly stated by the Court in Dillwyn358, nor in the previous cases in equity.  
 
However, the Court’s reference to Dillwyn359 as a case of proprietary estoppel may be 
because it demonstrates the requisites of proprietary estoppel including the assurance 
made by the father, the reliance on the assurance by the son in expending monies in 
building the house, and the detriment suffered in being evicted off the land. The 
detrimental reliance of the son on the assurances of the father had created an equity 
in the land that gave rise to a proprietary interest in the land. Also, the case presents 
another requisite element of proprietary estoppel, that is a statement of future 
intention for an interest in land. The encouragement of the father and the 
memorandum to the son, constituted a statement of future intention to grant the 
estate to the son. This statement of future intention give rise to a proprietary estoppel 
where an equity arises in the land.  
 
Another reason for the reference to Dillwyn360 as a case of proprietary estoppel, 
rather than the Earl of Oxford’s Case361, may be that the Earl of Oxford’s Case362 
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significantly predated the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875. It was only following the Earl 
of Oxford’s Case363 that a more liberal approach to an equity in land was applied in 
Dillwyn364. For example, the Earl of Oxford’s Case365 established a number of 
principles that were reflected in Dillwyn366 such as the expenditure on land created an 
equity in the land; the priority of an equity in land over the legal title of the landowner; 
the primacy of equity in land against statute (as the equitable interest in the land arose 
despite the lease being void by statute), and also that the landowner’s acquiescence of 
a party’s expenditure on land creates an equity in the land.  
 
The decision of the Earl of Oxford’s Case367 can be also be distinguished from 
Dillwyn368 by the fact that the equity created in the land had given rise to an equity 
that was ordered to be compensated by the defendant, instead of a proprietary 
interest in the land. Arguably, the Earl of Oxford’s Case369 describes a proprietary 
estoppel by acquiescence whereby the plaintiff had expended monies in the mistaken 
belief of title, and the defendant had acquiesced in the plaintiff’s expenditure on the 
land. It represents the turning point for equity in land giving rise to a proprietary 
estoppel.  
 
In Dillwyn v Llewelyn370 the Court had granted the conveyance of the fee simple to the 
son, based on the son’s detrimental reliance on the assurances of the father. This was 
equated to a proprietary estoppel in land by the Privy Council in Plimmer v Mayor of 
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Wellington371; by the High Court in Re Basham372; by the Court of Appeal in Inwards v 
Baker373 and Pascoe v Turner374, and by the House of Lords (Supreme Court) in 
Thorner v Major375.  
 
Thus, Dillwyn376 is considered to be the first and leading case on proprietary estoppel 
that is cited in all cases involving an equitable estoppel in land such as Plimmer v 
Mayor of Wellington377, and Inwards v Baker378. It is also cited by the House of Lords 
(Supreme Court) as authority for proprietary estoppel in Thorner v Major379.   
 
The significance of the Earl of Oxford’s Case380 and Dillwyn v Llewelyn381 is that they 
established the principle that expenditure following a representation by the landowner 
can create an equity in the land, capable of yielding an equitable or proprietary 
interest enforceable against third parties. For example, although in the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case382, the equity created in the land was compensated for, in Dillwyn383 the equity 
gave rise to a proprietary interest in the land itself. Also, the decisions in the above 
cases reflect that an equity in land arises in various circumstances such as where a 
landowner is bound by his words or conduct because the landowner has created or 
encouraged an expectation for an interest in the land, or where the landowner has 
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acquiesced in a party’s expenditure on the land, and where a party has expended 
monies on land in a mistaken belief of title.  
 
The limitation of the Earl of Oxford’s Case384 and Dillwyn v Llewelyn385, is that neither 
mentions the terms ‘estoppel’ or ‘equitable estoppel’ or ‘proprietary estoppel’. They 
only establish an equity that manifested as an estoppel in the Earl of Oxford’s Case386, 
and as a proprietary interest in Dillwyn387. Also, although the decisions of the Courts in 
both the Earl of Oxford’s Case388 and Dillwyn389 illustrate that an estoppel had arisen 
against the landowners by the equity created in the land, the Courts had still not 
established any principles for dealing with the extent of the equity created in the land 
or how that equity ought to be satisfied.    
 
Following Dillwyn390, was the case of Walsh v Lonsdale391 that was determined after 
the Judicature Acts 1873-1875. This case affirmed and applied the supremacy of equity 
contained in Section 25(11) of the Judicature Act 1873 (now reaffirmed in Section 49 
Senior Courts Act 1981), and demonstrates the equitable basis of proprietary estoppel 
that ‘equity regards as done that which ought to be done’.  
 
In Walsh392, the defendant (landlord) had agreed in writing to grant the plaintiff 
(tenant) a seven years’ lease with a condition that the landlord could demand one 
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year’s rent in advance. A deed had not been executed but the plaintiff took possession 
and paid rent quarterly in arrears. The defendant, as per the agreement, demanded a 
year’s rent in advance, and when the plaintiff refused sought to seize the plaintiff’s 
goods to the value of the rent that was owed. The plaintiff disputed the defendant’s 
actions and sued for trespass. 
 
Competing arguments were made in law and equity. At law, there was no deed and 
consequently there could not be a seven years’ lease. Also, the requirement to pay a 
year’s rent in advance was inconsistent with the tenant’s ability to terminate the lease 
by six months’ notice to quit. In equity, on the other hand, there was no need for the 
formality of a lease and, consequently, there was a valid seven years’ lease.  
 
The court held that in so far as law and equity differed as to how the transaction was 
viewed, equity prevailed. A seven years’ lease existed and what the defendant had 
done was lawful. Sir George Jessel M.R. stated that, “There is only one court and the 
equity rules prevail in it.”393 
 
Thompson394 asserted that equity intervenes to ensure specific performance in land 
transactions “because equity takes the view that what ought to be done should be 
regarded as already having been done”395. 
 
The basis of this case is that equity awarded specific performance of the lease. Pending 
the creation of the formal lease, equity considered the lease to have been created by 
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the agreement for a lease and the plaintiff taking possession of the land. The 
agreement must now comply with Section 2 Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1989396 as must any contract concerning land, and also Section 2(5) of 
the same Act provides exception in case of constructive trusts or resulting or implied 
trust, but there is no express exception for estoppel which makes the incidence and 
growth of estoppel even more significant.  An estoppel in contrast can be entirely 
raised without a contract for the sale of land. In addition, equity had created an 
estoppel against the plaintiff who had acted on the informal agreement and was thus 
estopped from denying the informal lease. This would have operated even in the 
absence of any written agreement.  
 
3.4  Conclusion 
In the Earl of Oxford’s Case397, equitable estoppel originated as a general principle to 
prevent the reliance or enforcement of strict legal rights where it was inequitable or 
unconscionable to do so. Gradually, the principle of equitable estoppel was extended 
by the Courts to dealings in land such as in Hunt v Carew398 and Hunning v Ferrers399. 
Whilst the Courts did not expressly determine that an estoppel had arisen in either of 
these cases, the decisions nonetheless imply that equitable estoppel was applied to 
prevent the detriment that the claimant suffered in reliance on the assurances of the 
landowner, and to prevent the landowner from enforcing his or her strict legal rights 
based on the prior dealings of the parties. 
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Despite the establishment of the principle of equity as an estoppel in the Earl of 
Oxford’s Case400, successive cases reflect that the Courts were not inclined to 
expressly state that an estoppel had arisen against the defendant, but rather that the 
defendant was estopped from exercising inequitable or unconscionable conduct. 
Therefore, following the Earl of Oxford’s Case401 the principle of estoppel remained 
unused and undeveloped by the Courts until the later case of Dillwyn v Llewelyn402 
where the Court intervened via equity and, more specifically, by the creation of an 
equity in land as an estoppel against the landowner.  
 
In both the Earl of Oxford’s Case403 and Dillwyn v Llewelyn404, the Courts did not 
expressly state that an estoppel had arisen against the defendant, but the decisions 
illustrate that expenditure on land had created an equity in the land that was 
manifested as an equity against the defendant in the Earl of Oxford’s Case405, and as a 
proprietary interest in the land in Dillwyn v Llewelyn406.  
 
The early cases, involving dealings in land, such as Hunt v Carew407 and Hunning v 
Ferrers408, demonstrate that the Courts adopted a restrictive approach to the 
development of estoppel and were more conservative in prohibiting the detriment 
arising from the representations made and relied on in the dealings between the 
parties. However, in the Earl of Oxford’s Case409 and Dillwyn v Llewelyn410, it appears 
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that the Courts adopted a more liberal approach to the creation of an equity by the 
expenditure on land and the landowner’s acquiescence or encouragement thereon.  
 
The Earl of Oxford’s Case411 and Dillwyn v Llewelyn412 affirmatively laid the foundation 
for equity creating an estoppel against a landowner. These cases also highlight the 
circumstances whereby an equity in land may arise, namely expenditure on land in the 
mistaken belief of title, or by the words or conduct of a landowner in creating or 
encouraging an expectation for an interest in land, or by the acquiescence of a 
landowner in a party’s expenditure on land.  It was the creation of an equity in land, 
giving rise to a proprietary interest as established in Dillwyn v Llewelyn413, that the 
courts later evolved into a proprietary estoppel.   
 
The Judicature Acts of 1873-1875 recognized the primacy of equity over the common 
law where the two jurisdictions clashed, enshrining the principle laid down in the Earl 
of Oxford’s Case414. In situations of conflict between common law and equity, the 
Courts were, therefore, able to apply equitable doctrines and concepts. The Judicature 
Acts thus affirmed the role of equity and arguably furnished an impetus for the 
application of proprietary estoppel, characterized by the significance of conscience- 
based equitable principles. This is exemplified in Walsh v Lonsdale415 where the court 
was prepared to enforce the informal dealings between parties in land, and embraced 
the equitable principle that equity regards as done those arrangements between 
parties which fell short of the strict formalities, required by the common law.  
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Both the Earl of Oxford’s Case416 and Dillwyn417 established the foundation for the 
development of proprietary estoppel as an equitable doctrine in land law, and by 
which equity prevails in land transactions. They also amplify the function of equity as 
an estoppel against the strict common law, and by which equity rules as an estoppel in 
land transactions by proprietary estoppel.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the theoretical perspective of proprietary estoppel as a 
doctrine.  
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Chapter Four: The Theoretical Perspective of Proprietary Estoppel 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter explores the theoretical perspectives or philosophy of law such as legal 
positivism and natural law theory. It aims to critically examine the theoretical 
underpinnings of proprietary estoppel to ascertain the underlying basis of a decision in 
proprietary estoppel. For example, it considers why judges apply morality and 
conscience in proprietary estoppel, rather than simply following strict legal rules418, in 
apparent contradiction of the equitable maxim that “equity follows the law”. It 
illustrates why the courts have been persuaded to redress inequitable or 
unconscionable conduct on the part of a legal owner of land on which the claimant has 
relied to his or her detriment.  
 
The scrutiny of differing theoretical perspectives of law in the context of proprietary 
estoppel will shed light on the rationale deployed by the courts in developing and 
crystallizing the doctrine of estoppel, and the role played by conscience and morality 
during this process.  
 
The approach and discussion adopted in this chapter is distinctive from that of other 
legal scholars419 who have dealt with the topic. These scholars focus on the various 
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theories of law including positivism and natural law, with extensive discussion of what 
they entail, relate the proponents of those theories and the perspectives they 
advance. However, they have not particularly explored the theoretical perspectives 
underpinning   proprietary estoppel itself.   
 
Further, this chapter inquires into the question of whether the doctrine is sound in 
terms of its theoretical basis and the extent to which this forms the basis of the 
principles and decisions of the Courts. For example, to what extent have the courts 
drawn upon the natural law precept of “good conscience” when developing and 
applying the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to ensure that its inherent rationale – 
the prevention of unconscionable behaviour on the part of a legal owner of land – 
is fulfilled?  
 
The chapter evaluates the reasoning behind the courts’ decisions in the decided cases 
discussed throughout the thesis, to determine whether they have been true to this 
fundamental purpose at the heart of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.    
 
4.2  Theoretical Perspectives of Law 
The theories of law provide a philosophical analysis about the nature of law. It 
incorporates legal positivism, natural law theory and critical legal studies that present 
theoretical underpinnings for the creation, application and enforcement of the law and 
legal rules. It also draws the relationship between law and social order; law and 
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morality and the schema of judicial decision making. Thus, the differing perspectives of 
law explicate the operation of law and legal systems.  
  
4.2.1  Natural Law Theory 
Many scholars have contributed to the development and application of natural law 
theory. According to Drury420, natural law encompasses a moral theory of law whereby 
universal moral standards are inherent in all persons and form the basis of a just 
society.  
 
According to Pope421, Thomas Aquinas, a 13th century monk and a proponent of the 
natural theory, articulated that natural law considers basic moral principles as being 
objective, because they are not derived from custom or man-made institutions. 
Pope422 asserted that, to Aquinas, the natural law encompasses a moral realism that is 
based on practical reasoning of moral principles applied to specific facts. This process 
of moral reasoning invokes conscience to produce a moral judgment. Pope423 
maintains that according to Aquinas, moral reasoning may go astray either in 
ignorance of the particulars of a case or by ignorance of the general moral principles 
relevant to it. These moral principles are interpreted by reference to the particular 
nuances of cases, and are not applied rigidly or mechanistically. 
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Wacks424 highlights one example of natural law theory as where certain acts were 
deemed to constitute “crimes against humanity” because they were morally 
reprehensible irrespective of the fact that they did not contravene specific provisions 
of law. In this context, he referred to the Nuremberg War Trials425 where the Tribunal 
did not explicitly appeal to natural law theory, although their judgments represented 
an important recognition of morality, and the principle that the law426 is not 
necessarily the sole determinant of what is right.   
 
Other examples identified by Wacks427 where morality was applied as a yardstick in the 
formulation of intentional legislation include the post-war recognition of human rights 
and their expression in declarations such as the Charter of the United Nations428, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights429 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights430. Also, the development of constitutional safeguards for human or civil rigths 
in various jurisdictions, such as the American Bill of Rights431 illustrate the influence of 
morality in the law. 
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According to Benditt432, natural law theory maintains that there are laws not created 
by human beings but which are binding on them. These laws are of divine origin and 
are immutable and eternal.  
 
Bix433 argues that natural law theory requires the courts to apply ethical judgment in 
their interpretive latitude of the law. Judges exercise a broad discretion in decision-
making that encompasses their moral or ethical beliefs to impart a sense of 
substantive or procedural justice in particular cases. Natural law takes priority in any 
conflict between natural law and positive law, and that all law is morally justified for its 
legitimacy as "law". 
 
Bradley434 expresses the view that natural law is based on intuition of what is self-
evident, and that knowledge of what is self-evident comes from experience and 
willingness to engage in reason and reflection or practical reasonableness.  
 
These scholars adduce that natural law is the epitome of morality which leads judges 
to exercise conscience and practical reasoning in their interpretation of the law. Also, 
that natural law enables judges to bypass legislation and apply their moral convictions 
to a particular case so as to arrive at a moral judgment rather than a legal one.  
 
For instance, the equitable maxim that ‘equity will not allow a statute to be used as an 
instrument of fraud’ provides that equity prevents a party from relying on legal 
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formality where it is unconscionable to do so. For example, in Bannister v Bannister435, 
the lack of legal formality did not defeat a trust. In this case, Y had orally agreed to 
permit X to live in the house that X conveyed to Y. Y later sought to evict X because 
their agreement was not in writing. The Appeal Court held that A was a tenant for life, 
as the agreement was binding despite the lack of formality.  
 
A further example436 is a secret trust which arises where a party executing a will 
creates a trust but fails to state that intention or the precise terms of the trust in the 
will.437 Although, the Wills Act 1837 stipulates that a will contains all the directives for 
the distribution of a deceased’s estate, the secret trust creates the exception. Where 
the deceased had informed his successors of the secret trust, and they seek to 
circumvent it in reliance of the strict application of the Wills Act, then equity 
intervenes with the secret trust to prevent the deceased’s successors from defrauding 
the intended beneficiary of the property. Thus, equity intercedes to provide a moral 
judgment rather than a legal one in the circumstances of a trust.  
 
However, the differing views presented by the scholars above beg the question of the 
yardstick for ascertaining whether a moral judgment is just, fair and right. Is it in the 
subjective assessment of the judge, or is it based on objective notions of conscience as 
accepted within society as universally applicable. These are pervasive issues that raise 
uncertainty to the notions of natural law, and that have not been addressed by these 
scholars.   
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As below, natural law theorists have also presented many distinct and disparate views 
of the nature of the law, and the consequential manner in which judicial decisions are 
made. The common thread advanced between the different theories is that morality is 
the basis of law and that this creates a moral duty to obey the law and do what is 
required by the law.  
 
Lon Fuller438, a proponent of the natural law theory argues against the separation of 
law from morality. According to Ten439, Fuller maintains that morality influences the 
administration of law, as a legal system must embrace the citizen’s need for co-
operation and reciprocal obligations. The notion of fidelity to law introducd by Fuller 
involves a procedural version of natural law operating with an inner morality of eight 
requirements that constitute a “valid legal system”.  
 
According to Asomah440, Fuller’s conception of the inner morality of law contends that 
a valid legal system must: “(1) have rules which are known; (2) be clear; (3) not be 
retrospective; (4) not contain contradictions; (5) not place impossible demands on its 
subjects; (6) not be revised on a temporal basis that prevents citizens from knowing 
the state of the law; (7) administer justice in accordance with legislation, and (8) 
achieve congruence between official action and declared rule.”441 When the eight 
requirements are satisfied, they provide order and coherence to the system of law 
they engender, and prevent law from being overly authoritative and unsustainable. 
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The principles of Fuller’s inner morality are also necessary to bring about a framework 
of reciprocity by which law acquires a moral dimension rather than instituted norms 
and rules by a supreme power. Asomah442 states that Fuller’s view of a valid legal 
system creates a moral duty to obey its laws, and a moral duty to do what is right.  
 
Minda443 states that for Fuller, decision-making according to rules requires judges to 
consider the purpose of the rule they seek to enforce. Judicial inquiry of purpose 
entails much more than simply deciding according to rules, and that judges adopt a 
functional or purposive approach to legal decision making.   
 
Reidy444 refers to another natural law propronent, John Finnis445, who argues that 
citizens internally accept and comply wth legal rules because of moral reasons. He also 
states that Finnis argues from the internal point of view of persons subject to law, 
meaning that the paradigm case law or a legal system is one where citizens have 
internally accepted most of the legal rules for good moral reasons. Finnis states that 
those legal rules that are not backed by moral reasons must be judged defective or 
considered as nonparadigm instances.  
 
Ronald Dworkin446, a natural law theorist, advances that law consists of both formal 
rules and legal principles, and argues for a constructive interpretation of the law by 
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judges. According to Mackie447, Dworkin states that a judge’s decision must harmonize 
with precedent established in similar cases so that unity in the law exists. Legal 
judgments must be coherent with legislation and previous judicial decisions.448 
Further, the exercise of judicial discretion does not create new laws, but ensures 
consistency with existing laws and judicial precedent.449  
 
By analysis, the natural law theorists concede that the natural law theory is founded 
on morality, but advance different propositions of how morality influences the 
decisions of judges. For example, Finnis articulates a functional or purposive approach 
to legal decision making, whereas Dworkin favors a constructive interpretative 
approach towards judicial discretion. Both approaches produce a similar conclusion to 
the effect that moral factors are sufficiently significant to permit judges, in limited 
circumstances to override legislation. Further, the natural law theorists posit that 
natural law embodies legal rules and concepts of moral principles reliant on reason 
and good conscience. They regard the law as creating moral obligations, and that 
obedience to the law leads to justice.  
 
Although these natural law theorists present varied but interconnected perceptions on 
what natural law theory represents, there appears to be no single definition of natural 
law or of the concepts of morality to which they allude. Another drawback to the 
natural law theory propounded is the imposition of possible unpredictability in the 
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application and the enforcement of the law. Since judges are guided by notions of 
good conscience when exercising judicial decision making in the sphere of equity 
jurisdiction, the outcome rests within the discretion of the presiding judge. Also, 
different judges will potentially reach conflicting decisions even when dealing with 
similar issues. The pivotal role accorded to discretion within the decision-making 
process, is liable to create unpredictability in terms of the likely success of legal 
proceedings and the availability and nature of the remedy which flows from them.  
 
4.2.2  Legal Positivism 
In contrast to natural law theory, there is legal positivism based on legislation and 
judicial precedent. According to Reidy450, positivism maintains that “law is law”, and 
has binding authority regardless of its moral merits. Thomas451 articulates that with 
legal positivism, the role of a judge is highly formalistic as judges seek to apply a strict 
doctrine of precedent rather than judicial reasoning, and will try to fit established facts 
into an existing rule so that the facts fit the law rather than the law fitting the facts. 
This process seek to inhibit or curtail judicial discretion by rules and established 
precedent. In other words, the judge tends to adopt a declaratory theory of law by the 
application of rational or predictable rules based on precedent.  
 
Minda452 asserts that positivism reflects a transcendent wisdom built by the judges of 
yesteryear. Judges adhere to that wisdom without question and perceive the exisitng 
law to be the same as natural law. 
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H.L.A Hart453, a leading proponent of positivist theory maintains that the crux of legal 
positivism is the “separation thesis”. According to Hart454, the positivist theory 
encapsulates the notion that legal rights are determined by laws established in society 
to perform or undertake an action, and does not involve any moral right. Hart455 
rejects natural law theory, and holds that the law is whatever is enacted, as such, by 
the legislature in a procedurally correct manner and is not necessarily identified with 
morality. Hart456 also argues that every legal system is a union of primary rules 
(obligation imposing) and secondary rules (power conferring) social rules. Secondary 
rules authorize primary rules, and enable the court’s interpretation and application of 
primary rules. Hart457 maintains that judges are obligated to apply settled principles of 
law in decision-making, and should not be influenced by personal preferences or 
ideology.  
 
Another proponent of legal positivism, is Joseph Raz458 who, according to Bix459, argues 
that the law is what is posited by the legislature, and provides a system of guidance 
and adjudication that is of supreme authority in society. Raz argues that legal rules do 
not impose moral obligations, as the purpose of a legal system is to provide a 
framework for social interaction with no agreement about moral principles. 
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Hans Kelsen460, a proponent of the positivist theory articulates that law and morality 
are independent concepts, as the legitimacy of law does not depend on its moral 
validation. Kelsen461 argues for a pure theory of law whereby the law comprises a basic 
form and basic norm. The form of every law is a conditional order that is directed at 
the courts so as to apply sanctions for delict behavior.462 The law moderates the social 
order by guiding officials on the appropriate action to be taken in the event of 
disobedience to the law.  
 
Therefore, the theorists who advocate legal positivism all concede that the law is 
exactly what is posited by the legislature and the courts by precedent. Judges are 
bound to abide by the written law without any moral compass or judicial reasoning. 
The literal or strict application of the law by judges demands strict compliance by 
society, because its disobedience leads to the controls imposed by the law.  
 
The major drawback to the theory of legal positivism is the formalistic application of 
the law and precedent, potentially culminating in an unfair outcome. The judge is 
merely trying to place a given set of facts and circumstances within the straightjacket 
of pre-existing precedent in order to arrive at a decision. The judge has no discretion 
to decide a case on its own facts unless it is supported by existing precedent. This 
inhibits the development of the law because judges are said to remain bound by the 
wisdom of the past, instead of exercising their moral intuition in the decision-making 
process. The literal application of the law may thus impede the possibility of 
innovation within the legal system. Judges are bound to decide as the legislature 
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ordains, rather than to do what they perceive to be the underlying purpose of law. 
Further, because it is unlikely that legislation will envisage and cover every single act or 
event that may occur within society, it is uncertain how judges can assess the just 
outcome of a case where positive law fails to provide for a specific eventuality.  
 
In contradistinction to the natural law and positivist theories of law, is the theory of 
critical legal studies which incorporate legal realism that is the prevailing legal 
philosophy in the United States. According to Benditt463, realism maintains that judicial 
decision making is creative and intuitive, rather than a mechanical activity. Different 
judges employ their own reasoning processes, which leads to divergent outcomes in 
similar cases. There are no binding legal rules in judicial reasoning and judges have the 
last word on the interpretation of statutes. 
 
The theories of natural law and legal positivism illustrate opposing views on the role of 
morality, legislation and judicial precedent in the law. Legal realism on the other hand 
opposes both views and considers the judge as the ultimate decision maker. However, 
no particular theory is self-evidently convincing as to the nature of law and its 
empirical operation. Generally, as legal systems and society become increasingly 
sophisticated, more than one theory of law underpins the judicial process of decision-
making. Therefore, these conflicting theories serve as crucial interpretive filters 
through which judicial discretion can be objectively examined and assessed.  
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4.3  Natural Law and Equity 
According to Edwards and Stockwell464, the evolution of equity can be traced back to 
the Lord Chancellor who was a clergyman, the King's confessor, and the keeper of the 
King's conscience. As an ecclesiastic, he was learned in civil law and well versed in 
moral and canon law which was the essence of equity.465 The Lord Chancellor resolved 
disputes based on his ideas, beliefs and conscience, and not by strict legal doctrine.466 
It was this resolution of disputes by conscience which developed into a system of law 
known as equity.467 Thus, equity emerged on a foundation of religious principles rather 
than from formalistic legal precedent and procedural processes.468 Hence, the 
foundation of equity on moral and religious principles is reflective of natural law 
theory which maintains that laws are valid only when they conform to a constant 
notion of morality.  
 
Lord Denning also asserts that equity is founded on natural law principles of morality 
and conscience, describing equity as follows:  
Equity is not a static system of law established for all time but can be 
adapted to any situation. It has developed from the cannon law in the 
nineteenth century which relied on reason and conscience. It is the 
application to particular circumstances of the standard of what seems 
naturally just and right. The basis of equity is that the judge must have a 
discretion to do justice in individual cases as laws cannot be framed to 
cover all eventualities. Equity is concerned with the reality of the 
situation and not with the formalities. It is concerned with the 
substance, not the form and with the intention of the parties. If the 
intention of the parties is vitiated by fraud, duress or mistake the 
transaction can be rectified and set aside. It will provide for specific 
performance of a contract where the remedy of damages is not enough. 
In exercising his discretion, the judge takes into consideration all 
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relevant matters relating to the justice or injustice of granting the relief 
sought, delay or hardship or unfairness.469  
 
Lord Denning thus epitomizes equity as a moral code of conduct for doing what is 
naturally just and right. For example, in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High 
Trees House Ltd470, his Lordship stated that “the law said that the contract must be 
observed, but equity said that the landlord had promised to reduce the rent and he 
should keep his promise”.471  The court held that the landlord was bound by his 
promise in equity. It was unconscionable for the landlord to revert to the increased 
rent when the tenants had acted on the promise of the reduced rent to their 
detriment. Here, morality and conscience had prevailed over the law to enforce the 
promise of the reduced rent. 
 
Lord Denning also asserted that “without religion there can be no morality, and 
without morality there can be no law”472; and that “many of the Christian precepts 
have given origin to the precepts of law”.473 Thus, according to Lord Denning, many of 
the fundamental principles of law were derived from the Christian religion. He 
articulated that the law proceeds on Christian principles whereby if you love your 
neighbour, you will take care not to injure him; and if perchance you should do him 
damage by negligence then you will compensate him.474 For example, this “Christian” 
principle was applied in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson475 where Lord Atkin 
established the principle of negligence that: 
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The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must 
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question " Who is my 
neighbor? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to 
avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be 
likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour? The 
answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by 
my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being 
so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which 
are called in question.476 
 
Thus, the traditional Christian principles that infuse the law impute a moral duty to do 
right to another and to make recompense for acts or omissions that may cause loss or 
damage. Similarly, the maxims of equity, which are general principles that govern 
equity and equitable conduct, are also founded on Christian principles of morality, 
conscience and reciprocity. For example, the maxim ‘equity acts in personam’ means 
that equity acts “on the person” and not against property. Orders are enforced against 
the defendant such as an injunction, specific performance of a contract or to observe a 
trust. Likewise, the maxim ‘equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy’ 
demonstrates that equity will not allow a claim to be defeated by the formality 
requirements of common law. For example, the use of specific performance can 
enforce contracts that are otherwise unenforceable at law and the use of injunctions 
can restrain threatened actions or protect a plaintiff’s interests before trial.  
 
Thus, equity is founded upon Christian principles that mirror natural law principles of 
morality and conscience to ascertain the truth of a transaction to prevent 
unconscionable conduct between parties.   
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Another example of the pervasiveness of morality in the law is the dissenting speech of 
Lord Goff in Tinsley v Milligan477, which stated that the claimant could not acquire any 
equitable rights in the property which she had purchased, because she had committed 
a criminal offence.478 The claimant’s conduct invoked equity against her, as equity 
does not provide a remedy where a party has acted unconscionably.479 Here, the 
morality of the law took precedence over legislation which recognized the claimant as 
the legal owner of the land by purchase.   
 
In his criticism of legal positivism, Lord Denning states that: 
 If lawyers hold to their precedents too closely, forgetful of the 
principles of truth and justice which they should serve, they may find 
the whole edifice comes tumbling down about them. They will be lost in 
“the codeless myriad of precedent. That wilderness of single instances. 
The common law will cease to grow. Like a coral reef it will become a 
structure of fossils.480 
 
Lord Denning argues that the strict application of precedent without morality in the 
law causes stagnation, because the application of legal principles impedes the 
constructive development of the law and impacts on fairness and justice. This, in turn, 
leads to a wilderness of single instances which prevent the development of the law 
and the loss of truth and justice.  
 
Hence, natural law underpins the moral basis of equity, with its attendant reliance on 
notions of fairness and good conscience. A decision in equity is a decision of morality 
and conscience, both reflective of natural law.  
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4.4  Natural Law and Proprietary Estoppel 
Proprietary estoppel is a doctrine founded in equity and therefore reflects and 
encompasses the moral character of equity described above. Like the natural law 
principles of equity elucidated by Lord Denning, proprietary estoppel encapsulates the 
wide discretion of judges to examine all the facts and circumstances of a case to arrive 
at a decision by logical reasoning and deduction. It also imputes the necessity of 
conscience in judicial decision making to prevent the reliance on formality and the 
enforcement of strict legal rights. For example, why do the courts apply the test of 
unconscionability in proprietary estoppel? The natural law theory holds that it arises 
from an innate sense of morality to do right from wrong and that the doctrine is based 
on a moral realism that adopts practical reasoning by the courts.  
 
The function of proprietary estoppel as a natural law doctrine is exemplified by Lord 
Denning who articulates that a decision in equity is premised on doing what is 
naturally just and right, and by reasoning and conscience.481 Lord Denning also 
emphasized the natural law principle that judges must have a discretion to do justice 
in individual cases, as laws cannot be framed to cover all eventualities, and the courts 
must be mindful of the reality of a situation rather than with strict formalities.482  
 
For example, Lord Denning applied a natural law analysis in Eves v Eves483 where the 
defendant had failed to put the claimant’s name on the legal title to their home. The 
parties were unmarried and the claimant had borne two children to the defendant. 
Although the claimant had not directly contributed to the purchase price of the home, 
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she had undertaken substantial work in its rehabilitation. The plans for marriage did 
not materialize and the defendant left the claimant for another woman. Lord Denning 
asserted that the contribution of the claimant was such that had she been a wife in a 
divorce, she would have obtained a share in the home. Lord Denning held it would be 
inequitable for the defendant to deny the claimant any share in the house, and held 
that the claimant was entitled to a fair quarter share in the home based on all she had 
done and was doing for the defendant and the children, and would thereafter do. This 
case illustrates that conscience and morality was applied to recognize the Claimant’s 
equity in the home against the Defendant’s legal title. Hence, morality and conscience 
prevailed over pre-existing precedent to enable her to establish an equitable interest 
in the family home.  
 
Lord Denning also applied natural law analysis in Tanner v Tanner484 where the parties 
had agreed to purchase a house for the defendant and the children. The claimant had 
paid for the house and the defendant left her rented house to live with the claimant. 
The claimant later asked the defendant to leave and filed for possession. Lord Denning 
asserted that the provision of a place to live was in return for the defendant and the 
children to live there. Lord Denning ruled that the claimant had a duty to the children, 
and in the circumstances the duration of the licence to leave in the home lasted until 
the children were of school leaving age to enable the defendant to afford them a 
better upbringing that was anticipated in the home. This case demonstrates that 
although the Defendant had not established an equity in the home, the Claimant’s 
promise of a secure home for the defendant and children was binding by morality, 
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conscience and reciprocity of the promise. Hence, morality and conscience prevailed 
over the law to achieve an equitable outcome.  
 
Lord Denning was cognizant of the intentions of the parties rather than the form of 
arrangement, and exercised a broad discretion to do what was naturally just and right 
in the circumstances rather than enforce the law or strict legal rights of the parties. 
Proprietary estoppel is therefore a moral precept of equity, and a decision in 
proprietary estoppel is a decision embedded in the conscience and morality of natural 
law, rather than the positivistic insistence on adherence to strict legal rules.   
 
4.5  Conclusion 
The philosophies of positivism and natural law have attempted to define the nature of 
the law and the duty of those bound by it to comply with the rules and procedures 
which it prescribes. These conflicting theories impinge upon the judicial decision-
making function and the manner in which it ought properly to be exercised. In turn, 
they illuminate the relationship between the positivist approach enshrined within the 
common law, and the natural law-based precepts of equity and equitable jurisdiction. 
They also portray the progression of the law from the common law positivist approach 
of precedent to embracing the natural law of equity. As the law and society evolve, 
legal systems are rarely confined to just one philosophy, but encompass an amalgam 
of the theories of positivism and natural law.  
 
Proprietary estoppel, as an equitable doctrine, is grounded in natural law theory. 
Equity embraces transcendent precepts derived from ideas of morality and good 
conscience echoed in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. Proprietary estoppel, 
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therefore, reflects the religious, moral and equitable principles of equity, all 
pervasively governed by adherence to good conscience. When a Court considers 
whether a proprietary estoppel arises in the facts and circumstances of a case, it is not 
minded to think whether or not the transaction of the parties is permitted by 
legislation, but instead considers the morality of the transaction. Specifically, it 
addresses whether a landowner should be permitted to renege on the representations 
made to another party who has suffered a detriment in reliance on the landowner’s 
representations. The Court, in effect, determines whether the landowner has acted 
unconscionably towards the other party, and therefore, holds the landowner bound by 
his or her words or conduct.   
 
Pertinently, the law is not self-applying and a law cannot by itself indicate exactly 
which factual circumstances are covered by it and which are not.485  Hence, judges are 
charged with the judicial task of interpreting and ascertaining the law, and the above 
theories provide the mechanism to best understand the process and impact of judicial 
decision making. Because proprietary estoppel is an equitable doctrine originating in 
natural law theory, each case where it is applied emanates from the intuitiveness of 
judges to achieve an equitable result based upon notions of fairness and good 
conscience. The extent to which this is achieved evidences the soundness of the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the transition of proprietary estoppel from a traditional 
approach to a modern approach in the Courts.  
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Chapter Five: The Transition of Proprietary Estoppel from a Traditional Approach 
to a Modern Approach in the Courts 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter involves a methodical examination of the case law to trace the origins of 
proprietary estoppel and the approaches applied by the Courts in the development of 
proprietary estoppel over the years. It explains how and why the doctrine transitioned 
from a traditional approach into a modern approach as an established legal doctrine 
from its early inception in Ramsden v Dyson486 to the most recent Supreme Court 
decision of Thorner v Major487. 
 
The approach and analysis presented in this chapter is exclusive, as other legal 
scholars488 have not adopted the same view, and neither investigated the 
development of the doctrine via case law to the same extent or depth as discussed. 
These scholars489 have, to a large extent, dealt with proprietary estoppel as a doctrine 
in land law and focused on such topics as the elements of the doctrine, the types of 
proprietary estoppel and decided cases, and compare the doctrine with constructive 
trust.  
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Further, this chapter inquires into the question of whether the doctrine is sound in 
terms of the courts’ transition from a traditional approach to a modern approach for 
the determination of an estoppel. Although the approach towards aspects of the 
doctrine may have developed with the passage of time, it will emerge that the courts’ 
determination to redress unconscionability in the specific contexts in which a claim 
based on proprietary estoppel arises, has been an enduring and consistently applied 
theme. This facet of the doctrine has not been explored by other legal scholars490.  
 
The chapter aims to present a critical analysis of the development of proprietary 
estoppel in preventing the legal owner of land from denying an equitable estoppel 
interest in favour of a claimant who would otherwise suffer from the legal owner’s 
unconscionable behavior. It reflects on the underlying impetus and rationale for the 
doctrine and the criteria necessary to give rise to the remedy of proprietary estoppel. 
Through scrutiny of relevant case law, the nature and character of the doctrine of 
estoppel will emerge, as will its novelty in creating a proprietary interest in land in 
favour of a claimant who previously had no such interest.  
 
This chapter traces the case by case law development of the doctrine in the courts, 
which flows to its progression to the House of Lords in further chapters.  
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5.2  The Development of Proprietary Estoppel by the Courts   
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel has a long historical pedigree originating in the 
House of Lords decision in Ramsden v Dyson491, and which one hundred and forty-two 
years later was approved by the House of Lords (Supreme Court) in Thorner v 
Major492. During the intervening period, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
participated in the development of the doctrine in various cases, including Taylor 
Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd493, Re Basham494, Crab v Arun 
District Council495 and Gillett v Holt496. Finally, Thorner v Major497 gave the House of 
Lords the opportunity of reviewing and affirming the operation of proprietary 
estoppel, crystallizing its significance for potential litigants.  
 
Proprietary estoppel had its roots in the doctrine of equitable estoppel, explored in 
Ramsden v Dyson498 after which it slowly emerged as a fully-fledged doctrine through 
a gradual process of judicial creativity.  
 
Judicial reasoning was impelled by the application of equitable principles to address 
unconscionable behavior on the part of the legal owner of land. In Crab v Arun District 
Council499 and Gillett v Holt500, the landowner was prevented from exercising his strict 
legal rights where it was inequitable to do so, by invoking the Court’s intervention to 
satisfy the equity that had been inchoately created in the land. It will emerge that each 
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decided case demonstrates that ‘a Court of Equity’ will not permit inequitable conduct 
on the part of the landowner. The decisions in Plimmer v Mayor of Wellington501 and 
Ives v High502 can be described as groundbreaking and revolutionary in nature in that 
the Courts applied the traditional doctrine of equitable estoppel to create an equitable 
proprietary interest in land, and were also prepared to extend the doctrine to new 
circumstances. Crab v Arun District Council503 and Thorner v Major504 can be described 
as progressive and reformative in their affirmation and extension of the previously 
established principles underlying the doctrine of estoppel.  
 
5.2.1  The Traditional Approach of Proprietary Estoppel   
The traditional approach appears to have originated in the House of Lords (Supreme 
Court) in the judgment of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson505. In Crab v Arun 
District Council506, Lord Scarman stated that “Ramsden v Dyson507 may properly be 
considered as the modern starting point of the law of equitable estoppel.”  
 
Ramsden v Dyson508 was an appeal from the Queen’s Bench to the House of Lords 
against the decision of the Vice Chancellor that two tenants were entitled to long 
leases from the estate holder based on their building on the land on the faith of the 
assurances of the landowner’s agent that they would never be disturbed. The Vice 
Chancellor’s decision was overturned and there was a difference of opinion by the 
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House of Lords on an issue of fact on what was said by the agent to cause the two 
tenants to be paying lower rents than the other tenants of the landowner.  
 
The appeal to the House of Lords was determined by four Lordships including Lord 
Cranworth, Lord Wensleydale, Lord Kingsdown and Lord Westbury. The majority of 
their Lordships namely: Lord Cranworth, Lord Wensleydale and Lord Westbury, 
decided that the appeal could not be substantiated in law or in equity and it was 
dismissed without costs. Lord Kingsdown, in the minority dissented, because in his 
view the Respondents were entitled to some kind of equitable relief.  
 
Lord Cranworth, Lord Wensleydale and Lord Westbury concurred that at law, there 
was no contract, express or implied, by the landlord to grant a long-term lease.  
Specifically, Lord Cranworth stated that equity could only intervene in circumstances 
where a stranger was building on the land believing it was his or her own, and the 
landowner had acquiesced in his or her acts. He stated thus:  
 If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own and I, 
perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right and leave him to 
persevere in his error, a Court of equity will not allow me afterwards to 
assert my title to the land on which he had expended money on the 
supposition that the land was his own.509 
 
Lord Cranworth asserted that equity could not assist the Respondents who had built 
on the lands knowing it belonged to the landlord. He stated thus: 
For if a stranger builds on my land knowing it to be mine, there is no 
principle of equity which would prevent my claiming the land with the 
benefit of all the expenditure made on it. There would be nothing in my 
conduct, active or passive making it inequitable in me to assert my legal 
rights.510 
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Lord Cranworth further explained his decision against the interposition of equity thus:  
…if my tenant builds on land which he holds under me, he does not 
thereby in the absence of special circumstances acquire any right to 
prevent me from taking possession of the land and buildings when the 
tenancy is determined. He knew the extent of his interest, and it was his 
folly to expend money upon a title which he knew would, or might soon, 
come to an end.511 
 
Lord Westbury concurred with Lord Cranworth, whilst Lord Wensleydale reiterated 
Lord Cranworth’s interpretation of the extent and scope of equitable relief:  
If a stranger builds on my land, supposing it to be his own and I knowing 
it to be mine do not interfere but leave him to go on, equity considers it 
to be dishonest in me to remain passive and afterwards to interfere and 
take the profit. But if a stranger build knowingly upon my land there is no 
principle of equity which prevents me from insisting on having back my 
land, with all the additional value which the occupier has imprudently 
added to it. If a tenant of mine does the same thing, he cannot insist on 
refusing to give up the estate at the end of his term. It was his own folly 
to build.512 
 
The reasoning behind the decision of the majority of their Lordships was that the 
Respondents were not strangers building on the land believing it to be their own or in 
the mistaken belief of title. Instead they were tenants who knew the land was owned 
by the landlord and had expended monies on the land knowing they had no title. 
Therefore, their Lordships concurred that equity could not assist in the folly of the 
Respondents. 
 
In contrast, Lord Kingsdown, in his dissenting judgment, articulated that the 
Respondent had “made out a case for relief of some kind in a Court of Equity”. His 
reasoning was that the tenants had acted on the assurance that leases were not 
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required and they would not be disturbed in their possession without full 
compensation.  
 
Lord Kingsdown stated that:  
…what I understand that law to be upon the subject and the effect 
generally which the evidence has produced on my mind. The rule of law 
applicable to the case appears to me to be this: If a man under a verbal 
agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land or what amounts 
to the same thing under an expectation created or encouraged by the 
landlord that he shall have a certain interest takes possession of such 
land with the consent of the landlord and upon the faith of such promise 
or expectation with the knowledge of the landlord and without objection 
by him lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the 
landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation. This was the 
principle of the decision in Gregory v Mighell (1811) and as I conceive is 
open to no doubt.513 
 
Lord Kingsdown’s approach in equity was based on the assurances of the landlord and 
the expectations created for a long-term lease that led the Respondents to expend 
monies in building on the land. His Lordship also asserted a limitation on his judgment 
for equitable relief, that equity would not intervene in circumstances where the 
landlord had not encouraged the expenditure or created the expectation of the 
extended lease. He stated thus: 
 If, on the other hand, a tenant being in possession of land and knowing 
the nature and extent of his interest, lays out money upon it in the hope 
or expectation of an extended term or an allowance for expenditure, 
then if such hope or expectation has not been created or encouraged by 
the landlord, the tenant has no claim which any Court of law or equity 
can enforce. This was the principle of the decision in Pilling v Armitage514 
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and like the decision in Gregory v Mighell515 seems founded on plain 
rules of reason and justice.516  
 
On the facts, however, the landlord had encouraged the tenant’s expenditure on the 
land and created the expectation of an extended lease and, therefore, a Court of 
equity would in Lord Kingsdown’s view enforce the interest that was created or 
encouraged. 
 
Lord Scarman, in Crab v Arun District Council517 stated that “the law has developed so 
that today it is to be considered as correctly stated by Lord Kingsdown in his dissenting 
speech in Ramsden v Dyson”518. His Lordship also asserted that although the 
statement of the law was expressed in the context of landlord and tenant, it had 
nonetheless been accepted as being of general application.  
 
It is clear that, Lord Kingsdown established a very broad approach to equitable 
estoppel based on the informal dealings of parties, the words or conduct of the 
landowner, the expectations created or encouraged by the landowner, and also the 
expenditure on land which created an equity that was capable of giving rise to a 
proprietary interest in land. His Lordship’s statement of the law was underpinned by 
equity, whereby it will not allow a landowner to profit from a party’s expenditure on 
land where he or she had acquiesced in that party’s expenditure or had created or 
encouraged an expectation for an interest in land. Lord Kingsdown’s statement of the 
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law, therefore, established the proprietary character of estoppel in relation to land. It 
is predicated on the basis that equity is not bound by the landowner’s title to land or 
by the usual formalities required to create a legal interest in land.519  
 
Following Ramsden v Dyson520 was the High Court case of Willmott v Barber521 which 
had curtailed the principle of equitable estoppel established in Ramsden v Dyson522.  
 
In Willmott523 a lessee had agreed to let one acre of land to the plaintiff and to sell the 
remainder of his interest to him despite a covenant in the lessee’s lease not to assign 
without a license. The plaintiff was not aware of the covenant and took possession of 
the one acre and expended money on it. The plaintiff later gave notice to the lessee of 
his intention to exercise his option to purchase his interest as agreed in their lease. The 
lessee declined to sell to the plaintiff on the ground that the lessor had refused to give 
a license to an assignment. The plaintiff instituted claim against the lessee and lessor 
for specific performance of the agreement by the lessee, and to compel the lessor to 
grant a license by his acquiescence in the plaintiff’s expenditure and mistaken belief 
that the lessee would assign the property to him. The lessor was not aware of the 
lessee’s covenant not to assign without a license at the time of the plaintiff’s 
expenditure, but later became aware of the lease agreement. It was held that the 
lessee could not be compelled to perform the agreement as it would be in breach of 
his prior covenant not to assign without a license.  
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Fry J ruled against equitable estoppel because legal title could not be defeated except 
by fraud. He stated that: “It requires very strong evidence to induce the Court to 
deprive a man of his legal right when he has expressly stipulated that he shall be 
bound only by a written document.”524 To Fry J, it was fraud alone, and not equity that 
could deprive a man of his legal rights to land.  
 
Fry J held that estoppel could not deprive a landowner of his strict legal rights unless 
he or she had acted in such a way to make it fraudulent to set up those rights. He 
established the five probanda as the pre-requisites for a claim in estoppel as follows:  
The plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights; the plaintiff 
must have expended money or done some act on the faith of his 
mistaken belief; the defendant, the possessor of the legal right must 
know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right 
claimed by the plaintiff; the defendant, the possessor of the legal right 
must know of the plaintiff’s mistaken belief of his rights; and the 
defendant, the possessor of the legal right must have encouraged the 
plaintiff in his expenditure of money or other acts done either directly or 
by abstaining from asserting his legal right.” Where all the elements exist, 
then there is fraud of such a nature that will entitle the Court to restrain 
the possessor of the legal right from exercising it.525  
 
These probanda formed the strict preconditions for the operation of estoppel, as 
opposed to the more expansive principles by Ramsden v Dyson526. Contrary to Lord 
Kingsdown’s judgment, Fry J established that equitable estoppel without more, could 
not deprive a man of his or her legal title. This begged the question of whether or not 
Lord Kingsdown’s judgment was an accurate statement of the law. Was equitable 
estoppel capable of depriving the legal owner of land of his collateral “right” to enjoy 
that land? Was the dissenting judgment of Lord Kingsdown a false claimer for the 
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doctrine of estoppel? Should legal ownership of land be impregnable, regardless of the 
unconscionability of the landowner?  
 
Fry J’s formulation was highly criticized by scholars527, the High Court528 and Court of 
Appeal529. In Crab v Arun District Council530, Lord Scarman stated that: 
Fraud was a word often in the mouths of those robust Judges who 
adorned the bench in the 19th century. It is less often in the mouths of 
the more wary judicial spirits today who sit upon the bench. But it is clear 
that whether one uses the word fraud or not, the plaintiff has to establish 
as a fact that the defendant by setting up his right is taking advantage of 
him in a way which is unconscionable, inequitable or unjust.531  
 
Lord Scarman further expressed that the “fraud in these cases is not to be found in the 
transaction itself but in the subsequent attempt to go back on the basic assumptions 
which underlay it.”532  
 
Oliver J, in Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Ltd533, also asserted that 
“…there is no room for the literal application of the probanda in Ramsden v 
Dyson534”535. Oliver J postulated that the circumstances in Ramsden536 “…do not 
presuppose a mistake on anybody’s part, but merely fostered an expectation in the 
minds of both parties at the time which, once it had been acted on, would be 
unconscionable to permit the landlord to depart.”537 
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Jackson et al (2008)538 also stated that in Ramsden v Dyson539 Lord Kingsdown had      
…articulated a more generalized jurisdiction for establishing an equity rooted in 
the concept of expectations induced by the landowner, rather than the mistake 
of the claimant ..540.   
 
Kevin Gray and Susan Gray541 suggest that the probanda had restricted the 
application, development and availability of estoppel as a remedy thus: 
The probanda came to be applied indiscriminately to all forms of 
estoppel claims thereby dramatically curtailing the availability of 
estoppel-based remedies. In particular, the estoppel doctrine was 
rendered virtually inapplicable to cases of common expectation in which 
mistaken assumptions of entitlement, if there are any, are usually 
bilateral and wholly innocent. The requirement that the estoppel 
claimant be positively mistaken as to his existing rights operated harshly 
where the claimant was in no doubt as to the absence of any strict 
entitlement on his own part, but had been led to expect that he would 
somehow or at some stage acquire rights by relying upon the 
representation made by the landowner. Dogmatic insistence on the five 
probanda caused special difficulty in the context of informal family 
arrangements where full awareness of non-entitlement in strict law is 
often wholly incompatible with an ill-defined expectation of future 
entitlement.542  
 
The probanda was short lived, as four years later, in Plimmer v Mayor of Wellington543 
the Privy Council affirmed and approved Lord Kingsdown’s judgment as the basis for 
establishing equitable estoppel. 
 
In Plimmer544, the Appellants had occupied Government land by a revocable licence 
and established a jetty and harbor thereon with the Government’s permission. The 
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Government later encouraged the appellants to extend the jetty and establish a 
warehouse on the land. The Appellant expended monies for that purpose in the 
expectation that his occupation would not be disturbed. The Government later sought 
possession of the land. Their Lordships held that the Appellants had an ‘equity arising 
from their expenditure on the land’ and the Government was estopped from asserting 
that the licence was revocable, as it constituted an estate or interest in the land.  
 
Their Lordships granted an equitable estoppel for the Appellant because the licence 
given by the Government to the Appellant had become irrevocable by the request for 
the extension of the jetty and the construction of a warehouse. The request had   
sufficiently created a reasonable expectation in the Appellant’s mind that his 
occupation would not be disturbed.    
 
Their Lordships stated that: “the law relating to cases of this kind may be taken as 
stated by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson545”.546 
Their Lordships held that: 
This case falls within the principle stated by Lord Kingsdown as to 
expectations created or encouraged by the landlord, with the addition 
that in this case the landlord did more than encourage the expenditure, 
for he took initiative in requesting it. [….] that the equity arising from 
expenditure on land need not fail merely on the ground that the interest 
to be secured has not been expressly indicated. [….] In fact, the court 
must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the 
equity can be satisfied.547   
 
The Privy Council effectively re-instated Lord Kingsdown’s judgment as the 
criteria for reliance on equitable estoppel. It re-established the capacity of 
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equitable estoppel to create a proprietary interest in land, and emphasized the 
discretionary basis of estoppel. The Privy Council broadly construed and 
extended Lord Kingsdown’s principle removing it from the confines of the 
landlord tenant situation to the broader context of an irrevocable license in land. 
This demonstrated the flexibility of the doctrine to evolve and relate to 
circumstances beyond its original remit.     
 
The ratio of Plimmer548 was applied by the Court of Appeal in Inwards v Baker549 
which also established an equitable estoppel in land. A father (F) had persuaded his 
son (S) to build a house on F’s land with the assurance that the house would remain 
there indefinitely as long as S wished to use the property as his home. S expended his 
monies in constructing the home and lived there for thirty years. Upon the father’s 
death, the successors of his estate sought to evict the son off the land. The Court 
refused to order possession against S and held S could remain there so long as he 
desired to use it as his home.  
 
The Court granted the remedy of equitable estoppel to the son because the licensee 
had, at the request and encouragement of the landlord, expended monies in the 
expectation of being allowed to live on the land. The Court did not allow the 
expectation of the licensee to be defeated as it was inequitable to do so.   
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Lord Denning MR stated that: “It is an equity well recognized in law. It arises from the 
expenditure of money by a person in actual occupation of land when he is led to 
believe that as a result of that expenditure he will be allowed to remain there.”550  
Danckwerts L.J. also stated that:  
…it seems to me that this is one of the cases of an equity created by 
estoppel or equitable estoppel as it is sometimes called by which a 
person who has made the expenditure is induced by the expectation of 
obtaining protection and equity protects him so that an injustice may not 
be perpetrated.551  
 
The Court of Appeal in Inwards v Baker552 affirmed the concept of equitable estoppel 
established in Ramsden v Dyson553 and Plimmer v Wellington554, and extended the 
principle to the creation of a licence to remain on land. The court established that the 
equity arising from the expenditure on land does not fail, as it creates an equitable 
estoppel against the landowner.  
 
Following Inwards v Baker555 the Court of Appeal in ER Ives Ltd v High556 also affirmed 
the principle of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson557 and Plimmer v Wellington558. 
In that case, the defendant owned lands on which he was building his house. A block of 
flats was being built on the adjoining land and the defendant realized that the 
foundation of the flats had trespassed onto his land. The defendant met with the 
adjoining owner and the parties agreed that the defendant would permit the trespass 
in return for the adjoining owner granting the defendant a right of way across his land. 
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The defendant built his house with the only access being via the right of way on the 
adjoining land. The block of flats was later sold but there was no mention of the right 
of way and it was not registered as a land charge. The new owners of the flats 
permitted the defendant to use the right of way for fourteen years without objection, 
and the defendant built a garage on his land in reliance that the right of way was valid. 
However, the flats were again sold at an auction to the plaintiff, and the auction had 
stated the flats were subject to a right of way and the conveyance had mentioned the 
right of way. The plaintiff nonetheless sought an injunction against the defendant for 
the right of way on the ground that it was not registered as a land charge and was 
void.  
 
The Court granted an equitable estoppel to the defendant because of equity’s 
insistence on redressing unconscionable behavior. The right arose from the 
defendant’s expenditure in building the garage, and the plaintiff’s predecessor had 
stood by and acquiesced in it knowing that the defendant believed that he had a right 
of way. The plaintiff’s predecessor had created a reasonable expectation in the 
defendant’s mind that his access over the yard would not be disturbed.    
 
Lord Denning stated that the defendant’s expectation that he would not be disturbed 
gave rise to an “…equity arising out of acquiescence”559 available against the plaintiff’s 
predecessors and their successors in title. Lord Denning expressed that “The court will 
not allow that expectation to be defeated when it would be inequitable to do so.”560  
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In Ives v High561, Danckwerts L.J. accepted the validity of the term ‘proprietary 
estoppel’ to explain that estoppel was capable of establishing an equitable proprietary 
interest in land.  
Danckwerts L.J. stated as follows:  
There is another equitable ground on which Mr. High's rights may be 
protected, which has nothing whatever to do with the Land Charges 
Act. It is discussed in Snell's Equity, 26th ed. (1966), pp. 629-633, under 
the name "proprietary estoppel," and the comment is made (p. 633) 
that "the doctrine thus displays equity at its most flexible.562 
 
Danckwerks L.J. then proceeded to illustrate the circumstances that gave rise to the 
proprietary estoppel of the defendants thus: 
There are two aspects in which equitable estoppel applies in the 
present case. First, the defendant in reliance of the arrangement made 
with Mr. Westgate allowed the encroaching foundations to remain on 
his land and built his house without proper access except over the yard, 
and finally built his garage in such a way that it was useless unless 
access to it could be had over the yard. Mr. Westgate acquiesced in the 
use of the yard for access, and the Wrights stood by and indeed 
encouraged the defendant to build his garage in these conditions and 
for these purposes. Could anything be more monstrous and inequitable 
afterwards to deprive the defendant of the benefit of what he has 
done?563  
 
Danckwerks L.J. continued to assert the circumstances of the defendant’s entitlement 
to a proprietary estoppel that: 
Secondly, the Wrights continued to enjoy the benefit of the encroaching 
foundations on the defendant’s land. It would no doubt be quite an 
expensive job to remove the encroaching foundations and provide 
other support for the building. Equity does not allow a person who 
takes advantage of such a situation to deny to the other party the 
corresponding benefits which were the consideration for allowing the 
foundation to remain. The plaintiffs bought the property subject to the 
defendant’s equitable rights and the property was so conveyed to them. 
[…] The principle stated here is not new. It goes back at least as far as 
the observations of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson (1866)564 
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which were approved by the Privy Council in Plimmer v Wellington 
Corporation (1884)565.566 
 
Danckwerts L.J. held a proprietary estoppel was established because an equity had 
arisen from the expense incurred by the claimant in building the garage with the 
former owners’ acquiescence in standing by, knowing that the defendant had believed 
he had a right of way. The defendant’s equity was binding on the claimant’s successor 
in title, who had express actual notice of the right of way and where it was inequitable 
to deny its existence. The court did not focus on the agreement or representation of 
the parties, but ruled that the equity had been created with the other party’s ‘implied’ 
consent.   
 
This was the process by which the term ‘proprietary estoppel’ was inscribed by the 
Court and given judicial status as proprietary estoppel. The principle of proprietary 
estoppel, established in Ramsden v Dyson567 had evolved during the intervening 
period as ‘equitable estoppel’, until Ives v High568 adopted the term ‘proprietary 
estoppel’ to describe the doctrine which the court was applying. The umbrella term 
captured and re-interpreted the previous case law in which estoppel had been applied 
to establish a proprietary interest in land.  
 
The strength of the traditional approach is that it laid the foundational principles for 
proprietary estoppel and also gave rise to the term by which it came to be known. In 
the early stages, the Courts had widened the application of equitable estoppel from 
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the landlord tenant situation in Ramsden v Dyson569, to include an irrevocable licence 
in Plimmer v Mayor of Wellington570, a right of way in Ives v High571 and also a licence 
to remain on land in Inwards v Baker572. The weakness exemplified by the traditional 
approach is that the early cases had not yet established the particular requirements 
for the doctrine and its remedy. Nonetheless, the traditional approach had set the 
scene for the development of the doctrine by the later Courts.  
 
5.2.2  The Modern Approach of Proprietary Estoppel  
The modern approach of proprietary estoppel involves the cases whereby the doctrine 
was pleaded as a defence or cause of action in the Courts. These cases led the Courts 
to establish the apparatus for the application and operation of proprietary estoppel, 
and to re-define the law on proprietary estoppel.  
 
In Crab v Arun District Council573, the claimant was assured that the defendant would 
build a right of way to his land so that a portion could be sold off without leaving the 
remainder landlocked. The defendant had also built a fence with a gap to confirm the 
right of way. The claimant sold a portion of his land in reliance of the defendant’s 
assurance of a right of way that left his land landlocked. Relations between the parties 
broke down, and the defendant filled the gap and demanded monies to construct a 
right of way. The Appellant pleaded a right of way by equitable estoppel, promissory 
or proprietary. The Court of Appeal held that it was inequitable for the Respondent to 
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insist on its strict legal rights, as the Appellant had established his equity in the land 
and was granted an easement without payment.  
 
The Court established a proprietary interest in land, by estoppel, in favour of the 
Appellant. The Appellant was led to believe that he would be granted a right of access 
over the Respondent’s land, and the Respondents had erected their gates at 
considerable expense in such a way to cause the Appellant to believe that the right of 
access would be granted. Also, the Respondent had known of the Appellant’s intention 
to sell his land and did nothing to dissuade him but had confirmed it by erecting their 
gates. The Respondent had acquiesced in the Appellant’s conduct and further, the 
Respondent’s conduct had caused the Appellant to act as he did, which raised an 
equity in the Appellant’s favour against the Respondent.   
 
Crab v Arun574 is significant as Lord Denning and Lord Scarman set out the most 
explicit framework yet for proprietary estoppel and its characterization for a 
proprietary interest in land. Lord Denning established a comprehensive clarification of 
proprietary estoppel. He described the nature and purpose of proprietary estoppel, 
identified the circumstances where the estoppel may arise, and also elucidated the 
effect of proprietary estoppel.  
 
Lord Denning MR described the nature and purpose of proprietary estoppel thus:  
“The basis of this proprietary estoppel – as indeed of promissory estoppel is the 
interposition of equity. Equity comes in true to form to mitigate the rigours of 
the common law. The early cases did not speak of it as ‘estoppel’. They spoke of 
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it as “raising an equity”. If I may expand that, Lord Cairns said: “it is the first 
principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed”, that it will prevent a person 
from insisting on his strict legal rights - whether arising under a contact, or on his 
title deeds or by statute – when it would be inequitable for him to do so having 
regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties (Hughes v 
Metropolitan Railway (1877)575.576   
 
Thus, proprietary estoppel prevents a party from enforcing his or her strict legal rights 
where it would be unconscionable to do so in light of the prior dealings of the parties, 
and this is evident in the case law under scrutiny.  
 
Lord Denning MR also described the circumstances whereby proprietary estoppel may 
arise as follows:  
What then are the dealings which will preclude him from insisting on his 
strict legal rights? – If he makes a binding contract that he will not insist 
on the strict legal position, a Court of Equity will hold him to his contract. 
Short of a binding contract, if he makes a promise that he will not insist 
upon his strict legal rights – that even though that promise may be 
unenforceable in point of law for want of consideration or want of 
writing – then if he makes the promise knowing or intending that the 
other will act upon it, and he does act upon it, then again a Court of 
Equity will not allow him to go back on that promise […] 
 
Short of an actual promise, if he by his words or conduct so behaves as to 
lead another to believe that he will not insist on his strict legal rights – 
knowing or intending that the other will act on that belief – and he does 
so act that again will raise an equity in favour of the other: and it is for a 
Court of Equity to say in what way the equity may be satisfied. The cases 
show that this equity does not depend on agreement but on words or 
conduct.577  
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Here, proprietary estoppel arises where party A by his words or conduct assures party 
B that party A will not enforce his or her strict legal rights, and party B relies on party 
A’s assurance to his or her detriment. Equity intervenes to enforce party A’s promise 
to party B.   
 
Lord Denning MR also articulated that the effect of estoppel on the true owner may be 
that: 
His own title to the property, be it land or goods had been held to be 
limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been created 
therein and this operates by reason of his conduct – what he has led the 
other to believe – even though he never intended it.578 
 
Thus, proprietary estoppel limits or extinguishes legal rights to property in favour of 
the new rights created by the words or conduct of a promisor.  
 
As to remedy in proprietary estoppel, Scarman LJ stated that where an equity is raised 
by the claimant, the court will apply the minimum equity to do justice in a particular 
case. Lord Scarman set out the criteria for the court to establish the estoppel being: 
Whether an equity is established? What is the extent of the equity? And what is the 
relief appropriate to satisfy the equity? The three-fold test illustrates the equitable and 
discretionary character of the doctrine, and also the broad jurisdiction of the Court to 
determine the estoppel and the remedy. Lord Scarman also stated that in proprietary 
estoppel, the Court must analyze and assess the conduct and relationship of the 
parties to determine the equity.    
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The rationale deployed in Crab v Arun579 highlighted the scope of proprietary estoppel 
and the principles governing the determination of the remedy it could afford. It 
provided a comprehensive description of the application and operation of the doctrine 
and sought to eliminate confusion and uncertainty regarding the utilization of estoppel 
in the future.  
 
Crab v Arun580 was followed by the High Court in Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool 
Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd581 which re-stated the principle of proprietary estoppel and 
its requirements extracted from Lord Kingsdown’s judgment in Ramsden v Dyson582.  
 
In Taylor Fashions583, two leases contained an option to renew that was not registered 
under the Land Charges Act 1925. The tenants had undertaken substantial 
improvements to the properties believing they had the benefit of the lease and the 
option to renew. The leases and the reversions were assigned to the defendant who 
argued the option to renew was void for non-registration. The claimants relied on 
proprietary estoppel that the defendants knew of the improvements being undertaken 
and had acquiescence in the claimant’s mistake. One of the tenants (Taylor Fashions) 
was able to show proprietary estoppel but the other tenant failed because he was 
acting on his own mistaken belief, rather than as a result of anything that the landlord 
did or allowed. 
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The Court granted a remedy arising from the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to Taylor 
Fashions584 based upon equitable principles. The Court emphasized that Taylor 
Fashion’s had expended monies on the improvements in the expectation that it was a 
necessary prerequisite to the extension of the lease; that Taylor Fashion’s expectation 
was known to the defendants; that the improvements undertaken were known to and 
acquiesced by the defendants who co-operated to the extent of installing the elevator; 
that at the time of the discussion and the completion of the works the Respondents 
did not challenge the validity of the option, and that if the Appellant had known the 
Respondent would challenge the option, they would have taken a different course of 
action. Hence, an equity was raised against the Respondents as they had acquiesced in 
the Appellant’s expenditure for the lease and created the expectation for the 
extension.   
 
Oliver J stated that the fundamental principle that equity prevents unconscionable 
conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine of estoppel.585  
Oliver J established that the application of the Ramsden v. Dyson586 principle, whether 
it be called proprietary estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement, is 
immaterial, as it required a broader approach to ascertaining whether in the 
circumstances it would be unconscionable for a party to deny that which he or she has 
knowingly or unknowingly allowed or encouraged another to assume to his or her 
detriment, rather than inquiring into whether the circumstances can be fitted into a 
preconceived formula as a yardstick for every form of unconscionable behavior.587   
He stated the principle of proprietary estoppel thus: 
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 If A under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have 
a certain interest in land, thereafter on the faith of such expectation 
and with B’s knowledge and without objection by B acts to his 
detriment in connection with such land, a Court of equity will compel B 
to give effect to such expectation.588 
 
Hence, the principle of proprietary estoppel, articulated by Lord Kingsdown in 
Ramsden v Dyson589 and by Lord Denning in Crab v Arun District Council590, was 
simplified for the purpose of establishing a proprietary interest in land. Although these 
prior cases embraced the same principle of proprietary estoppel, the re-statement of 
the law created a new criterion for the creation of proprietary estoppel. Oliver J. had 
not modified the law, as previously stated in Crab v Arun591, but sought to add more 
clarity and certainty to the establishment of proprietary estoppel.  
 
Oliver J also established that three interrelated elements must be satisfied to establish 
an estoppel equity: the claimant must show that there was an assurance by the 
landowner that gave rise to an expectation that he or she was entitled to an interest in 
land; that he or she had relied on the assurance made, and that he or she had acted to 
his or her detriment in consequence of the assurance.  
 
The satisfaction of the requirements of assurance, reliance and detriment created the 
equity for the operation of proprietary estoppel. Oliver J thus simplified the law on 
proprietary estoppel by eliminating the requirement of ‘creating or encouraging an 
expectation for an interest in land’, as evident in the previous case law, to a more 
universal formula of assurance, reliance and detriment. It provided a more realistic 
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model for the Courts to determine the estoppel, rather than inquiring into the 
landowner’s mind to ascertain what, if any, expectation was created or encouraged.  
 
Taylor Fashions592 was followed by the Court of Appeal in Gillett v Holt593.  In Gillett594  
G left school to work full-time on H’s farm for over forty years on the repeated 
promises and assurances by H to G that G would inherit the farm upon H’s death. 
Relations between G and H subsequently broke down. H altered his will to disinherit G 
and G was dismissed from the farm. G filed a claim for proprietary estoppel, but it was 
dismissed by the High Court on the basis that the representations relied on by G could 
not reasonably be construed as an irrevocable promise that G would inherit H’s estate 
regardless of any change in circumstances. However, on appeal the Court held that a 
proprietary estoppel had arisen as G had acted in reliance on H’s promise to his 
detriment. The judgment was given by Robert Walker LJ to which Beldam LJ and Waller 
LJ agreed.  
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously granted a proprietary estoppel to G. H’s assurances 
for bequeathing the farm to G were repeated over a long period on special family 
occasions, and some of the assurances made such as ‘it was all going to be ours 
anyway’ were held to be completely unambiguous. H had intended that his assurances 
be relied on by G to remain on the farm in the expectation of inheriting the estate 
upon H’s death.  
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In reliance on H’s assurances, G had suffered a substantial detriment in leaving school 
before sixteen to work on H’s farm for low wages; G had not taken any examinations 
which might otherwise might have given him academic qualifications; G went to work 
for and live with H against the advice of his headmaster and against his parents’ 
doubts about H; H’s influence had extended over G’s social and private life which 
revolved around the farm, and H had promised to arrange for G to attend agricultural 
college but did not make the arrangement. G also stated that he continued in H’s 
employment for over forty years without seeking or accepting offers of employment 
elsewhere; had not started a business on his own account; had undertaken tasks and 
worked long hours beyond an employee’s duty; had not taken steps to secure his 
future wealth upon retirement, and had expended monies for improvements of one of 
the farmhouses that was uninhabitable upon acquisition. G had suffered a detriment 
in reliance on H’s assurances, which created an equity in H’s estate and gave rise to a 
proprietary estoppel. 
 
The Court of Appeal established that H’s promises were revocable by their own nature, 
but it was G’s detrimental reliance which made them irrevocable. The Court ruled that 
once a promisee has acted upon the promise to his detriment, it is binding in equity, 
and the minimum equity was for H to transfer the freehold in one of his houses to G 
with compensation for loss of the farming business. 
Robert Walker LJ stated thus: 
…it is important to note at the outset that the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four watertight 
compartments.  […] that the quality of the relevant assurances may 
influence the issue of reliance, that reliance and detriment are often 
intertwined and that whether there is a distinct need for a mutual 
understanding may depend on how the other elements are formulated 
and understood. Moreover, the fundamental principle that equity is 
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concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the 
elements of the doctrine. In the end, the Court must look at the matter in 
the round.595  
 
Robert Walker LJ articulated the necessity and interconnection of assurance, reliance 
and detriment to give rise to proprietary estoppel in land. He advanced that 
proprietary estoppel could not be established by the satisfaction of one of those 
elements but rather by the combined effect of the three elements. Robert Walker LJ 
asserted that it was immaterial whether there was a mutual understanding between 
the parties, as the estoppel depended on the interplay of the three elements of 
assurance, reliance and detriment. He also affirmed that the interposition of equity 
was to prevent unconscionable conduct which required the Court to consider all the 
facts and circumstances as a whole and to determine whether the promisor had acted 
unconscionably towards the promisee.   
 
In establishing the estoppel, Robert Walker LJ stated thus: 
There must be sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and 
the detriment asserted. The issue of detriment must be judged at the 
moment when the person who has given the assurance seeks to go back 
on it. Whether the detriment is sufficiently substantial is to be tested by 
whether it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the assurance to be 
disregarded – that is, again, the essential test of unconscionability. The 
detriment alleged must be pleaded and proved.596 
 
Here, Walker LJ asserted that proprietary estoppel is proved by the causal link 
between the assurance made and the detrimental reliance thereon. The detriment 
arises where the promisor seeks to resile from his or her promise, and where the 
detriment is substantial, the Court will consider whether the promisor had acted 
unconscionably towards the promisee.  
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As to the nature and the extent of the detriment suffered, Walker LJ stated that 
detriment is: 
…not a narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of 
the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment so 
long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached 
as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or 
is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.597 
 
He further asserted that: …“it is the other party’s detrimental reliance on the 
promise which makes it irrevocable.”598  
 
Here, Robert Walker LJ established the importance of detriment in establishing 
proprietary estoppel. He asserted that the detriment suffered need not be quantifiable 
or based on expenditure on land, so long as the detriment was substantial. The 
detriment suffered makes the promise irrevocable, and also invokes the test of 
unconscionability on whether the promisor should be permitted to renege on his or 
her promise.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Gillett v Holt599 re-affirmed and approved the tripartite test of 
assurance, reliance and detriment for proprietary estoppel as established by Oliver J in 
Taylor Fashions600. The Court of Appeal also emphasized the test of unconscionability 
as established in Taylor Fashions601 as the determinant factor in establishing the 
estoppel, and reiterated that the Court must consider all the facts and circumstances 
as a whole to determine the estoppel. However, the Court of Appeal moved a step 
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further than Taylor Fashions602 in categorically defining the role of detriment for 
proprietary estoppel. For example, Walker LJ in Gillett603 had explained what 
comprised the element of detriment and how it determined the proprietary estoppel. 
Walker LJ established that the detriment suffered made the promise irrevocable, and 
determined whether it was unconscionable for the promisor to renege on his or her 
promise. The Court of Appeal in Gillett604 adopted the rationalized test for proprietary 
estoppel as adopted in Taylor Fashions605, following the comprehensive treatment of 
proprietary estoppel in Crab v Arun606.  
 
Gillett v Holt607 was followed by the House of Lords in Thorner v Major608. In 
Thorner609 T worked on his father’s cousin’s (P) farm for thirty years without pay. P 
had indicated on several occasions that T would inherit the farm one day. P had 
handed him a bonus notice on two life insurances policies and said “that’s for my 
death duties”. P had also made a will leaving his residuary estate to T but it was 
subsequently revoked. P died intestate and his farm was inherited by his personal 
representatives. T brought a claim against P’s estate that he had the benefit of a 
proprietary estoppel. The House of Lords held that T had established a proprietary 
interest in the farm as P’s pattern of conduct had amounted to an assurance for the 
estate.  
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The Court granted the remedy of proprietary estoppel to T. P’s remarks and conduct 
towards T over thirty years were intended to indicate to T that T would be the 
successor to P’s farm at P’s death. T had continued in rendering unpaid help to P and 
had forgone other opportunities that were available by P’s encouragement, which 
created an expectation by T of inheriting the farm upon P’s death.  
 
Lord Walker approved and affirmed the test for proprietary estoppel thus: 
…identified the three main elements requisite for a claim based on 
proprietary estoppel as first, a representation made or assurance given to 
the claimant; second, reliance by the claimant on the representation or 
assurance; and third, some detriment incurred by the claimant as a 
consequence of that reliance.610    
 
Thus, Lord Walker had approved the tripartite test of assurance, reliance and 
detriment for a proprietary estoppel.  
 
As to the nature of the assurance made, Lord Scott asserted an implied intention could 
create a proprietary interest in land thus: 
..to confine proprietary estoppel to cases where the representation, 
whether express or implied on which the claimant has acted is 
unconditional….611 
 
Here, Lord Walker asserts that an assurance can be expressed or implied for a 
proprietary estoppel.  
 
Lord Walker also advanced that the assurance must be determined from the 
contextual circumstances in which it was made. He stated thus: 
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I would prefer to say that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant 
assurance must be clear enough. What amounts to sufficient clarity is 
hugely dependent on context.612  
 
Lord Neuberger also concurred and stated that: 
Perhaps more importantly, the meaning to be ascribed to words passing 
between parties will depend often very much on their factual context.613  
 
Hence, Lord Walker and Lord Neuberger adduced that an assurance must be 
determined in the particular context in which it was made, and Lord Walker further 
affirmed that the assurance must be clear enough to give rise to a proprietary 
estoppel.  
 
Thorner v Major614, the first case of proprietary estoppel to be determined by the 
House of Lords (Supreme Court), gave efficacy and affirmation to the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel developed by the lower Courts. It affirmed the threefold criteria 
of assurance, reliance and detriment established by Oliver J in Taylor Fashions615 and 
by Walker LJ in Gillett v Holt616, but with greater emphasis on the assurance made by 
the legal owner of land. It affirmed the court’s willingness to grant a proprietary 
estoppel where a party had undertaken a course of conduct in reliance on the promise 
made by a landowner, and had suffered a detriment in consequence of that promise. 
This case also broadened the parameters of the doctrine to include an implied 
intention for the claimant to acquire an interest in land and the contextual relation or 
circumstances in which the promise was made. It sought to eliminate the problems 
encountered by the lower Courts in deciding whether proprietary estoppel should 
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operate on the facts before them. The decision in Thorner617 also effectively continued 
and approved the stance adopted by the lower courts towards the formulation and 
embrace of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  
 
The strength of the modern approach is that the Courts have developed proprietary 
estoppel as a doctrine in its own right and have affirmatively established how and why 
it arises to create an equitable interest in land. The weakness of the modern approach 
is that the Supreme Court has prescribed the criteria for the establishment of a 
remedy based on proprietary estoppel arising from the nature of the assurance, 
contextual circumstances and implied intention of the parties which the lower courts 
will need to interpret. Following Thorner v Major618, no other case on proprietary 
estoppel has been taken to the Supreme Court, and until this occurs it remains unclear 
whether the doctrine will be applied in the manner envisioned by the Supreme Court.   
  
5.3  What factors motivated the development of Proprietary Estoppel? 
During the course of over a century, the courts have conceived, moulded and refined 
the now thriving doctrine of proprietary estoppel. 
 
The decided cases illustrate that one possible catalyst for the development of 
proprietary estoppel has been the moral conviction of diverse members of the 
judiciary, who have been influenced by a desire to apply equitable principles to 
achieve a fair and conscionable outcome on the facts of the case. For example, 
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Heward619 states that “Lord Denning was a moral conservative who believed in 
established rules of conduct. Lord Denning thought if the law was divorced from 
morality it would lose the respect of the people.”620  
 
Heward621 also articulates that Lord Denning described a judge’s role as follows: 
My root belief is that the proper role of a judge is to do justice between 
the parties before him. If there is any rule of law which impairs the doing 
of justice, then it is the province of the judge to do all that he legitimately 
can to avoid the rule, even to change it, so as to do justice in the instant 
case before him. He need not wait for legislation to intervene because 
that can never be of help in the instant case.622 
 
It is arguably the moral conviction of Lord Denning MR and Danckwerts LJ. in Ives v 
High623 which established a right of way by estoppel as a proprietary interest in the 
land, and also created a proprietary interest in the land for the bungalow built thereon 
in Inwards v Baker624. Similarly, it was the moral conviction of Lord Kingsdown in his 
dissenting judgment in Ramsden v Dyson625, which established an equitable estoppel 
by the words or conduct of a landowner for an interest in land or the creation of an 
equity for the expenditure on land. Each case of a proprietary interest in land is 
premised on equity, because equity will not permit a landowner to enforce his or her 
strict legal rights where it is unconscionable or inequitable to do so. The moral stance 
of members of the judiciary thus paved the way for the development of proprietary 
estoppel.   
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It is also apparent that there were progressive judges who sought to develop the law. 
For example, Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House 
Ltd626 states that: 
At this time of day however, when the law and equity have been joined 
together for over seventy years, principles must be reconsidered in the 
light of their combined effect.627  
 
 Similarly, Lord Denning in Crab v Arun District Council628 finally established a 
comprehensive model for proprietary estoppel regarding its nature, purpose, 
and the circumstances where it can arise, together with the effect of 
proprietary estoppel on a landowner’s right. Also, Lord Scarman defined the 
criteria for ascertaining the existence of a proprietary estoppel by considering 
whether an equity had arisen, the extent of the equity and the satisfaction of 
the equity.  
 
Likewise, it was the progressive judges of the Privy Council in Plimmer v Mayor of 
Wellington629 who affirmed and approved Lord Kingsdown’s statement of the law on 
equitable estoppel and established the criteria for the creation of a new proprietary 
interest in land based on that judgment. This set a precedent for other courts to follow 
in cases such as Inwards v Baker630, Ives v High631, Crab v Arun District Council632 and 
Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd633. These progressive judges 
sought to develop and extend the bounds of proprietary estoppel in response to the 
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circumstances before them, rather than force the circumstances into the legal 
straightjacket of earlier decisions.  
 
Another major influence in the development of proprietary estoppel has been the 
judicial activism of the Courts. Judicial activism is described by Heward634 thus: 
It is a positive approach to the law with a readiness to stretch the law to a 
certain degree so that justice can be done in the particular case. It 
requires judicial courage as judges like to keep in step with their brother 
judges. Judicial activism includes a desire to meet the needs of the times. 
What is laid down in the nineteenth century is not necessarily what is 
wanted in the twentieth century and the law has to be adjusted to meet 
the different circumstances.635 
 
Lord Denning was described as a judicial activist and this is reflected in his 
comprehensive description of proprietary estoppel in Crab v Arun District Council636. 
According to Heward637, Lord Denning:  
…was bold and innovative, wished to restate the law in accordance with 
the established principles and hated the restrictions imposed by 
precedent. He was astute enough to circumvent awkward precedent so 
that justice could be done in the individual case before him; he did not 
wait for Parliament to amend the law.638 
 
Judicial activism also appears to have been the driving force in Plimmer v 
Wellington639 to affirm the principle of equitable estoppel by Lord Kingsdown in 
Ramsden v Dyson640, and to create a proprietary interest in land in the face of a 
statute such as Section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
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1989641. Likewise, it was judicial activism that re-stated the law on proprietary 
estoppel and re-defined its requirements in Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees Ltd642, and it was judicial activism that led the House of Lords (Supreme 
Court) to give efficacy and affirmation to proprietary estoppel and to establish its 
requirements for an interest in land in Thorner v Major643. Throughout the 
development of proprietary estoppel, the Courts have not been constrained by the 
strict formalities of the common law, but rather driven by equity to consider all the 
circumstances of the case to arrive at a decision based on equitable principles of good 
conscience. Judicial activism has caused the Courts to move with the times and the 
circumstances of the case before them, rather than adhere to the constraints of 
previously established principles. However, at no stage have the courts failed to 
uphold the intrinsic purpose underlying proprietary estoppel.  
 
With the traditional approach of proprietary estoppel, the parties did not plead the 
intervention of estoppel but the Courts, nonetheless, invoked equity based on the 
words or conduct of the parties. Conversely, with the modern approach of proprietary 
estoppel, the parties did plead proprietary estoppel which, in turn, led the Courts to 
establish the protocol for its application and operation. Judicial activism in proprietary 
estoppel shows that the Courts were not concerned with what the law was, but what it 
ought to be. 
 
The above combination of the moral conservatism of judges, the progressiveness of 
judges and the judicial activism of judges had spearheaded the development of 
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proprietary estoppel and brought about the transition of facets of the doctrine from a 
traditional approach to the modern approach in law. This has, however, occurred 
against the pivotal backdrop of the courts’ abiding insistence on preventing or 
curtailing unconscionable behaviour in accordance with equitable principles and the 
intrinsic purpose for which proprietary estoppel was conceived.  
 
5.4  Conclusion 
To summarize, the transition from the traditional to the modern approach of 
proprietary estoppel was a gradual process that evolved over a century. It did not arise 
spontaneously but developed on a case by case basis as the Courts determined the 
particular cases before them. It began as the doctrine of equitable estoppel and finally 
appropriated the label of “proprietary estoppel” because it was capable of creating a 
proprietary interest in land. Although the equitable doctrine was stifled in its early 
development by Willmott644, it gained new vigour following the Privy Council case of 
Plimmer645 and from then proceeded along a clear path to its affirmation as a doctrine 
of equitable land ownership by the House of Lords (Supreme Court) in Thorner v 
Major646. It arose in response to, and in consequence of, the particular facts and 
circumstances in land disputes that were dealt with by the Courts through the 
interposition of equity. According to Lord Justice Cotton in Birmingham & District Land 
Co. v. The London & North Western Railway647 cited with approbation by Lord 
Denning in Crab v Arun District Council648, “…what passed (between the parties (my 
emphasis)) did not make a new agreement but what took place …. raised an equity 
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against him”649. Likewise, Danckwerks L.J. asserted in Inwards v Baker650 that “… 
equity protects him so that an injustice is not perpetrated.”651 Hence, each decided 
case of proprietary estoppel is a decision in equity.  
 
What is significant about the traditional approach is that it has established the 
framework of proprietary estoppel. It laid the foundation for proprietary estoppel, the 
proprietary character of proprietary estoppel and the flexibility of the doctrine to be 
applied in varying circumstances. With the modern approach, the Courts have 
affirmatively created new perspectives on proprietary estoppel for the acquisition of 
an interest in land. The Courts have established an all-inclusive paradigm on the 
application and operation of proprietary estoppel and have later re-defined and 
simplified the doctrine to be of universal application. The common thread between the 
traditional and modern doctrine is equity and the prevention of unconscionable 
behaviour, whereby a Court of Equity will hold a landowner bound by his or her words 
or conduct for an interest in land where a party has acted in detrimental reliance 
thereon.  
 
Also, with both the traditional and modern approaches of proprietary estoppel, the 
burning question as to why the courts developed the doctrine and what motivated the 
judiciary is answered by five words in every case – ‘equity speaks for the plaintiff’! The 
Courts have established that where an equity arises in land, it will not be allowed to 
fail, and where an equity is raised, the landowner is precluded from enforcing his or 
her strict legal rights. As Lord Denning emphatically stated in Crab v Arun District 
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Council652, “Equity comes in true to form to mitigate the rigours of strict law.”653 Thus, 
equity has created a pillar of conscience by which judges are persuaded to rule against 
strict legal rights in relation to proprietary interests in land.   
 
The next chapter will focus on proprietary estoppel in the House of Lords decision of 
Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe654.  
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Chapter Six: Proprietary Estoppel in Yeoman’s Row655 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the House of Lords decision in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd 
v Cobbe656 on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. Yeoman’s Row657 is one of the two 
cases thus far considered by the House of Lords on the status of the doctrine. The 
other case is Thorner v Major658 which will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
Although Yeoman’s Row659 was primarily based on a “subject to contract” agreement 
rather than proprietary estoppel, their Lordships nonetheless considered the 
application of the doctrine to the facts in Yeoman’s Row660 and adduced some 
principles for the finding of the estoppel. For example, their Lordships determined that 
proprietary estoppel is a principled doctrine that applies only to land, and not to 
commercial pre-contractual agreements relating to land. Lord Walker pointed out that 
in commercial cases, the claimant often only expects to acquire a contract (leading to a 
purchase of land) whereas the proper basis for estoppel (as exists in family cases) is an 
expectation of the claimant to obtain an interest in land.  
 
The chapter demonstrates the House of Lords’ approval of the doctrine and its 
elements, and assesses the impact of the principles introduced. It explores whether 
the principles are novel, whether they are consistent with those of the decided cases 
and whether they simplify the finding of an estoppel. The discussion presented is 
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distinct from the existing literature661 that has not thoroughly undertaken an 
investigation of the principles of proprietary estoppel established in Yeoman’s Row662, 
and neither has it considered the extent to which those principles influence the 
development of the doctrine. The principles introduced by their Lordships help define 
the foundation and future of proprietary estoppel, and help put perspective on its 
operation by the courts, specifically the extent to which their interpretation and 
application of the doctrine upheld its purpose of redressing unconscionable behaviour 
in the contexts where proprietary estoppel arises.   
 
This chapter leads to the discussion in further chapters of the thesis on whether or not 
Yeoman’s Row663 has imported clarity and simplicity in the application of the doctrine 
by the courts.  
 
6.2  The Decision of the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe664 
In Yeoman’s Row665, the Appellant (Y) was the owner of land for residential 
development and entered negotiations with the Respondent (C) for the sale of the 
land to C. The parties had arrived at an oral agreement on some terms but no written 
or draft contract was produced. The agreement required C at his own expense to make 
the application for residential development, and if planning permission was obtained, 
then Y would sell the land to C or a company nominated by C at an agreed price. Also, 
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at his own expense C had to develop the land in accordance with the planning 
permission, sell off the residential units, and pay 50% of the amount where the gross 
proceeds exceeded £24 million.  
 
In accordance with the agreement, C expended considerable monies and time in 
obtaining planning permission. Upon C obtaining planning permission, Y sought to re-
negotiate the financial terms of sale for a substantial increase in the gross proceeds of 
sale as originally agreed. C disagreed on the new financial terms and Y refused to 
proceed on the originally agreed financial terms, so C commenced legal proceedings. 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had granted relief in proprietary estoppel 
but the House of Lords disagreed.  
 
Notably, an oral contract for the sale or purchase of land is normally void without 
writing which complies with section 2 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989. The contention in Yeoman’s Row666 was that the mere oral agreement did not 
meet the statutory requirements. Hence, the reliance on equity via proprietary 
estoppel as a defence.   
 
Lord Scott stated that the remedy to which Mr. Cobbe was entitled was neither based 
on estoppel nor was it estoppel in character. The question to be determined by their 
Lordships was what relief should C be granted in the circumstances of the case. The 
House of Lords unanimously agreed that C was entitled to a quantum meruit payment 
for his services in obtaining the planning permission as he did not intend to provide his 
services gratuitously nor did Y understand the contrary. Their Lordships held that both 
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parties knew that their oral agreement was subject to further negotiations and was 
not legally binding.  
 
Lord Walker cited Lord Cranworth from Ramsden v Dyson667 that agreements made in 
honour were not binding and were excluded both by the courts of equity and of law: 
If anyone makes an assurance to another, with or without consideration, 
that he will do or will abstain from doing a particular act but he refuses to 
bind himself and says that for the performance of what he has promised 
the person to whom the promise has been made must rely on the honour 
of the person who has made it, this excludes the jurisdiction of courts of 
equity no less than of courts of law.668 
 
Lord Walker also referred to similar comments made by Lord Wensleydale that an 
arrangement which was expressly and deliberately acknowledged to be a “gentleman’s 
agreement” may not be capable of giving rise to an estoppel.669 Lord Walker 
maintained that the parties knew the agreement was binding in honour only and was 
not legally binding. He stated that both parties were experienced in property matters 
and knew the position between themselves. Lord Scott also emphasized that there was 
no certainty in relation to the expectation created or encouraged by Y to create a 
proprietary estoppel, nor that an interest in land would be acquired.  
  
6.3  The Approach to Proprietary Estoppel in Yeoman’s Row670 
The House of Lords embraced the test formulated by Oliver J in Taylor Fashions671 as 
the modern test of proprietary estoppel, and dismissed the five probanda in Willmott 
v Barber672.  
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Lord Walker remarked that the five probanda propounded by Fry J had over the years 
proven to be an impediment to the development of equitable estoppel until the 
position was finally clarified by Oliver J in Taylor Fashions673. However, his Lordship did 
comment that these five probanda had never been intended to be indispensable 
prerequisites to the operation of proprietary estoppel, Fry J had indicated that he was 
not seeking to stipulate a generic and all-embracing test. On this point, Lord Walker 
highlighted that the judgment in Willmott674 was based on the facts before the court:  
 
 I think it is very questionable whether after what Bowyer has done he 
could interfere with the plaintiff’s possession of the one acre. But that 
point is not raised in this action, and my decision will in no way affect it.675 
 
Hence, Lord Walker explained that the context in which Fry J formulated the five 
probanda was based on the particular facts of the case that were being dealt with by 
the court, rather than comprising a formulation for the universal application of 
proprietary estoppel.  
 
Lord Walker stated that Oliver J had in Taylor Fashions676 “…analyzed the authorities in 
a masterly way and put this aspect of the law back on the right track”. He related the 
requirements of proprietary estoppel established by Oliver J thus: 
If A under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have a 
certain interest in land, thereafter on the faith of such expectation and 
with the knowledge of B and without objection by him, acts to his 
detriment in connection with such land, a Court of Equity will compel B to 
give effect to such expectation.677 
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Here, Lord Walker approved the requirements of assurance, reliance, detriment and 
unconscionability established by Oliver J for a finding of proprietary estoppel. Lord 
Scott also approved and affirmed these pre-requisite criteria described by Oliver J. 
However, their Lordships did express reservations about the overriding influence of 
unconscionability advanced by Oliver J in the determination of the estoppel. 
 
Accordingly, Lord Walker and Lord Scott in Yeoman’s Row678 affirmed the essential 
components of the established doctrine of proprietary estoppel, by ascertaining the 
requirements of the doctrine and endorsing its application to land in conformity with 
Taylor Fashions679. This arguably accorded a measure of consistency in the application 
and operation of the doctrine by the lower courts.  
 
6.4  The Principles of Proprietary Estoppel in Yeoman’s Row680 
Lord Scott and Lord Walker established a number of key principles for the application 
and operation of proprietary estoppel as follows: 
 
First, proprietary estoppel is a principled doctrine that is not subject to the whims 
and fancies of the courts.  
Lord Scott stated that proprietary estoppel is a principled doctrine that is not 
subjective, but is objectively ascertained upon established principles. He cited Deane J 
in Muschinski v Dodds681 in a judgment concurred by Mason J where he elaborated on 
the nature and function of constructive trust, that Lord Walker considered was equally 
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applicable to proprietary estoppel. He described the nature of proprietary estoppel in 
the following terms:  
…as an equitable remedy, it is available only when warranted by 
established equitable principles or by the legitimate processes of legal 
reasoning, by analogy, induction and deduction, starting from the 
conceptual foundations of such principles ….682  
 
Lord Scott continued on the principled nature of proprietary estoppel that: 
Under the law of this country – as I venture to think under the present 
law of England … proprietary rights fall to be governed by principles of 
law and not by some mix of judicial discretion, subjective views about 
which party ‘ought to win’ … and the ‘formless void’ of individual moral 
opinion…683  
 
Here, Lord Scott affirmed the objective character of proprietary estoppel and the 
operation of the doctrine on established equitable principles and sound legal 
reasoning. He articulated that the court embraces a legitimate process of analogy, 
induction and deduction, rather than subjective views and individual moral opinion.  
 
Lord Walker also asserted the principled nature of proprietary estoppel in the 
following terms: 
Equitable estoppel is a flexible doctrine which the court can use in 
appropriate circumstances to prevent injustice caused by the vagaries and 
inconsistency of human nature. But it is not a sort of joker or wild card to 
be used whenever the court disapproves of the conduct of a litigant who 
seems to have the law on his side. Flexible though it is, the doctrine must 
be formulated and applied in a disciplined and principled way. Certainty is 
important in property transactions.684 
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Hence, Lord Walker ascertained that proprietary estoppel is based on established 
principles of law, and is not founded on ungrounded judicial discretion or subjective 
criteria or opinion.  
 
Their Lordships thus concluded that the objective nature of proprietary estoppel had 
been alluded to in previously decided cases without being explicitly explained. For 
example, in Crab v Arun685 and Taylor Fashions686 the courts asserted the 
circumstances whereby a proprietary estoppel may arise, but did not specifically focus 
on, or elaborate upon the objective nature of the doctrine. If it is possible to apply a 
consistently objective approach, as articulated in Yeoman’s Row687, this may arguably 
lend more clarity to the operation and application of the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel.  
 
Second, proprietary estoppel requires the expectation of a certain interest in land.  
Lord Scott referred to Ramsden v Dyson688 and Taylor Fashions689 that established the 
requirement for a claim in proprietary estoppel to relate to a certain interest in land. 
His Lordship remarked that in Ramsden v Dyson690, Lord Kingsdown emphasized that 
an informal agreement for an interest in land was the core of the doctrine thus:  
If a man under a verbal agreement with a landlord for certain interest in 
land, or what amounts to the same thing, under an expectation created or 
encouraged by the landlord that he shall have a certain interest takes 
possession of such land ….691 
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Lord Scott stated that the requirement of “a certain interest in land” is the basis for a 
claim in proprietary estoppel, and provide clarity on the object of the parties’ dealings 
or arrangements. He emphasized that there was not a certain interest in land in 
Yeoman’s Row692, and no certainty for the expectation created or encouraged by the 
Appellant to invoke proprietary estoppel.  
 
Lord Scott also referred to the case of Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees Co. Ltd693 where Oliver J stated the requirement of ‘a certain interest in land’ 
for a proprietary estoppel as follows:  
…if A under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have a 
certain interest in land, thereafter on the faith of such expectation and 
with the knowledge of B and without objection by him, acts to his 
detriment in connection with such land, a Court of Equity will compel B to 
give effect to such expectation.694 
 
Hence, unless there was an expectation created or encouraged for the acquisition of 
an interest in land, then the doctrine of proprietary estoppel could not be invoked by 
the claimant. 
 
In Yeoman’s Row695, the expectation of Cobbe was merely for further negotiations 
leading to a formal contract. Hence, any expectation of a certain interest in land was 
contingent on further contractual negotiations and the conclusion of a formal written 
contract.696 Lord Scott asserted that an expectation dependent upon the conclusion of 
a successful negotiation is not an expectation of an interest having comparable 
certainty to the certainty envisaged in the test required to invoke proprietary estoppel 
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in Taylor Fashions697.698 Hence, no proprietary estoppel could have arisen at minimum, 
without an oral agreement for an interest in land.  
 
This same principle has resonated throughout the period from the inception of the 
doctrine by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson699 and the succession of cases 
following including Inwards v Baker700, Plimmer v Wellington701 and Ives v High702.  
 
Third, unconscionability is not the overriding factor or requirement in the 
determination of a proprietary estoppel.  
Their Lordships maintained that unconscionability, though highly relevant, does not 
supersede the importance of the other criteria of assurance, reliance and detriment. 
Rather, it is used in combination with them in the determination of the estoppel. Lord 
Scott illustrated the status of unconscionability in the following terms: 
My Lords, unconscionability of conduct may well lead to a remedy but in 
my opinion proprietary estoppel cannot be the route to it unless the 
ingredients for a proprietary estoppel are present. These ingredients 
should include in principle a proprietary claim made by a claimant and an 
answer to that claim based on some fact, or some point of mixed fact and 
law that the person against whom the claim is made can be estopped from 
asserting.703  
 
Lord Scott continued to comment on the requirements of the doctrine thus: 
To treat a “proprietary estoppel equity” as requiring neither a proprietary 
claim by the claimant nor an estoppel against the defendant but simply 
unconscionable behavior is in my respectful opinion, a recipe for 
confusion.704 
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Here, Lord Scott established that proprietary estoppel is a doctrine that assimilates the 
prescribed formula of assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability. He 
asserted that neither criteria is more relevant than another, nor does any carry more 
weight. It is the combined effect of these interconnected ingredients that determine 
the estoppel.  
 
Lord Walker also asserted the relevance of unconscionability in the determination of 
proprietary estoppel as follows:  
…it should always be used as an objective value judgment on behavior 
(regardless of the state of mind of the individual in question). As such it 
does in my opinion play a very important part in the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, in unifying and confirming as it were the other elements. If the 
other elements appear to be present but the result does not shock the 
conscience of the court, the analysis needs to be looked at again.705 
 
Here, Lord Walker stressed the unifying characteristic of unconscionability to underpin 
the other elements of the estoppel, so as to invoke equity against the conscience of 
the defendant. Unconscionability is the causal link and catalyst for the equitable 
estoppel to arise. 
 
The above is consistent with the principle in Taylor Fashions706 and Gillett v Holt707 
whereby unconscionability appears to be the pre-requisite for proprietary estoppel to 
operate. Although their Lordships agreed that the importance of unconscionability 
should not be overstated, they were nonetheless united in their view that 
unconscionable behavior was an indispensable factor in the invocation of equity to 
invoke estoppel against the conscience of the promisor.  
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Their Lordships favoured a holistic assessment of assurance, reliance, detriment and 
unconscionability, without promoting the importance of one criterion over another. 
Nonetheless, the existence of unconscionability is pivotal to the operation of 
proprietary estoppel.  
 
Fourth, proprietary estoppel does not apply in a commercial context involving similar 
facts as Yeoman’s Row708.   
Lord Walker established that proprietary estoppel typically arises in a domestic or 
family context. Estoppel did not operate in the particular commercial context of 
Yeoman’s Row,709 but there are numerous cases such as Ives v High710, Yaxley v 
Gotts711 and Taylor Fashions712 where estoppel operated in a commercial context. His 
Lordship illustrated the difference between a commercial context and a domestic or 
family context as follows: 
In the commercial context, the claimant is typically a business person with 
access to legal advice and what he or she is expecting to get is a contract. 
In the domestic or family context, the typical claimant is not a business 
person and is not receiving legal advice. What he or she wants and expects 
to get is an interest in immovable property, often for long-term occupation 
as a home. The focus is not on intangible legal rights but on the tangible 
property which he or she expects to get.713 
 
In other words, proprietary estoppel in the family or domestic context deals with the 
expectation of an interest in land, rather than simply the negotiation as a prelude to a 
formal contract of rights in land.  
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Lord Walker further stated that in relation to commercial transactions, proprietary 
estoppel in a commercial context would introduce considerable uncertainty into 
commercial negotiations, and that although “equity has some important functions in 
regulating commercial life, those functions must be kept within proper bounds”714. 
Hence, the negotiations involved in commercial transactions import uncertainty as to 
the dealings of the parties that preclude the application of proprietary estoppel.  
 
This principle elucidates that proprietary estoppel does not apply in a commercial 
context on similar facts as Yeoman’s Row715, as it imports uncertainty in commercial 
transactions. The doctrine exerts a broad influence on domestic and family 
arrangements. The limitation of proprietary estoppel in the commercial context as in 
Yeoman’s Row716, is a new development in the operation of the doctrine and provides 
guidance for future cases in proprietary estoppel.  
 
Fifth, ‘subject to contracts’ do not create a proprietary interest in land.  
Lord Scott explained that the reason why a proprietary estoppel cannot arise in a 
‘subject to contract case’ is that “the would-be purchaser’s expectation of acquiring an 
interest in the property”717 is entirely speculative. He asserted thus:  
The reason why in a “subject to contract case”, a proprietary estoppel 
cannot ordinarily arise is that the would-be purchaser’s expectation of 
acquiring an interest in the property in question is subject to a contingency 
that is entirely under the control of the other party to the negotiations 
…718  
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Hence, in a subject to contract case, a would-be purchaser’s expectation in acquiring 
an interest in land could be withdrawn, whether expressly or by inference from 
conduct, and therefore could not establish an arguable case for proprietary estoppel.  
 
For example, in the case of Yeoman’s Row719, negotiations had been made subject to 
contract, and in the end no contract was formed, and therefore no remedy could be 
granted in proprietary estoppel. Lord Scott maintained that the representations of 
intention on which Cobbe acted could not in principle entitle him to a remedy that 
intended to give him the value of his expectations engendered by the representations.  
 
This principle qualifies the type of arrangements that give rise to a proprietary 
estoppel and its limitation in the context of negotiable contracts. Their Lordships in 
Yeoman’s Row720 therefore affirmed the nature and character of proprietary estoppel 
as an objective and principled doctrine. The pre-conditions required for proprietary 
estoppel to arise, such as a “certain interest in land” alerts the legal practitioner as to 
whether a litigant has a viable action lying in proprietary estoppel, and enables advice 
to be given on whether or not to proceed with a claim.  
 
Their Lordships also established the limits to a potential claim in proprietary estoppel 
such as the exclusion of ‘subject to contract’ agreements, and confined the 
circumstances in which proprietary estoppel can arise – in a domestic and family 
context and not a commercial context as in Yeoman’s Row721. Thus, their Lordships 
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developed a new perspective towards the judicial application and operation of the 
doctrine.   
 
The strength of their Lordships’ decision in Yeoman’s Row722 is that it imports clarity 
and consistency with the decided cases in proprietary estoppel such as Gillett v 
Holt723, Crab v Arun District Council724, Ives v High725 and Taylor Fashions726. The 
House of Lords gave credence to the doctrine, and approved its rationale for a 
proprietary interest in land. The weakness of Yeoman’s Row727 is that the court did not 
fully examine the doctrine of proprietary estoppel as a whole, as their decision was 
limited by the pertinent issues to be decided. Also, their Lordships did not define the 
role of unconscionability in proprietary estoppel, but only emphasized its significance. 
Their Lordships decision did not seek to re-invent a new doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel, or to transform the doctrine of the lower courts, but merely to implant 
clarity and provide guidance on the application of the doctrine. Although, the case of 
Yeoman’s Row728 was not primarily based on proprietary estoppel, the court had 
nonetheless articulated instructive principles for the future operation and scope of the 
doctrine.  
 
6.5  Conclusion 
Their Lordships did not seek to re-define the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and 
neither to re-state the law established by the lower courts. To a large extent, they 
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ratified the existing decisions and affirmed the traditional course of the doctrine. 
However, the House of Lords also dealt with the constraints on the application of the 
doctrine within the context of commercial transactions involving negotiable contracts. 
This provided some guidance on the operation and scope of the doctrine, and gave an 
indication to the legal practitioner and litigant on the type of cases to which 
proprietary estoppel might apply. Even had the later case of Thorner729 not proceeded 
to the House of Lords, the doctrine would have been preserved and accorded judicial 
status at the highest level by their Lordships in Yeoman’s Row730.  
 
The next chapter will focus on proprietary estoppel in the House of Lords decision of 
Thorner v Major731. 
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Chapter Seven: Proprietary Estoppel in Thorner v Major732 
 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the House of Lords decision in 
Thorner v Major733 on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. Since Yeoman’s Row734, 
Thorner735 is the only case in which the House of Lords has made a determination in 
proprietary estoppel. Not only did their Lordships revisit the lower courts’ decisions on 
the doctrine, but assiduously considered its application and devised new principles and 
practices that the courts should adopt in determining the estoppel.  
 
The chapter illustrates the House of Lords approval of the doctrine and its elements, 
the principles affirmed for its application, and the extent to which Thorner736 
represents a restatement of the stance taken by the Court of Appeal or a divergence 
from the lower court. It also assesses whether the principles advanced by their 
Lordships had developed the law beyond what was applied by the lower courts, 
whether the principles propounded were novel or consistent with the decided cases, 
or whether they simplified the law of proprietary estoppel.  
 
The discussion adopted in this chapter is distinct from the existing literature737 that has 
not undertaken an in-depth investigation of the principles developed in Thorner738 but 
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presented a holistic perspective of the House of Lords decision. Although some legal 
scholars739 have considered the impact of Thorner740 on the future of proprietary 
estoppel, they have not analyzed and compared its implications on the previous cases 
before Thorner741. The chapter illustrates the modern approach of the House of Lords 
for the future application of the doctrine. 
 
This chapter further explores the question of whether the underlying purpose of 
estoppel in redressing unconscionable behaviour was upheld by their Lordships, 
whether or not the principles adduced are consistent with those of the decided cases, 
and whether the principles advocated have created clarity in the application of the 
doctrine by the courts. This aspect of the doctrine has not been investigated by legal 
scholars742 who have discussed some of the principles advanced by their Lordships, but 
not to the extent and depth presented in this chapter.  
 
The chapter leads to the discussion in further chapters of the thesis on whether or not, 
and to what extent Thorner743 has influenced any future decisions of the courts in 
proprietary estoppel.  
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7.2  Thorner v Major744 in the House of Lords 
In Thorner745, T (also referred to as D) had worked for his cousin P for almost thirty 
years without pay on P’s promise that D would inherit P’s farm upon P’s death. Over 
the years P’s words and conduct such as handing D the bonus notice to P’s two 
insurance policies for the payment of P’s death duties, and making a will leaving the 
farm to D had led D to believe that P would keep his promise. However, P had 
destroyed the will and had not made another before his death, and the farm passed to 
P’s personal representatives upon P’s death. D made a claim for proprietary estoppel.  
 
The High Court held there was a proprietary estoppel. The Court held that by P 
handing over the bonus notice and saying that it was for his death duties, P indicated 
to D that D would be P’s successor to P’s farm upon P’s death. P’s conduct encouraged 
the expectation which D had formed that D would be P’s successor and encouraged D 
to continue working without pay for P. The Court also held that it was reasonable for D 
to understand and rely on P’s words and conduct to inherit P’s farm. D was granted a 
proprietary estoppel to P’s farm and received the land, buildings, live and dead stock 
and other assets of P’s farming business, and had to indemnify the personal 
representatives in respect of the inheritance tax payable on P’s farm.   
 
An appeal was made against the High Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal held there 
was no clear and unequivocal assurance for the farm from P to D, and therefore no 
proprietary estoppel could be granted to D. D appealed to the House of Lords.  
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The House of Lords (now Supreme Court) allowed the appeal and restored the decision 
of the High Court. Their Lordships held that a proprietary estoppel was established, as 
P’s assurances, objectively assessed, was intended for D to inherit P’s farm at P’s 
death.  
 
7.3  The Approach to Proprietary Estoppel in Thorner v Major746  
Thorner747 was the first case founded in proprietary estoppel to reach the House of 
Lords (now Supreme Court) since the evolution of the doctrine by Lord Kingsdown in 
Ramsden v Dyson. The court approved the judicial principle of proprietary estoppel by 
which an interest in land could be acquired.  
 
Their Lordships also affirmed the same elements required for a proprietary estoppel as 
previously established in Taylor Fashions Ltd V Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Ltd748. 
Lord Walker stated that the three major elements requisite for a claim in proprietary 
estoppel includes a representation made or an assurance given to the claimant; 
reliance by the claimant on the representation or assurance, and some detriment 
incurred by the claimant as a consequence of that reliance.749 The approval of these 
requirements by their Lordships illustrate their necessity for a successful claim in 
proprietary estoppel, and also impute certainty in the law and pleadings of a case 
founded on proprietary estoppel.  
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Their Lordships proceeded further to broaden the scope of the assurance required for 
a proprietary estoppel. More emphasis was placed on the role of an assurance in 
creating the estoppel. In other words, unless the assurance was proved, then the other 
elements could not be invoked to do so. Their Lordships established a very broad test 
for proving the assurance, including the nature of the assurance made; the context in 
which it was made; whether the assurance was expressed or implied; whether the 
subject matter of the assurance was identifiable, and also that the assurance was a 
finding of fact by the trial judge. This test gave the promisee a wide latitude for proving 
estoppel by direct or indirect statements made, by the context in which it was made, 
or the contextual relationship of the parties. Hence, the task of proving the assurance 
was made easier or less onerous for the promisee.  
 
In Thorner750, their Lordships751 also rejected the ‘clear and equivocal’ test for an 
assurance that was established by the Court of Appeal. Their Lordships determined 
that it was sufficient if the assurance was ‘clear enough’. The clear and equivocal test 
was more restrictive, and constituted an imperative intention by the landowner to give 
an interest in land. On the other hand, the ‘clear enough’ test had narrowed the 
assurance to being apparent or discernible rather than certain and unquestionable. 
Hence, the intricacies of how and whether an assurance was binding depended on the 
lesser standard of being just clear enough to understand that it was intended to be 
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binding. Thus, in Thorner752 their Lordships amplified the nature and purpose of the 
assurance, the circumstances in which it could arise, and how it could be proved.  
 
The House of Lords in Thorner753 also re-stated the correct test for determining 
whether an estoppel could arise on the facts of a case. The Court of Appeal had 
established the “subjective test” of whether the landowner had intended the promisee 
to rely on the representation made, or to have foreseen that the promisee would have 
done so. This was a departure from the traditional approach adopted in the decided 
cases whereby the court focused on the detrimental reliance suffered by a promisee 
on the assurances of a landowner, rather than the landowner’s subjective intentions.  
 
Their Lordships in Thorner754 affirmed the test applied in previous cases to be whether 
the promisee had understood and interpreted the words or conduct of the landowner 
to create an expectation for an interest in land.755 Hence, the burden of proof for the 
estoppel was reversed and imposed on the landowner to disprove the assurance made 
to the promisee and the expectation created for that interest in land. Thus, their 
Lordships had established an objective test of whether it was reasonable for the 
promisee to rely on the assurance made, rather than looking at the subjective 
intentions of the landowner in making the promise or representation.  
 
Thorner756 thus introduced more clarity in the law of proprietary estoppel. It affirmed 
the longstanding doctrine, devised and developed by the lower courts, and established 
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new criteria for its operation and application by the courts. Not only had their 
Lordships further developed the law to be applied by the courts, but had shifted the 
focus to the assurance made.  
 
7.4  The Principles of Proprietary Estoppel in Thorner v Major757 
Thorner758 is the leading case in proprietary estoppel to be decided by the House of 
Lords, and is the authoritative precedent and historical pinnacle in the law of 
proprietary estoppel. Their Lordships pronounced cardinal principles for the future 
application and operation of the doctrine as follows:  
 
First, the affirmation of the pre-conditions necessary for a proprietary estoppel. Their 
Lordships approved and affirmed the requirements of assurance, reliance, detriment 
and unconscionability for establishing proprietary estoppel.   
 
Lord Scott and Lord Walker asserted that the elements required to prove a proprietary 
estoppel are a representation made or assurance given to the claimant, reliance by the 
claimant on the representation or assurance given, and some detriment incurred by 
the claimant in consequence of this reliance.759   
 
Lord Walker also emphasized the importance of unconscionability for a proprietary 
estoppel based on the retrospective nature of the doctrine. He expressed that 
proprietary estoppel is backward looking from the moment of the promise to the 
events which have transpired to determine whether it would be unconscionable for 
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the promise not to be kept. Conversely, the remedy awarded in proprietary estoppel is 
prospective by nature. For example, estoppel creates an interest in land (if that is what 
the court decides) from the moment the decision is made. Unlike the constructive 
trust which operates retrospectively and always gives the claimant an equitable 
interest in land, estoppel operates prospectively and an interest in land created by 
estoppel thus only binds third parties dealing with the land from the date the court 
declares that interest (if any) exists.  
 
Their Lordships approved and confirmed the pre-conditions of proprietary estoppel 
established in Taylor Fashions760 and Gillett v Holt761. In ratifying the requirements of 
the estoppel, the House of Lords defined the precise elements that create the 
estoppel, and confirmed its capacity to give rise to a proprietary interest.   
 
Second, an assurance can be made by indirect statements, mere inferences and 
implied statements.  
Their Lordships determined that a promise or representation may be inferred by the 
words or conduct of the landowner, or by the landowner’s implied intention or indirect 
statements relating to an interest in land. For example, Lord Hoffman asserted that the 
representations made to David (Appellant) were never made expressly but were a 
“matter of implication and inference from indirect statements and conduct”762. It 
consisted of Peter (deceased, whose estate was represented by the Respondents) 
handing over to David an insurance policy bonus notice to pay Peter’s death duties and 
other oblique remarks which indicated that Peter intended David to inherit the farm. 
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Likewise, the trial judge found as a fact that Peter’s words and acts were reasonably 
understood by David as an assurance that David would inherit the farm, and Peter 
intended his acts to be so understood.763 Thus, an assurance can be created by indirect 
statements, mere inferences or implied statements relating to the landowner’s land so 
long as it is reasonably construed and interpreted as an assurance by the promisee.  
 
Lord Roger also adduced that oblique or vague statements, or mere inferences for an 
interest in land, were capable of creating an assurance for that interest if interpreted 
or understood to do so. His Lordship maintained that David had years of experience in 
interpreting what Peter said and did, so as to form a reasonable view that Peter was 
giving him the assurance that he was to inherit the farm and David relied on Peter’s 
assurance.764  
 
This approach is innovative, as none of the decided cases had established that the 
indirect statements, inferences or implied intention of the promisor constituted an 
assurance. Their Lordships had broadened the scope of an assurance for proprietary 
estoppel beyond the oral arrangements or promises of a landowner to incorporate the 
landowner’s implied intention, inferences or indirect statements for an interest in 
land. Irrespective of a landowner’s oblique remarks or intentions, an assurance 
depended on how it was reasonably interpreted and understood by the promisee. 
Although the decided cases demonstrated that the courts apply the narrow test for an 
assurance as whether or not the words or conduct of the promisor sufficiently 
amounted to an assurance, their Lordships introduced a new test of how the 
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landowner’s words or actions were reasonably construed by the promisee to lead to 
the promisee’s detrimental reliance thereon. Hence their Lordships extended the 
ambit of an “assurance” to encompass implied as well as expressed representations.  
 
Third, an assurance must be assessed on the context in which it was made.   
Lord Roger articulated that the context in which an assurance is made provides insight 
on the unusual situation and circumstances in which the promise was made. For 
example, His Lordship stated since David worked on the farm without pay for almost 
thirty years, and his only income was pocket money from his father, then that unusual 
situation provided ‘the context in which the remarks which lie at the heart of the case 
of proprietary estoppel fall to be interpreted’765.  
 
Likewise, Lord Scott stated that the relationship between Peter and David was a 
familial one and the conduct of the parties in the years leading up to Peter’s death had 
to be assessed in the context of that familial relationship.766 For example, Lord Scott 
asserted that David’s many years of unpaid labour on the farm and assistance with the 
management of Peter’s farming business took place in the context of that 
relationship.767 Similarly, David’s expectation of inheriting Peter’s farm was driven by 
years of unpaid labour and his understanding of Peter’s remarks and intentions. Hence 
the contextual relationship of the parties provide insight on the assurance of the 
promisor and the detrimental reliance of the promisee.  
 
                                                 
765
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 [23] (Lord Rodger) 
766
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 [12] (Lord Scott) 
767
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 [12] (Lord Scott)  
202 
 
Lord Hoffmann also indicated that the context in which the words or conduct of the 
representor was made impacted upon the future conduct of the promisee. His 
Lordship stated thus: 
Past events provide context and background for the interpretation of 
subsequent events and subsequent events throw retrospective light upon 
the meaning of past events.768  
 
Hence, the incident of Peter handing over the insurance policy to David to pay his 
death duties led David to rely on Peter’s assurances of inheriting the farm that was 
affirmed by later words and conduct from Peter. Moreover, Peter’s remarks and 
conduct encouraged David to continue with his unpaid help to Peter in the expectation 
of being Peter’s successor.  
 
Lord Neuberger also adduced that “… the effect of words or actions must be assessed 
in their context.”769 His Lordship remarked that this was particularly true “where a very 
taciturn farmer, given to indirect statements, made remarks obliquely referring to his 
intention with regard to his farm after his death.”770 Hence, whether an assurance is 
intended to be binding on the promisee depends on the context in which it was made, 
and relied on to the detriment of the promisee. Context provides insight of the 
conduct and relationship of the parties in the determination of the estoppel. 
 
Previously decided cases did not place emphasis on the context in which the assurance 
was made. This contextualization of the assurance requires consideration of the   
background and circumstances in which the promise was made. For example, context 
provides insight and understanding of a landowner’s inferences, implied intention or 
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indirect statements for an interest in land. It eliminates any speculation about the 
parties’ conduct and relationship. Further, context provides clarity on ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
a promise was made and helps understand the rationale or reasoning for the 
detrimental reliance on the promise. Hence their Lordships sought to import a broader 
approach and greater latitude in ascertaining an assurance for the estoppel. It is 
arguable that this broad approach may introduce a level of uncertainty in trying to 
determine the context in which the assurance was made. However, this does not 
impact upon the soundness of the estoppel in that although the outcome is fact-
dependent it does not detract from the court’s unwavering adherence to the essential 
purpose of proprietary estoppel, that of preventing unconscionable behavior on the 
part of a legal owner of land who seeks to renege upon representations on which the 
claimant has relied to his or her detriment. 
   
Fourth, an assurance is a finding of fact by the trial judge.  
Their Lordships established that the existence of an assurance is determined by the 
factual evidence presented before the trial judge, who has the benefit of first-hand 
evidence from the claimant.  
Lord Walker described why an assurance is a matter of fact as follows: 
The commercial, social or family background against which a document or 
spoken words have to be interpreted depends on findings of fact. When a 
judge sitting alone hears a case of this sort, his conclusion as to the 
meaning of spoken words will be inextricably entangled with his factual 
findings about the surrounding circumstances …771 
 
Here, the trial judge is privy to all the evidence of the character, demeanour, 
relationship and conduct of the parties and is better able to draw inferences from the 
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direct evidence which another court cannot. The evidence heard by the trial judge 
includes primary facts not heard by the higher courts.  
 
Lord Roger stated that the trial judge who heard and tried the case, had the advantage 
of first-hand evidence of the parties’ relationship, and there was no reason to doubt 
the trial judge was right. 
 
Lord Walker declared that the facts found out by the deputy judge were 
unquestionable, as the judge had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses 
who gave evidence before him.  
 
Lord Neuberger also affirmed that the Appellate tribunal only had the benefit of 
transcripts of evidence. The trial judge was far better able to assess not only how the 
statements would have been intended by Peter and understood by David, but also 
whether any such understanding and any subsequent reliance by David was 
reasonable.772   
 
The above approach re-affirmed the deep-rooted precept of previous cases that a 
proprietary estoppel is fundamentally based on the findings of fact by the trial judge. 
Whether an assurance was made, relied on and detriment suffered is a question of 
fact to be determined by the trial judge. The trial judge has the advantage and seeing 
and hearing the witnesses first-hand and is able to determine whether the witness was 
truthful or not, or whether the promisee had reasonably relied on the promise, or 
whether the promisee had suffered a detrimental reliance on a promise. Hence an 
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estoppel is based on the factual matrix of the promise made and the trial judge has the 
benefit of hearing the witnesses in the determination of the estoppel.  
 
Fifth, their Lordships established a clear enough test for a proprietary estoppel.  
Their Lordships adduced that an assurance need not be certain, unequivocal or 
ambiguous as long as it was clear enough to the promisee. Lord Walker asserted the 
‘clear enough’ test as follows: 
I would prefer to say … that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant 
assurance must be clear enough.”773 
 
Lord Roger also confirmed that the ‘clear enough’ test determined the subjective view 
of the party to whom the assurance was made as follows:  
…I would hold that it is sufficient if what Peter said was “clear enough”. To 
whom? Perhaps not to an outsider. What matters however, is that what 
Peter said should have been clear enough for David whom he was 
addressing and who had years of experience in interpreting what he said 
and did to form a reasonable view that Peter was giving him an assurance 
that he was to inherit the farm and that he could rely on it.774 
 
Here, the ‘clear enough’ test is better suited to the invocation of estoppel as it 
examines the assurance through the lens of how it was understood and interpreted by 
the promisee, and relied on to his or her detriment. It eliminates the landowner’s 
subjective intentions or contemplations in making the promise. It is arguable that the 
test may introduce a level of uncertainty in trying to determine whether the assurance 
was “clear enough” to the promisee.  
 
                                                 
773
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL [56] (Lord Walker) 
774
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL [26] (Lord Rodger) 
206 
 
The above test is novel as it is not applied in the decided cases. It simplifies the test for 
an assurance, and broadens the scope of an assurance for proprietary estoppel. 
Whereas the decided cases show the assurance is narrowly construed as being precise, 
certain, unequivocal or absolute, the “clear enough” test requires the assurance to be 
judged on what was said and how it was reasonably understood or interpreted by the 
promisee. Hence, the clear enough test focuses on the subjective interpretation of the 
promise by the promisee, rather than the subjective intention of the landowner. This 
test is a new development in the law of proprietary estoppel as the assurance whether 
it be made orally, or by inference or indirect statement or implied intention, need only 
be clear enough to be considered for a proprietary estoppel. This approach makes the 
assurance less onerous to prove and, perhaps, more easily to establish an estoppel.  
 
The House of Lords in Thorner775 thus articulated a new paradigm for the 
determination of proprietary estoppel with more focus on the assurance made by the 
landowner. The House not only approved the doctrine and confirmed its requirements, 
but also developed new principles to assist the court in the finding of the estoppel. 
Their Lordships have set forth a very broad test for the assurance in proprietary 
estoppel with greater scope in the determination of the assurance for the estoppel.  
 
The strength of Thorner776 is that the House of Lords had finally heard and determined 
a case based purely on proprietary estoppel following the genesis of the doctrine over 
four hundred years earlier. Their Lordships elevated the status of the judicial principle 
of proprietary estoppel, and also supported the efficacy of the doctrine. The principles 
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adduced by their Lordships amplify the criteria for the future application and operation 
of the doctrine by the courts. 
 
The limitation of Thorner777, is that the House of Lords’ decision was confined to the 
issue to be determined: that is whether the representations made by Peter had 
created, or was capable of creating an assurance for an interest in land. Hence, their 
Lordships’ decision narrowly focused on this issue with less emphasis or consideration 
on the other requirements of the estoppel such as reliance and detriment. Unless and 
until another case is heard and determined by the House of Lords to develop and 
establish new principles for the lower courts to follow, then the law on proprietary 
estoppel is guided by their Lordships’ decision in Thorner.778  The Supreme Court (as it 
now is) has not dealt with any subsequent cases based on proprietary estoppel.  
 
7.5  Securing an Inheritance with Proprietary Estoppel 
Definitively, without the benefit of the defence of proprietary estoppel, the claimant 
would have lost the inheritance without a will from the testator. Section 3 of the Wills 
Act says that all property may be disposed of by will, and the original will in favour of 
the claimant was destroyed by the testator. The testator died intestate and the 
property devolved by law (section 3 of the Wills Act 1837 as amended) to his 
successors. The Claimant’s only defence was in proprietary estoppel based on the 
representations made by the deceased, and his detrimental reliance thereon that 
made it unconscionable for the deceased to renege on the assurances made.  
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In sharp contrast to Thorner779, is the case of Lothian v Dixon780 where the deceased 
had left a will for her property. The deceased had promised to leave her entire estate 
to the claimant in return for taking full-time care of her and to manage her hotel until 
her death. The deceased left no will to the claimant. Upon her death, there was an 
original will which bequeathed the property in equal shares between the claimant and 
defendant. The claimant made a claim in proprietary estoppel for the deceased’s 
entire estate, and the court awarded the deceased’s estate to the claimant on the 
basis of proprietary estoppel, thereby overriding the will of the deceased.  
 
Here, equity is effectively enabling claimants to sidestep the testator’s intentions as 
expressed in a valid will made in conformity with section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 as 
amended. Equity is thereby disregarding its own maxim that “equity follows the law” 
to provide a remedy in terms of the maxim that “equity will not suffer a wrong to be 
without a remedy”. Further, as per the Earl of Oxford’s Case781, equity prevails over 
the law; and in Crab v Arun District Council782, Lord Denning stated that equity comes 
to mitigate the rigours of strict law. The flexibility of equity permits a promise made in 
a deceased’s lifetime to be enforced after death, based on the detriment suffered by 
the promisee in reliance of the assurances of the deceased. In both Thorner783 and 
Lothian784, the court considered the ‘substantial’ detriment which the claimants had 
suffered, and held that it would be unconscionable if they could not inherit what they 
had been promised. Thus, equity by nature presents a balancing scale in bypassing 
statute to prohibit inequitable or unconscionable conduct.  
                                                 
779
 [2009] UKHL 18 
780
 [2014] 11 WLUK 851 
781
 [1615] 21 ER 485 (Ch)  
782
 [1976] Ch 179 (CA)  
783
 [2009] UKHL 18 
784
 [2014] 11 WLUK 851 
209 
 
7.6  Conclusion 
The influence of Thorner785 as the leading authority by the House of Lords in 
proprietary estoppel, and its potential to enforce informal rights to land gives infinite 
credence to the doctrine since its evolution over a century ago.   
 
Their Lordships did not seek to re-define the doctrine of proprietary estoppel or to re-
state the law established by the lower courts. Their Lordships ratified the existing 
decisions and affirmed the traditional course of the doctrine. For example, whereas 
the Court of Appeal in Thorner786 held that proprietary estoppel was determined by 
the subjective intentions of the landowner, the House of Lords intervened and 
established that proprietary estoppel is an objective assessment of the assurance 
made to the promisee. Also, whereas the Court of Appeal in Thorner787 held that a 
proprietary estoppel is not based on the inferences drawn by the promisee, the House 
of Lords intervened and established that mere inferences, indirect statements, or an 
implied assurance can give rise to a proprietary estoppel. Hence, Thorner788 was 
significant in that it restored the direction of the law back to its traditional roots, whilst 
enunciating new criteria for the establishment of the requisite elements on which the 
estoppel was founded. The House of Lords thereby instilled a measure of consistency 
to assist in the future application of the doctrine of the lower courts.  
 
Pertinently, both decisions of the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row789 and Thorner790 
amplify the essence of the doctrine and its implications for the creation of an interest 
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in land. For example, both decisions describe the same pre-requisites for the estoppel, 
being an assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability. Further, both cases 
demonstrate that a proprietary estoppel may arise in a family or domestic context, and 
must concern an interest in land. Moreover, the unifying principle between the two 
cases is that they both assert an objective approach in the determination of the 
estoppel. Hence, although the two decisions vary in outcome, the House of Lords 
broadly considered the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, and its capacity to create an 
interest in land. The most illuminating difference between the two cases is that 
Yeoman’s Row791 highlights the limitations or exceptions to a claim in proprietary 
estoppel, whereas Thorner792 embraces the finding of a proprietary estoppel in the 
type of context within which the case arose.  
 
Thus, the House of Lords decisions in Yeoman’s Row793 and Thorner794 heralded a new 
chapter in the development and progression of proprietary estoppel. The new 
principles devised by their Lordships substantially influence the finding of a proprietary 
estoppel, and the court’s approach to the doctrine. Whether or not these principles 
have simplified or complicated the finding of the estoppel is to be determined by the 
future case law on proprietary estoppel. Also, how far the lower courts embrace those 
new principles will be determined by the future case law to the extent discussed 
above. The House of Lords has set the doctrine on a new path, and the onus is on the 
lower courts to implement the principles it articulated.  
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The next chapter will focus on a critical review of the case law following Thorner v 
Major795.  
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Chapter Eight: Critical Review of the Case Law following Thorner v Major796 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter critically examines the recent case law on proprietary estoppel following 
the House of Lords decision in Thorner797. It seeks to assess whether the courts are 
applying the principles; how far are the principles being applied; whether the cases are 
dominated by the principles that prevailed before the House of Lords decisions; 
whether the courts have adopted a progressive or conservative approach to the 
evolution of proprietary estoppel, and whether the courts have developed new 
principles of proprietary estoppel following Thorner798.  
 
The discourse in this chapter is exclusive as it goes beyond the mere vagaries of the 
principles applied by the courts to assess what changes, if any, that Thorner799 has 
created in the application and operation of the doctrine by the courts. Other legal 
scholars800 tend to discuss the ratio of the court’s decision, but neither seek to 
compare each new case decided with the previous cases, nor consider the influence of 
Thorner801 in arriving at a decision in proprietary estoppel. The cases demonstrate the 
direction of proprietary estoppel following Thorner802.  
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This chapter further considers the question of whether the doctrine is sound in terms 
of the extent to which the courts continue to prevent unconscionable behaviour on 
the part of a legal owner of land and further to this, whether or not, and how far the 
courts are applying the principles adduced by their Lordships in Thorner803. This sphere 
of the doctrine has not been investigated by other legal scholars804, and neither have 
they considered the case by case development of the law following Thorner805.  
 
The chapter leads to the discussion in further chapters of the thesis on whether or not, 
and to what extent Thorner806 has created a positive impact in the development of the 
doctrine.  
 
8.2  Recent Case Law 
There are many High Court cases on proprietary estoppel following Thorner807, most of 
which proceeded to appeal. In most cases, the appeal turned on the facts rather than 
the law, and the appeal courts upheld the decision of the trial judge appearing to apply 
settled principles of proprietary estoppel elicited from previously decided cases.  
 
Below is an account of the key decisions which demonstrate the judicial attitude 
towards the doctrine.  
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8.2.1  Henry v Henry808 
In that case, Geraldine Pierre had permitted the Respondent’s grandmother to build a 
house on her plot of land and to live there. The Respondent’s grandmother was a 
relative of Geraldine Pierre. The Respondent testified that he was born in that house 
and lived with his grandmother until her death. He continued to live in the 
grandmother’s house and was later joined by his girlfriend with whom he had four 
children. The Respondent stated that Geraldine Pierre had frequently visited the 
property until five years before her death as she became too old and infirm to do so. 
He said that he called Geraldine Pierre “Mama” and that she treated him like a son. 
The Respondent testified that Mama promised him her share of the plot of land upon 
her death because he lived on the land, cultivated it and cared for her.809 The 
Respondent said he cultivated the plot of land to provide food for himself and family, 
as well as for Mama to whom he took food and sold any leftovers.   
 
In 1998, Geraldine Pierre had made a will appointing the Respondent as her executor 
and leaving her half share in the plot of land to him. In September 1999, Geraldine 
Pierre made a further will in which she left her half share in her plot of land to the first 
Appellant who was later registered as owner upon the death of Geraldine Pierre in 
October 1999. The first Appellant gave notice to the Respondent to vacate the plot. 
The Respondent instituted proceedings for proprietary estoppel.  
 
The trial judge found that Mama had made a clear representation to the Respondent 
but that the Respondent had not acted to his detriment. The Respondent had instead 
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benefited from the land, as he had lived on the land rent free for decades, it had been 
his source of livelihood and had reaped the benefits of the land. On appeal, the court 
held that the Respondent had acted to his detriment and was awarded the plot of land 
by proprietary estoppel.  
 
On further appeal to the Privy Council, the Board held that the issue was whether the 
Respondent had acted to his detriment, and the process of deciding whether there had 
been sufficient detriment was to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages suffered 
by the Respondent in reliance of Mama’s promises.810 The Board followed the 
approach in Gillett v Holt811 that detriment was to be viewed in the round and ruled 
that the Respondent had established his detriment and equity in choosing a hard life 
to work the land to care for Mama and to provide food for her and had deprived 
himself of a better life elsewhere. The Respondent was awarded a half share in 
Mama’s property by proprietary estoppel.  
 
This case applied the settled principles of the decided cases for proprietary estoppel 
and did not change its application. Although the Board did not refer to the House of 
Lords decision in Thorner812, it affirmed the principles applied in previous cases. The 
Privy Council did not endeavor to examine the doctrine of proprietary estoppel as a 
whole, or to express a view on its principles or operation by the courts, but applied the 
established principles to determine the estoppel.  
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8.2.2  Bradbury v Taylor813  
In this case, the claimant was awarded a proprietary estoppel based on a promise to 
inherit the property. In Bradbury814 a couple (B) had left their home and moved to care 
for an elderly relative (T) on the promise that they would inherit T’s home at death. B 
expended monies for improvements to the property. T brought proceedings that B had 
no beneficial interest in the property and to deny their access to the property. T died 
before the trial and the proceedings were continued by T’s executors. B 
counterclaimed that they were entitled to the property by proprietary estoppel.  
 
The Court held an equity had arisen by proprietary estoppel as the couple had relied 
on T’s representations to their detriment. It ruled that B had moved, based on the 
promise to inherit the property, and the move itself constituted a detrimental reliance 
as the couple were away from their family providing care for T and making 
improvements at their own expense to the property. 
 
The law of proprietary estoppel was not in dispute in the appeal. Rather, the facts 
were in dispute and also how the trial judge had directed himself. The appeal court 
upheld the trial judge’s decision and established the role of the court in deciding the 
remedy of proprietary estoppel. Lloyd LJ stated thus: 
So long as the judge has the facts clearly in mind, with the material 
elements of advantage or disadvantage to those concerned … and has 
understood the law correctly … it is inherently difficult to show that the 
judge has misdirected himself in coming to a conclusion as to the 
appropriate remedy.815  
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Here the court established that a trial judge’s decision will not be challenged where 
the law and facts have been considered in a balanced way. It illustrates that the Court 
of Appeal will more readily uphold a trial judge’s decision in proprietary estoppel 
where the finding of facts and law have been decided. Hence, this case affirms the 
principle established in Thorner816 that an appeal court should be wary not to disturb 
the findings of a trial judge for a proprietary estoppel. The trial judge receives first-
hand evidence from the parties whereas an appeal court only has reference to the 
documented evidence and findings of the case.   
 
Lloyd LJ articulated that a case in proprietary estoppel generally turns on its own facts, 
and it is not helpful for a legal practitioner to argue about the facts of one case by 
comparison with those of another. Hence, a case in proprietary estoppel is determined 
on its own particular facts, and not in light of the previous cases. The findings of fact 
determine whether the requisite elements exist for the estoppel.  
 
This case provides clarity and guidance in the application of the doctrine to legal 
practitioners who seek to rely on previous case law to draw a co-relation for a 
proprietary estoppel in another case. Unless the material facts of a case are pleaded 
and proved for estoppel, then the courts will not be impressed by previously decided 
facts or circumstances of a case. Whereas Thorner817 established that each case of 
proprietary estoppel is determined on its own facts, this case has clarified this principle 
further to establish that the facts of previous cases will not influence future decisions 
in proprietary estoppel. Legal practitioners are guided to prove the facts and principles 
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for a proprietary estoppel in every case rather than rely on co-relations or similarities 
of decided cases.  
 
8.2.3  Suggitt v Suggitt818 
In Suggitt819, a son (J) had worked for many years on his father’s (F) farm for no wages 
on the promise that the farm would be his one day. J left home after F decided that J 
was unfit to run the farm. J returned to the farm briefly to work but left to undertake 
his own business with F’s support. F died leaving the farm to J’s sister. J claimed the 
farm by proprietary estoppel.  
 
The High Court ruled that F had made an unconditional promise or assurance of the 
farm to J and a place for J to stay upon F’s death and it was unconscionable to go back 
on the assurance that had resulted in detrimental reliance to J. The court determined 
that the promise by F was unconditional as it was made by F knowing and believing 
that J was not fit to ran the farm. Also, J had worked on the farm for no wages in the 
expectation and reliance that the farm lands would be his one day. The court held that 
J had positioned his whole life on the basis of the assurances given to him and were 
reasonably believed by him and was granted the farm land and farmhouse to live by 
means of proprietary estoppel.  
 
On appeal the decision of the trial judge was upheld. It was undisputed that 
unconditional promises were made by F to J for the farmlands and the appeal turned 
on the aspects of reliance and detriment.  
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Arden LJ sought to clarify the uncertainty of an assurance for an interest in land by 
stating that it was necessary to consider the strength of the evidence of reliance and 
detriment on the promise. She stated thus: 
Where doubt is raised as to whether assurances have been given then the 
court may wish to look for confirmation to the strength of the evidence 
about reliance and detriment. The requirements of proprietary estoppel 
are not watertight requirements and it is a matter of substance whether 
they have been fulfilled.820 
 
Arden LJ continued that reliance and detriment are connected matters as follows: 
They are clearly connected matters; reliance is what a person does on the 
faith of some matter and detriment is usually the result: they are very 
closely connected. Clearly the same factual matters may show both 
reliance and detriment. That is why Walker LJ held in Gillett v Holt821 that 
the concepts were “often intertwined”.822  
 
Arden LJ also stated that unconscionability is unconscionable conduct in failing to give 
effect to the assurances made, and the court was bound in equity to give effect to the 
assurance made.  
 
The court thus adopted a holistic approach to the determination of the estoppel per 
the decided cases of Thorner823, Taylor Fashions824 and Gillett v Holt825. The court 
considered the interconnection of the requirements of assurance, reliance, detriment 
and unconscionability for a proprietary estoppel. Neither of the requirements were 
isolated or held more weight than the other. Hence, the court is to be guided by the 
settled principles of the decided cases for a proprietary estoppel.  
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On the question of appeals, Arden LJ stated that the appeal court could only interfere 
with the trial judge’s judgment if it was “perverse or clearly wrong”, as the judge had 
heard a substantial amount of oral evidence and that his decision was based on 
evaluation of all the evidence.826 Here, Arden LJ had introduced a new development in 
the operation of the doctrine by establishing the circumstances whereby a trial judge’s 
decision could be overturned on appeal. In Thorner827, their Lordships had stated their 
reasoning that the trial judge had the benefit of hearing the evidence and seeing the 
witnesses, but in Suggitt828 Arden LJ had extended the reasoning beyond the evidence 
to whether the decision was perversely or clearly wrong. Hence, the court had added a 
further ground against reversing a trial court’s decision in proprietary estoppel, thus 
making it difficult for cases to succeed on appeal.  
 
This case also set new ground in the application of the doctrine by establishing that a 
party’s absence from the land will not break the assurance made for the estoppel 
where the promisee had already suffered a detrimental reliance thereon. The 
assurance was already irrevocable upon the detrimental reliance suffered by the 
promisee despite the promisee’s absence from the land or provision by the promisor. 
In Suggitt829 J had moved off the farm to York for nine months and later returned. 
Despite the Appellant’s argument that J could not have relied on F’s promise for the 
whole farm as J had gone off to York for nine months, Arden LJ established that leaving 
the farm did not alter J’s reliance on F’s promise as follows: 
For my own part, I do not consider that simply going off to York shows that 
John did not intend to rely on his father’s promise. He was a very young 
man when he went, 21 or 22. There was no evidence that, when he went 
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to York, he did so with a view of never coming back; there is no reason why 
he should not have gone off to York for a period of time, then returning to 
the farm to work there until it became his own.830 
 
Here, Arden LJ reiterated the principle established in Thorner831 that an assurance is 
irrevocable where a party has suffered a detrimental reliance thereby. In Suggitt832, J 
had already relied on F’s promise in working for no wages in the expectation of 
inheriting the farm and a place to live. It was irrelevant that J had moved off the farm 
or that F provided for J upon his return, as the promise made by F was unconditional 
and J had fashioned his life in expectation on F’s promise. This case also reiterates that 
a proprietary estoppel will override a testamentary disposition to land as equity holds 
a landowner bound by their promise for an interest in land. The case adds more clarity 
in the law and also extends its application beyond Thorner833.  
 
8.2.4  Southwell v Blackburn834 
In Southwell835, the couple (S & B) lived together for ten years in a house purchased by 
S. B was assured by S that she would be secure in their new home and B had left her 
secure tenancy to move in with S. The relationship broke down and S gave B notice to 
quit the property. B made a claim for proprietary estoppel. The Court held that a 
proprietary estoppel had been established. A proprietary interest was not granted in 
the home as there was no clear promise that B would become an equal owner of the 
property. B had relied on S’s assurances for a secure home and had given up her 
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secure home on S’s promise and S was compensated to put her back in the position 
she was in before she had moved in with S. 
 
This case appears to deviate in an important respect from one of the principles in 
Thorner836 and Yeoman’s Row837 whereby proprietary estoppel relates to an interest 
in a parcel of identifiable land. Although B was promised a secure home, there was no 
promise of ownership specifically in S’s house; in short the promise of a secure home 
did not identify which property.  However, the court established that the promise of a 
secure home for life nonetheless gave rise to a proprietary estoppel as B had incurred 
losses and given up her secure home in reliance on S’s promise. The court held that 
unconscionability permeated all the elements of proprietary estoppel rather than 
being a discrete feature of it and it was unconscionable for S not to return B to the 
same position as she would have been before they moved in together. The detrimental 
reliance made the promise irrevocable and the repudiation of the assurance was 
unconscionable.  
 
The court had adopted a broad approach towards the determination of the estoppel 
and although the promise of a secure home was vague, the elements of assurance, 
reliance and detriment were still satisfied for the estoppel. The court ascertained that 
the assurance was clear enough per Thorner838 and need not relate to a specific right 
or interest, and it was unconscionable for S to deny what he had knowingly allowed or 
encouraged B to believe to her detriment per Taylor Fashions839 and Thorner840. 
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Hence, the ‘clear enough’ test from Thorner841 had enabled the court to arrive at a 
proprietary estoppel in satisfaction of the requirements of the estoppel. However, the 
case illustrates the unpredictability in the law as to how the court will view a vague 
promise for an estoppel. Whether a promise amounts to an assurance is entirely to be 
determined by the court.  
 
8.2.5  Lothian v Dixon842 
In this case, the court found a proprietary estoppel operated in the claimant’s favour 
despite the deceased’s will. In Lothian843 L was a cousin of the deceased who had had 
left her home and business to care for the deceased and manage her hotel on the 
promise that L would inherit her entire estate at death. Despite the deceased’s 
instructions for a will in L’s favour, it was not executed before her death. L instead 
inherited a half share in the estate based on a previous will of the deceased. L made a 
claim on the basis of proprietary estoppel. The Court held that in spite of the 
deceased’s will, L was entitled to the entire estate on the grounds of proprietary 
estoppel. The promises of the deceased were clear, certain and continued until her 
death, and L had suffered a substantial detriment in reliance and expectation on those 
promises.  
 
The court did not establish any new development in the operation of proprietary 
estoppel, as the established principles from Thorner844 and the previous case law were 
applied. For example, the court decided that a proprietary estoppel was founded on 
the elements of assurance, reliance and detriment, as established in Taylor 
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Fashions845, and upheld by the House of Lords in Thorner846.  The test applied from 
Thorner847 was whether in the circumstances that transpired it would be 
unconscionable for the promise or assurance not to be kept when there was no legally 
binding agreement in favour of the claimant. The court held the promises or 
assurances made by the deceased were relied upon to the last moment of her death 
and in applying the principle in Gillett v Holt848 that detriment had to be judged in the 
round, it would be unconscionable to deny the promise, due to the detriment suffered.  
 
Like Thorner849, the court established that detriment should not be judged by the 
countervailing benefits of free rent or other tangible or intangible benefits such as 
provision for care and sustenance. The issue of detriment was whether the promisee 
had suffered detriment and, if so, how could the equity created in the promisee’s 
favour be satisfied. The case is consistent with the decided cases on the doctrine.  
 
8.2.6  Hoyl Group Ltd v Cromer Town Council850 
In Hoyl851, the Council (C) owned a house that comprised a basement, ground floor 
and upper floors. The council occupied the ground floor and Hoyl852 (H) took tenancies 
for the upper floors and basement. H intended to convert the basement into a 
residential apartment and the layout and conversion plans were approved by C. The 
plan provided for the removal of the internal door to the basement via the ground 
floor and for its replacement by an external door over garden land owned by C. C 
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stood by without objections whilst the conversion works were being completed but 
later sought to deny the right of way over the garden land.  
 
The trial judge held that H was entitled to a right of way over the garden by 
proprietary estoppel as C had led H to believe they had or would have had a right of 
way following the conversion of the basement. In reliance on that belief, H had acted 
to their detriment in undertaking the conversion works, and it was unconscionable for 
C to deny the existence of the right of way. The appeal court upheld the decision of the 
trial judge.  
 
On appeal, the court applied the test in Taylor Fashions853 and Thorner854 as to 
whether it was unconscionable for the council to be permitted to deny what it had 
knowingly or unknowingly allowed or encouraged. The holistic approach of assurance, 
reliance, detriment and unconscionability were applied to the facts of the case to 
arrive at the estoppel.  
 
The case applied the settled principles of proprietary estoppel and did not develop its 
principles of application following Thorner855. The court favoured the broad analysis of 
the core principles of assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability for the 
estoppel in coherence with the decided cases.  
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8.2.7  Burton v Liden856  
In Burton857, the parties lived together in a home registered in B’s sole name. L paid B 
£500 per month towards the mortgage payments of the house in L’s belief that she 
would obtain an interest in the property. The relationship broke down and L claimed 
she had an equity by proprietary estoppel. The Court of Appeal held that L’s monthly 
payments were made in reliance on her belief that she was paying towards the 
ownership of the house; that B had induced, encouraged and allowed L in her belief 
and it was unconscionable to deny L a proprietary interest in the property. L was 
compensated for her interest in the home.  
 
The Appeal Court followed the settled principles in Thorner858 in relation to 
proprietary estoppel. The court considered the context in which the assurance was 
made, and held that L’s assurance of making payments “towards the house” was 
clearly meant “towards the ownership of the house”. Hamblen LJ stated that:  
Context is “hugely important” as to whether an assurance is sufficiently 
clear, and the judge was best placed to evaluate that issue, having had the 
advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses.859  
 
Hence, the context in which the statements were made by L constituted a sufficiently 
clear assurance for a proprietary estoppel. The court considered that the assurance 
was based on the promisee’s interpretation and not on the promisor’s intention.  
 
This case also reiterates the principles established by Thorner860, Gillett v Holt861 and 
Crab v Arun862 and Taylor Fashions863 that the elements of the assurance, reliance and 
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detriment must be considered as a whole rather than as disparate entities. It also 
upholds the principle in Thorner864 and Suggitt865 that an appellate court will be 
reluctant to overturn the conclusions of a trial judge on factual issues which have been 
decided on correct legal principles. The case does not seek to challenge the established 
principles of proprietary estoppel, thereby contributing a greater measure of 
consistency in judicial approach.  
 
8.2.8  Davies v Davies866 
In Davies867, the claimant worked on her family’s farm for long hours and low wages in 
reliance on her parent’s assurances that the farm would be hers one day. These 
assurances were repeatedly made to the claimant by her parents over many years. The 
claimant’s relationship with her parents broke down and the parents sought to evict 
the claimant off the farm. The claimant counterclaimed on the basis of proprietary 
estoppel for an interest in the farm, land and business. The Court held that the 
claimant had established an equity in the farm and farming business. The claimant had 
relied on the parents’ representations and forfeited a different career and lifestyle to 
work on the farm for long hours and without wages. The detriment that she suffered in 
expectation of the promises made gave rise to proprietary estoppel to which a 
substantial monetary award of £1.3 million was awarded to the claimant.   
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On appeal, the court reduced the monetary award to £500,000 on the basis that the 
trial judge had not provided a reasoned assessment for the award. The court 
determined that different expectations had been generated at different times and the 
Respondent had not positioned her whole life on her parents’ assurances. The court 
held that the monetary award should be based on the financial and non-financial 
aspects of the detriment that the Respondent suffered and the expectations that had 
been generated. Davies868 show that it is difficult to apply law to the facts of family life 
with the inconsistency and contrary nature of the parties’ evidence spanning decades.  
 
Davies869 was arguably inconsistent with aspects of the previously established 
principles of estoppel. Whereas Thorner870 and Suggitt871 established that an 
assurance is irrevocable where the promisee had acted to his or her detriment, the 
appeal court in Davies872 failed to consider that the assurance of the farm to the 
Respondent was irrevocable by the Appellants. The Respondent had already suffered a 
detriment in working for low wages (that was considered as maintenance provision) 
and long hours upon the expectation of inheriting the farm.  
 
The assurance of the farm was also unconditional as the Appellants made the promise 
knowing and accepting that the Respondent was the only child to continue the farm 
upon their death as their other two daughters had no interest in the farm. Moreover, 
the decision is contrary to Thorner873 which established that an assurance is not based 
on the landowner’s intentions as to how his or her assurance was likely to be 
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perceived by the promisee, but on its objectively accessible interpretation by the 
promisee. The Appellant’s subjectively-held intentions when making the “promise” 
were given primacy over the Respondent’s detrimental reliance on the promise in her 
favour that she would one day become entitled to the farm.  
 
Further, the decision is contrary to the principle in Suggitt874 that the promisee’s 
absence from the land and provision by the promisor does not break the assurance 
made for the estoppel where the promisee has already suffered detrimental reliance 
thereon. Also, in Gillett v Holt875, Lord Walker established that rent-free occupation 
does not extinguish a party’s equity. The assurance of the farm was already irrevocable 
upon the detrimental reliance suffered by the Respondent working for low wages, long 
hours and the lost opportunity of working in a different environment. The assurance 
was also irrevocable despite the Respondent’s absence from the land or provision to 
the Respondent by the Appellants upon her return to the farm.   
 
Whereas in Suggitt876, the Appeal Court held that the trial judge’s decision could not 
be overturned unless it was perverse or clearly wrong, the Appeal Court in Davies877, 
instead, overturned the award of the trial judge due to his giving no explanation of the 
award. Although, the trial judge asserted that the award was based on all the facts and 
evidence, and the Respondent’s expectation and detriment suffered, the appeal court 
failed to adhere to the decision of the trial judge who had heard first-hand evidence of 
the witnesses and was in a better position to make a determination on the facts as per 
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Thorner878. Moreover, the Appeal Court failed to emphasize the role of 
unconscionability of the Appellants in reneging on their promise several times to the 
Respondent in its assessment of detriment.  
 
This decision also undermines the doctrinal basis of proprietary estoppel. It makes 
clear that a landowner can make an assurance for an interest in land, and later renege 
on that promise despite the detrimental reliance suffered by the promisee, and the 
court would not hold the actions of the landowner to be unconscionable. The trial 
judge’s award of one third of the farming business to the Respondent was based on 
the irrevocable assurance of the farm to the Respondent but the appeal court had 
failed to consider the irrevocable assurance and unconscionability of the Appellants in 
denying their promise.  
 
Despite the fact that the Appellants had promised the farm to the Respondent, they 
had changed their minds and later misled the Respondent about a proposed 
partnership and testamentary disposition. The Appellants made repeated promises to 
keep the Respondent working on the farm and their retraction led to the difficult and 
strained relations with the Respondent.  
 
As per Thorner879, proprietary estoppel looks backward from the moment when the 
promise falls due to be performed and asks whether it would be unconscionable for a 
promise not to be kept in whole or in part. Hence, the promise of the farming business 
to the Respondent was irrevocable and it was unconscionable for the Appellants to 
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deny the promise as the Respondent had suffered a detrimental reliance by working 
for low wages and long hours in a difficult environment. As per Gillett v Holt880, the 
issue of detriment must be judged at the moment when the person who has given the 
assurance seeks to go back on it. Hence, the issue of detriment had to be judged from 
the moment the Appellants had reneged on their promise for the farming business to 
the Respondent and not on the successive promises made. Per Gillett v Holt881 and 
Taylor Fashions882, unconscionability permeates all the elements of proprietary 
estoppel and the unconscionability of the Appellants in their repeated broken 
promises to the Respondents was not dealt with by the appeal court in their 
assessment of detriment.  The case illustrates the confusion and uncertainty that in 
some respects pervade the law of proprietary estoppel.   
 
8.2.9  Moore v Moore883 
In this case, the claimant was awarded the defendant’s interest in the farm by the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel. The farm was originally owned by the defendant and 
the claimant’s uncle. The claimant worked on the farm at a young age and was 
promised the farm on numerous occasions by the defendant. When the claimant’s 
uncle left the farming partnership with the defendant, the claimant replaced the uncle 
and worked in partnership with the defendant on the farm. Later the defendant 
became incapacitated by Alzheimer’s disease and the claimant took over the operation 
of the farm. The claimant’s mother had encouraged the defendant to alter his will and 
to leave only a share of the farm to the claimant to allow the claimant’s sister to 
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inherit a share. The claimant instituted proceedings for full ownership of the farm on 
the basis of proprietary estoppel.  
 
The court decided in favour of the claimant and awarded him the entire farm by 
proprietary estoppel. The defendant’s promises to the claimant that he would inherit 
the farming business were unconditional, and the claimant had devoted his whole life 
to the farm in the expectation of inheriting it. The claimant had acted to his detriment 
in not seeking alternative employment in the expectation and belief of inheriting the 
farm and it was unconscionable to allow the defendant to renege on his promise.  
 
On analysis, the case did not establish any new principles of proprietary estoppel, but 
utilized the approach applied in practice. The court relied on the three elements of 
assurance, reliance and detriment for a proprietary estoppel as established in Taylor 
Fashions884 and upheld in Thorner885. It also applied the test of a reasonable man as 
predicated in Thorner886 – whether the words and actions of the defendant had 
reasonably conveyed the assurance to the claimant that he would inherit the farm. Mr. 
S Monty QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge) articulated that proprietary estoppel should not 
be narrowly construed as expressed in Thorner887. He emphasized that “… the 
equitable doctrine should be as flexible as the circumstances allow in order to give 
effect to the equity …”888. The case is therefore consistent with the decided cases 
concerning the doctrine.  
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8.2.10  James v James889 
In that case, the claimant was not successful in the claim for proprietary estoppel. The 
claimant (Raymond James (R) was the son of a farmer (Charles James (C).  C left a will 
in favour of his wife and two daughters. R made a claim in proprietary estoppel against 
the successors of the deceased being his mother and two sisters (defendants). R 
claimed that C had told him he would will the farmland to R but it was instead 
bequeathed to the defendants. C had made a will to that effect but it was never 
signed. R also stated that twice before buying further land (including the land 
bequeathed to the defendants) C would ask R whether he should buy it as R would be 
farming it one day. A witness, Andrew Mills (A) also testified that C had told him that R 
would “run the farm” that was being claimed by R.    
 
The court held that R was unable to give evidence of any particular promise or act 
creating an expectation to inherit the farmland, and there was no promise intended to 
be relied on to satisfy the element of an assurance for a proprietary estoppel. Also, R 
could not prove that he had suffered a detriment as he was being paid by C for his 
services, lived rent free on the farm and was given cars or bonuses. HHJ Paul Matthews 
ruled that the draft will was merely ambulatory and was a statement of current 
intention which could be changed at any time. Justice Matthews also held that C 
asking R whether or not to buy further land did not amount to a promise or assurance 
to leave the property to R as the intention to do a thing is not the same as promising it. 
Further, Justice Matthews held that the witness evidence that R would “run the farm” 
indicated C’s current intention but did not amount to a promise intended to be acted 
upon.  The court determined that R’s eagerness to inherit the farmland from C had 
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caused R to persuade himself that he was being promised something when he was not. 
Also, that C did not intend his words in that way, and did not intend them to be relied 
upon by R, as it is not consistent with C’s image who kept everything in his own hands 
and did not confide in others. Moreover, the court held that a reasonable person 
would not have misinterpreted C’s words and actions in that way. Thus, the claim in 
proprietary estoppel failed as R could not prove the requirements for the estoppel. 
 
The court applied the decision in Thorner v Major890 in relation to the requirements of 
the estoppel, the totality of the evidence and the “clear enough test” for establishing 
the estoppel. The components of proprietary estoppel were not challenged, but the 
facts and circumstances establishing the estoppel were in dispute. The case reinforced 
the principles of Thorner891 and demonstrated that the court was more inclined to 
follow the established principles of proprietary estoppel rather than seeking to 
expound or develop the law any further than Thorner892. The principles in Thorner893 
were applied as the leading authority in proprietary estoppel.  
 
On further analysis, the court’s decision is confusing by its application of the 
principles in Thorner894. The court seemed to focus on the testator’s intentions of 
how his words and conduct would be perceived by the claimant. This was the test 
laid down by the Court of Appeal in Thorner895 and was overruled by the House of 
Lords. Thus, the court seemed to have strayed from the House of Lords decision in 
this regard. For example, the court considered that the draft will was a statement 
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of current intention by the testator and failed to consider how it was interpreted by 
the claimant. In Thorner896, the House of Lords ruled that an intention may be 
implied, or be made by mere inferences or be made indirectly. This begs the 
question of whether the words “would be farming it one day” was an implied 
intention, or an indirect statement, or mere inference that constituted a promise. 
Thus, although the court considered that the context in which the statements were 
made did not constitute a promise, there was no consideration on whether or not 
the testator could have made an indirect promise based on his nature to hold on to 
his property. 
 
Further, the court’s approach towards the issue of detriment was arguably confusing. 
The court determined that there was no detriment suffered by the claimant but gave 
little consideration to the fact that the testator would not buy more farmland without 
the claimant’s approval and assurance that he would farm the land upon his death. No 
consideration was given to whether the claimant would have persuaded the testator 
not to purchase further farmland if the claimant knew he was not to inherit it, or 
whether the claimant would have sought other opportunities elsewhere if he knew he 
was not to inherit the farmland. Further, the defendants would not have inherited the 
farmland if the claimant had not persuaded the testator to purchase it in the 
expectation of owning it one day.   
 
The court instead focused on the wages paid to the claimant, the bonuses given and 
the rent-free accommodation, which were held in Suggitt v Suggitt897 to be such 
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benefits that would not defeat a promise made and expectation created. The wages 
and bonuses by the testator may have reflected the hard work produced by the 
claimant to ensure the success of the farm, as there was no mention of the testator’s 
love and affection to the claimant. The court maintained that the claimant’s 
statements were inconsistent and contradictory, but also expressed that the claimant 
was poor at reading. Thus, the claimant may not have been able to clearly express 
himself and the circumstances that evolved to influence the court’s decision.   
 
Since the matter did not proceed to the appeal court, it remains uncertain whether the 
same view would be expressed, or whether the court would find a proprietary 
estoppel. The judgment nonetheless illustrates the court’s strict application of the 
requirements of proprietary estoppel. There was no promise or act that amounted to 
an assurance or to create an expectation to be relied upon. Further, no detriment was 
suffered as there was no assurance to be relied upon. This illustrates that no estoppel 
can arise unless all the requirements of the doctrine is proved.  
 
Further, the court decided that testamentary intentions were current intentions, and 
do not equate to a promise of that conduct or to be acted upon. Hence, a draft will is 
considered ambulatory and is not a promise of ownership to property. Evidentially, 
this ascertains that a party cannot rely on a draft will to be considered as a promise for 
an interest in land, or a proprietary estoppel. This case provides practical guidelines to 
both legal practitioners and litigants on the strict requirements for a successful claim in 
proprietary estoppel, and also the courts will not rule in proprietary estoppel without 
strict proof of a promise to trigger the other elements of the doctrine.  
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8.2.11  Haberfield v Haberfield898  
This was a successful claim in proprietary estoppel. The claimant Lucy (L) was the 
daughter of a farmer who left school at aged 16 and gave up further education to 
devote her life to the farm upon her father’s (deceased) assurance that L would 
eventually take over the farm when he could not do farming anymore. The defendant 
Jane (J) was the claimant’s mother who denied that the deceased had made such a 
promise, and could not have made it knowing J was an equal owner of the farm. By a 
partnership proposal prepared in 2008 by their solicitor, the deceased and defendant 
had stated their desire that L inherit the farming house and farming stock, but the 
exact terms of the proposal were not communicated to L. Later in 2013, L left the farm 
following an altercation with her sister in the milking parlour. L instituted claim for a 
proprietary estoppel following the death of her father, claiming that although the 
deceased did not refer to her ownership of the farm but only to the running of it, her 
ownership of the farm was impliedly stated in encouraging her to work on the farm.   
 
The court found that L’s interest in the dairy farm and her willingness to work on it led 
the deceased to restart a dairy farm. The deceased had taught L about dairy farming 
and both shared a close personal bond. The deceased had also assured L at least eight 
times over an extended number of years that L would inherit the farming business 
when he could no longer farm. The court determined that although the various 
representations used different words and were not always explicit, when put together 
they amounted to a coherent promise to L that she would inherit the dairy farm. L’s 
detriment comprised the low wages paid, long hours with few holidays and her 
continued commitment to the farm. L had forgone a farming tenancy elsewhere or 
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seeking other employment and positioned her working life based on the assurances 
given. The court ruled that a proprietary estoppel had been established because an 
equity had arisen. L was awarded a cash payment of the value of the farmland and 
farm buildings. Compensation was awarded instead of a transfer of title to prevent the 
farmhouse from being split from the rest of the holding, and also not to force the 
defendant out of her home.   
 
The court relied on the principles in Thorner899 and the pre-existing case law principles 
seen in Gillett v Holt900 and Davis v Davies901. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel was 
not in dispute, nor were the components with it. Instead, the focus was whether the 
facts and circumstances had given rise to a proprietary estoppel. No new principles 
had been applied beyond the existing case law on proprietary estoppel. The principles 
of proprietary estoppel in Haberfield902 were also applied more flexibly as envisaged 
by their Lordships in Thorner903. For example, an assurance for an ownership in the 
farm was held to have been made based on the meaning of different words and 
phrases that were not explicit or coherent, but which when put together amounted to 
a representation of ownership. Hence, the indirect statements reiterated over time 
created an implied ownership of the farm to the claimant. The issue of detriment was 
also considered to be the same in Thorner904, as the claimant had positioned her 
whole life to working on the farm in the expectation of inheriting it and had forgone 
other opportunities of higher education or employment. Pertinently, the case presents 
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a very flexible approach towards the establishment of an assurance in proprietary 
estoppel following Thorner905.  
 
8.2.12  Thompson v Thompson906  
In Thompson907, the claimant was promised the farm and bungalow upon the death of 
his parents. The claimant and his parents operated under a partnership agreement 
whereby the claimant would inherit both his parents’ shares upon their death. He had 
been farming with his father since leaving school at aged 15, and worked for long 
hours and low pay. When the claimant’s father died, the partnership deed was varied 
and his one third share was assigned to his mother. Subsequently, the claimant’s 
relationship with his mother broke down, and she executed a will that disinherited the 
claimant of his share in the farm upon her death. The will was a departure from his 
mother’s original will that bequeathed her estate to the claimant. The claimant filed a 
claim in proprietary estoppel for the mother’s share in the farm. 
 
The claimant claimed that throughout his working life, his parents had made promises 
to him that upon their death the farm and bungalow would be his. In reliance on that 
promise he had worked for low wages, and forsook alternative employment or other 
life outside the farm. On that basis, it would be unconscionable for his mother to 
dispose of her interest that was already promised to him. The court granted the 
claimant the farm and bungalow in proprietary estoppel.  
 
                                                 
905
 [2009] UKHL 18 
906
 [2018] EWHC 1338 (Ch) 
907
 [2018] EWHC 1338 (Ch)  
240 
 
The court affirmed the established principles of assurance, reliance and detriment per 
Thorner v Major908 for a proprietary estoppel. For example, the court decided that the 
claimant had relied on his parents’ promises or assurances to his detriment. He 
dedicated his whole life to the farm which had affected his lifestyle “in terms of 
working hours, financial independence and ability to buy his own house”909. Thus, the 
court determined it would be unconscionable if the claimant was denied the farm 
upon his mother’s death.  
 
As in Thorner910, the court adopted a flexible approach in finding the requisite 
assurance. HH Davies-White held that although it was not possible to pinpoint a 
specific occasion where the promise or assurance was given, it was nonetheless a very 
longstanding promise or assurance that was repeated within the family, to the 
claimant and to others on numerous occasions as a young child and while working 
fulltime on the farm.911 Thus, the court considered that the promises or assurances 
made by both parents were consistent over time, and that they were sufficiently clear 
and definite to have created the expectation of inheriting the farm.  
 
In terms of detriment, the court emphasized the principles established in Suggitt v 
Suggitt912. For example, the court held that the claimant’s abandonment of the farm 
when the relationship broke down with the mother, did not affect the promise to 
inherit the farm. The claimant’s equity had crystallized before the breakdown, and the 
events that transpired thereafter could not affect the promise to inherit the farm. 
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Further, the court declared that detriment was to be measured by what the claimant 
had given up, and not by the means of the maker of the promise. Also, the court 
maintained that any benefit given by the promisor to the promisee represented the 
beginning of the fulfilment of the promises made, and could not defeat the equity that 
had arisen. Thus, this case serves to clarity the application of the principles in 
Thorner913 and Suggitt914 for a proprietary estoppel, and illustrates the flexible 
approach adopted by the courts following Thorner915 in determining the assurance for 
the estoppel.  
 
8.2.13  Gee v Gee916 
In Gee917, the claimant worked on the farm for over twenty years, upon the assurances 
of his father that he would inherit the lion’s share of the farm and farming business. 
He relied on these assurances and devoted his whole working life to the farm, working 
long hours for low wages. His father instead transferred all his shareholdings in the 
farming company, and land to the claimant’s brother. The claimant’s mother testified 
that it was always the family’s intention that the claimant would receive the company 
and the farm. The claimant instituted a claim in proprietary estoppel for the whole 
farm and shares in the company. The court granted the farm to the claimant in 
proprietary estoppel. The court satisfied the claimant’s equity by awarding 52% shares 
in the company and 46% of the land. The remainder was left to the father and mother 
to dispose of as they saw fit. The court maintained this approach ensured the 
continuity of the farm and the farming business.  
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Again, here, the court applied the principles of assurance, reliance and detriment in 
Thorner918 for a proprietary estoppel. The court decided that over a twenty-year 
period, the claimant’s father had made several representations to the claimant to 
inherit the whole farm and company as farmer and owner, as he was the only one 
farming the land, and the only successor to his father’s role as a farmer. The court also 
held that the remedy was based on the claimant’s expectation, and not on the 
financial value of the measurable parts of the detriment. Thus, the court asserted that 
emphasis should not be placed on the financial value of the assets that were promised, 
but instead on the expectation of the claimant. Since the claimant had understood that 
his father’s shareholding and land would be his, then detriment and expectation 
should be apportioned accordingly. Following Thorner919, Gee920 is consistent with the 
flexible approach increasingly adopted by the courts when finding that an assurance 
had been made.   
 
8.3  Conclusion 
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel has not significantly evolved since Thorner921 as 
the courts continue to apply settled principles from decided cases. For example, most 
of the appeals following Thorner922 turn on the facts rather than the constituent 
elements of proprietary estoppel. Hence, the courts have elected to adopt a more 
conservative approach to the doctrine, rather than seeking to deviate from established 
principles.  
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In compliance with Thorner923 the courts have adopted a broader approach to the 
determination of the assurance to found the estoppel. An increasing number of cases 
have appeared before the courts, since Thorner924, and successfully argued on the 
basis of proprietary estoppel. For example, where the elements of proprietary 
estoppel have been proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge, the Appeal Courts 
have always been reluctant to overturn the decision. The principles established in 
Thorner925 have provided more flexibility in the application of proprietary estoppel, 
such that the courts have been able to adopt a more open-minded approach to the 
doctrine. For example, since Thorner926 asserted that the components of proprietary 
estoppel are subject to a finding of fact by the trial judge, the majority of cases heard 
at first instance illustrate that the finding of fact and consequent conclusions are very 
clear, explicit, thorough and meticulous and more legally precise than before 
Thorner927 – so much so that the Appeal Courts have frequently dismissed appeals 
against the trial judge’s decision.  
 
The majority of cases on appeal turn on the facts, as following Thorner928 the doctrinal 
aspects of proprietary estoppel are more settled. In fact, the Appeal Courts have 
upheld the trial judge’s decision of proprietary estoppel, in almost every case, 
following Thorner929 in view of their Lordships’ perspective in Thorner930, that the trial 
judge has the benefit of hearing the evidence and seeing the witnesses first-hand to 
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make a   determination on the facts. The trial judge is considered as the chief arbiter of 
the facts to establish whether the criteria for proprietary estoppel, are satisfied.   
 
Some practical guidelines have evolved from the case law following Thorner931. In 
Bradbury932, the Appeal Court declared that proprietary estoppel is not determined by 
the same or similar facts of previous cases, and in Suggitt933, the Appeal Court 
asserted that a trial judge’s decision will be overturned only if it was clearly wrong or 
perverse, and that a party’s absence from the land will not extinguish the assurance 
made for an interest in the land where that party has suffered a detrimental reliance 
on the assurance. These guidelines are not only instructive to legal practitioners in 
proceeding with a case in proprietary estoppel, but also provide guidance for the 
process of appeals.  
 
The case of Davies934 is most at variance with the decided cases, but this,    
unfortunately, did not proceed to the House of Lords to re-consider the Appeal Court’s 
decision. Davies935 illustrates the costs constraints in proceeding to further appeals in 
such cases, as the potential reduction in the trial judge’s award may have deterred 
further litigation. Likewise, the focus of the court in James v James936 on the testator’s 
intentions, rather than objectively considering how the promisee had perceived and 
interpreted the testator’s words or conduct is arguably confusing, but the case did not 
proceed to appeal and it remains uncertain whether the Appeal Court would have 
                                                 
931
 [2009] UKHL 18    
932
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1208 
933
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1140    
934
 [2016] EWCA Civ 643 
935
 [2016] EWCA Civ 643 
936
 [2018] EWHC 43 (Ch) 
245 
 
decided differently. The case of Suggitt937 more closely embraces the established 
doctrinal principles of proprietary estoppel by adhering to the approach adopted in 
Thorner938.  
 
Following Thorner939, no case in proprietary estoppel has proceeded to the House of 
Lords, so that Thorner940 currently represents a plateau in the development of the law 
on proprietary estoppel. Their Lordships have arguably contributed a greater measure 
of clarity in the law of proprietary estoppel and the lower courts are demonstrating a 
readiness to uphold and apply the doctrine. Moreover, the decisions of the lower 
courts are now being presented in a fully reasoned manner citing the appropriate case 
law and applicable principles. However, unless and until other cases in proprietary 
estoppel proceed to the House of Lords, it is unlikely that there will be further 
significant developments in the law as the lower courts will be required to adhere to 
the principles affirmed in Thorner941.  
 
The next chapter will focus on the challenges to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  
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Chapter Nine: The Challenges to Proprietary Estoppel 
 
 
9.1  Introduction 
This chapter considers the controversies that befall the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel. It begins with a critical examination of the principles from the House of Lords 
decisions in Yeoman’s Row942 and Thorner943 and continues with further investigation 
into the limitations of the application and operation of the doctrine.  
 
The disquisition and analysis presented in this chapter are exclusive as they present a 
thorough investigation of the drawbacks to the doctrine through the lens of case law 
developed over the years. The existing literature944 has not adopted the same 
approach when reviewing the case law, and in presenting a holistic assessment of the 
operation of the doctrine. It provides insight and knowledge of the dilemmas that 
continue to beset the doctrine despite its overview by every court including the High 
Court to the House of Lords (now Supreme Court).  
 
The chapter identifies the problems arising from the case law discussed in the chapters 
of the thesis, to determine whether or not, or how far those challenges hinder the 
future development of the doctrine.  
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9.2  The Quandaries of Proprietary Estoppel 
The quandaries that persist in the doctrine of proprietary estoppel are as follows: 
First, the description of proprietary estoppel, as a principled doctrine, was not 
expounded by the court.  
In Yeoman’s Row945, Lord Walker and Lord Scott highlighted the objective nature of 
proprietary estoppel as a principled doctrine exercised by the courts. However, their 
Lordships merely provided a generalized idea of the conceptual nature of the doctrine 
‘without more’. Their Lordships did not clarify what they meant by the doctrine being 
‘principled’’. No examples are provided by the court, whether by previously decided 
cases or circumstances to illustrate how it might operate in a ‘principled’ fashion.   
 
Likewise, in Thorner946, their Lordships held that the objective nature of the doctrine is 
measured by the test of a reasonable man, being the conduct of a promisee or the 
interpretation of a statement by a promisee, equated to a reasonable person in the 
same circumstances. No case examples were cited by their Lordships to illustrate what 
is and what constitutes ‘reasonableness’. Critically, a legal practitioner may consider a 
potential client’s conduct or interpretation of a statement as ‘reasonable’ in instituting 
a claim for a proprietary estoppel, but the court may decide otherwise. Thus, a client 
may expend monies in instituting a claim for a proprietary estoppel on the premise 
that a reasonable person may have acted in the way that he or she did, or interpreted 
a statement in the same manner that he or she had, but may not succeed in his or her 
claim. For example, in James v James947, the court held that the statement relied on by 
the claimant that he would be ‘farming the land one day’ did not amount to a promise, 
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because no reasonable person would interpret the words as a promise. Hence, the 
‘reasonableness’ nature of the doctrine provides no certainty or clarity of what their 
Lordships alluded to in Thorner948. Much is left to the imagination or speculation of the 
legal practitioner and potential client, and have the potential to lead to costly litigation 
and unsuccessful claims.   
 
Second, the elements of proprietary estoppel are undefined.  
A successful claim in proprietary estoppel requires the satisfaction of the criteria of 
assurance, reliance and detriment. However, these three elements are undefined by 
the courts in the sense of exactly what each means, represents or constitutes. Much is 
left to be speculated or deduced from the case law on what would fulfil each element 
and what specifically the courts require for each element. For example, in Pascoe v 
Turner949 it was held that the words, “the house is yours and everything in it”, 
constituted an assurance; in Wayling v Jones950, it was held that the words, “it’ll all be 
yours someday”, constituted an assurance, and in Williams v Staite951, it was held that 
the words, “live here as long as you want”, constituted an assurance on which a claim 
for proprietary estoppel could be founded. 
 
However, in Layton v Martin952, the court held there was no assurance where a man 
had given a woman who moved in with him a general assurance that he would provide 
for her financially. Similarly, in Jones v Thomas953, the Court of Appeal held that 
assurances by the defendant that his cohabitee would be ‘provided for’ when he died   
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and that improvements to the property that the claimant were working on would 
‘benefit’ them, were not specific enough to amount to an assurance. Exactly what type 
of words or conduct qualifies as an assurance is therefore left to the determination of 
the individual judge.  
 
Likewise, the requirements of reliance and detriment are left undefined by the courts. 
In Teng Huan v Ang See Chuan954, the Privy Council held that reliance can be inferred 
from the facts of the case. The parties had jointly purchased a portion of land, and 
subsequently executed another agreement in which the plaintiff accepted monetary 
compensation for his half share from the defendant. The plaintiff was compensated 
before the defendant commenced construction of his house on the land, but later 
claimed his half share in the property.  The defendant counterclaimed that he was the 
sole beneficial owner of the land, and in reliance of their agreement, and 
compensation to the plaintiff had continued construction. The Privy Council decided 
that the parties had intended the land to belong solely to the defendant, and the 
defendant had acted in reliance of that agreement to begin construction. It was also 
held unconscionable to allow the plaintiff to deny the defendant’s title having received 
compensation for his half share. Hence, it is left for the courts to determine what 
reliance is, and whether it arises on the facts of a case. 
 
As to detriment, in Coombes v Smith955 it was held there was no detriment where the 
claimant had left her husband to live with the defendant, bore the defendant’s child, 
cared for the child and re-decorated the defendant’s house. Similarly, in Watts v 
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Storey956, it was held there was no detriment where a grandson had given up his 
protected tenancy in Leeds to move into his grandmother’s home in Nottinghamshire 
giving up any prospects of employment in Leeds. On the other hand, in Yaxley v 
Gotts957, the plaintiff acted to his detriment in refurbishing the house owned by the 
defendant; and in Gillett v Holt958 the plaintiff acted to his detriment in improving the 
defendant’s farmhouse that was uninhabitable. The difference between these cases of 
non-detriment and detriment is that in Coombes959 and Watts960, the claimant had not 
acted in reliance of a promise but had, of their own free will and volition, lend 
themselves to change their position. Conversely, in Yaxley961 and Gillett962, the 
claimants had acted in reliance of the promise of the defendant and thus suffered a 
detriment.  
 
Thus, it is left for the courts to determine what detriment is, and whether it arises on 
the facts of a case. Hence, both the legal practitioner and litigant are bound to 
examine the decided cases to infer what circumstances the court deems adequate to 
constitute assurance, reliance and detriment. Hence, this leaves scope for 
unpredictability of outcome in a claim founded on proprietary estoppel as the legal 
practitioner and litigant may consider that an estoppel has arisen in their case, but the 
court may decide otherwise. This dilemma may even prevent potential cases on 
proprietary estoppel being commenced at all where a legal practitioner may consider 
the statement made was too vague to comprise an assurance or representation, or the 
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litigant believes that the words spoken did not amount to a promise capable of 
supporting a claim based on proprietary estoppel. Prior understanding and knowledge 
of what amounts to each of the elements of the estoppel may, therefore, potentially 
render the outcome of litigation unpredictable, though this is arguably always the by-
product of the exercise of all equitable principles and the attendant discretion of the 
court.  
 
Third, the focus on the ‘nature’ of the assurance to determine the estoppel is 
undefined.  
Since there is no judicial definition of an assurance, how can a legal practitioner 
accurately assess the ‘nature’ of the assurance required for the estoppel? What exactly 
does the court require by the ‘nature’ of the assurance, or what qualities constitute 
the “nature’ of the assurance? Does the ‘nature’ of the assurance refer to the type of 
words or conduct; or does it refer to the interest promised, or the repeated promises 
made over long years? Alternatively, does it relate to the landowner inducing, 
encouraging, permitting or allowing a party to believe that he or she will acquire a 
right or interest in land? Exactly what the court considers by the ‘nature’ of the 
assurance, and the capacity of a legal practitioner to know what ‘nature’ is required for 
the estoppel is undefined, potentially giving rise to inability to forecast the exact 
outcome on any particular combination of facts.  
 
Fourth, an assurance may be implied or made by mere inference or indirect 
statements is confusing.  
Their Lordships failed to define, describe and give examples of an implied assurance 
for a proprietary estoppel. Exactly what is or what constitutes or amounts to an 
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implied assurance is open to speculation. For example, what types of words or conduct 
constitute an implied assurance, or a mere inference or indirect statement for an 
interest in land? How does a legal practitioner know or determine what words or 
conduct give rise to an implied assurance or an inference for an interest in land? And 
how does the court determine what words or conduct equates to an implied assurance 
or implied intention? What type of words or conduct would be considered ‘vague’ or 
‘unclear’ for an implied assurance, inference or indirect statement? How can a legal 
practitioner accurately advise his or her client on whether the landowner’s words or 
conduct is an implied assurance or an inference or indirect statement for an interest in 
land? What is the test for an implied assurance, inference or indirect statement for an 
interest in land? Does the implied assurance, inference or indirect statement have to 
be repeated several times over the course of several years?  
 
In Thorner963, the Court of Appeal held there was no assurance based on the subjective 
intentions of the landowner as to how his words would be interpreted by the 
promisee, but the House of Lords held that the indirect statements, inferences and 
implied intentions of the land owner by words and conduct over several years had 
created an assurance and a detrimental reliance thereon. Hence, what type of words 
or conduct qualify as an implied assurance, implied intention, mere inference or 
indirect statement for a proprietary estoppel is not fully defined by the courts.  
 
Fifth, an assurance must be assessed against the context in which it was made. 
The question of whether there was an assurance depends on the context in which it 
was made, and unless the trial judge determines contextually that there was an 
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assurance, then there is no proprietary estoppel. Their Lordships failed to define what 
is meant by ‘context’ for an assurance but referred to the family or domestic 
relationships and surrounding circumstances that influence an assurance for the 
estoppel. Exactly what the ‘context’ encapsulates or constitutes for the estoppel is left 
for the court to determine on the facts. Thus, how can a legal practitioner advise his or 
her client that an assurance was made based on the ‘context’ in which it was made? Or 
how can the legal practitioner assess whether the circumstances described by the 
litigant provide the appropriate ‘context’ for an assurance in proprietary estoppel?  
 
For example, if a landowner promises a friend that if he or she works the farm for no 
wages and that friend will inherit the farm upon the landowner’s death, how does a 
legal practitioner decide the ‘context’ in which that promise was made? What is the 
test for the ‘context’ of an assurance? Does it relate to why the landowner made the 
promise? What influenced the landowner’s promise? What is the relationship of the 
parties? Whether the landowner has any family? Whether the landowner was a man 
of few words and kept his or her property until death? Or why the landowner chose 
the friend to whom to make the promise? In Thorner964, their Lordships considered the 
handing over of a life insurance policy to pay the landowner’s death duties provided 
the context for an assurance to inherit the landowner’s estate. Thus, exactly what 
factors the court considers for the ‘context’ of an assurance remain unpredictable, and 
much is left to the imagination of and speculation by, the legal practitioner and 
litigant.   
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Sixth, a finding of fact by the trial judge for an estoppel creates considerable 
unpredictability.  
Unless the trial judge makes a finding of fact for an assurance, then there is no 
proprietary estoppel. This begs the question of whether every trial judge would view 
the evidence and witnesses in the same way. Although the trial judge has the exclusive 
advantage of first-hand evidence from the claimant, this also begs the question of 
whether every judge will perceive the facts in the same way, and arrive at the same 
finding or conclusion. For example, a trial judge may declare there was no assurance 
on the facts, but on appeal the court may decide there was assurance. Exactly how 
does a trial judge arrive at a finding of fact that there was an assurance is unknown, or 
what factors may persuade or prove a finding of fact for an assurance is uncertain. 
Would a finding of fact be influenced by a credible witness, or the demeanour of the 
witness, or the manner in which the evidence is given, or the amount of evidence 
given by a witness, or the number of witnesses who testify. In Thorner965, the Appeal 
Court ruled there was no clear and unequivocal promise made to the claimant to 
inherit the farm and made no finding of a proprietary estoppel. The House of Lords 
overruled the Court of Appeal’s decision and held there was a proprietary estoppel 
based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, there are no hard and fast 
rules for the finding of fact for an assurance by a trial judge. This process may reduce, 
limit or even preclude a successful claim in proprietary estoppel, as only the trial judge 
decides if there is an estoppel on the facts of the case. Hence, whether a finding of 
proprietary estoppel is determined by the trial judge remains unpredictable.   
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Seventh, the ‘clear enough’ test for a proprietary estoppel is undefined and apt to 
cause confusion.  
This test begs the question of what is meant by the terms ‘clear enough’ and what 
exactly is required for an assurance to be judged ‘clear enough’ for a proprietary 
estoppel. Also, who determines whether the representation or promise made was 
‘clear enough’ for a proprietary estoppel? Is it the trial judge who decides on the facts, 
or is it the claimant’s interpretation of the promise made and relied thereon to his or 
her detriment? How does a trial judge determine if the assurance was ‘clear enough’ 
for a proprietary estoppel? Likewise, how does a legal practitioner determine if the 
assurance was ‘clear enough’ for a proprietary estoppel? And how does a litigant 
adjudge a promise as being ‘clear enough’ to rely thereon for an interest in land? 
Exactly what qualifies, justifies or constitutes an assurance as being ‘clear enough’ for 
an estoppel is unable to be predicted in advance.   
 
Eighth, the standard of reasonableness applied for a proprietary estoppel is unclear.  
This begs the question of whether it was reasonable for the claimant to perceive that 
an assurance was made; whether it was reasonable for the claimant to have relied on 
the promise, and whether it was reasonable for the claimant to have suffered a 
detriment in the circumstances. How is the test of ‘reasonableness’ judged? Is it 
whether another person would have interpreted the assurance in the same way, or 
whether another person would have embarked on the same course of conduct? Is the 
court’s perception of ‘reasonableness’ the same for every person, or judge? Is it 
reasonable to expect the court to arrive at the same finding of ‘reasonableness’ as a 
legal practitioner?  It may be that what is considered reasonable for one judge, may 
not be reasonable for another. Likewise, it may be that what is considered reasonable 
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by a legal practitioner may not be the same for another. And how does the litigant 
decide if he or she had acted reasonably in his or her interpretation of an assurance. 
Exactly what words or conduct qualify as being reasonable for an assurance, reliance 
or detriment is difficult to predict as a precursor to litigation.966 
 
Ninth, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is complicated by the different types of 
estoppel.  
It can be confusing and difficult to distinguish between the different forms of 
proprietary estoppel such as “acquiescence estoppel, promise estoppel and 
representation estoppel”967. Unless a legal practitioner has sound knowledge of the 
circumstances whereby a particular estoppel may arise, then it might be misapplied to 
a given set of facts. For example, how can the legal practitioner determine whether an 
assurance constitutes a promise estoppel or a representation estoppel? In Huning v 
Ferrers968 the claimant was awarded the quiet possession of the mills where the 
defendant had failed to warn of his interest in the property; in Suggitt v Suggitt969, the 
court awarded a proprietary estoppel where the claimant’s father had promised the 
claimant the farm where the claimant worked for no wages and long hours as a young 
child in the expectation of inheriting the farm; and in Thorner v Major970, the House of 
Lords awarded a proprietary estoppel based on the representations made to the 
claimant by words and conduct over a period of thirty years. Thus, it requires sound 
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knowledge of the different forms of estoppel to know when and how to use them 
appropriately to obtain a remedy in proprietary estoppel.971  
 
Tenth, the scope and operation of proprietary estoppel is not always certain in terms 
of the predictability in outcome of litigation.  
Proprietary estoppel has been applied to a wide range of circumstances, and there is 
no precise rule to define in what circumstances that proprietary estoppel may arise or 
is likely to succeed. Reference has to be made to case law for guidance on its 
applicability to certain facts or circumstances. For example, in Crab v Arun District 
Council972 proprietary estoppel was applied to an easement; in Ives v High973 it was 
applied to a right of way; in Griffiths v Williams974 it was applied to a long lease; in 
Inwards v Baker975 it was applied to a licence to land; in Greasley v Cooke976 it was 
applied to possession of property; in Gillett v Holt977 it was applied to an expectation 
of an inheritance, and in Pascoe v Turner978 it was applied to co-habitees.   
 
The scope and operation of proprietary estoppel is left to be deduced from the 
conflicting circumstances that arise in the case law. This begs the question of how can 
a legal practitioner or litigant confidently predict in advance that a proprietary 
estoppel can be found on the particular circumstances of his or her case, and a 
successful outcome will be achieved? It lends a legal practitioner or litigant to draw 
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inferences and conclusions from similar case law which may be inconsistent and 
confusing.979  
 
Eleventh, there is no formal acceptance of proprietary estoppel in law.  
The equitable doctrine is not enacted by legislation, as it is a judicial doctrine that is 
applied by the courts. In the case of Muschinski v Dodds980 Mr. Justice Deane stated 
that under the law of the land, proprietary rights fall to be governed by principles of 
law and not by a mix of judicial discretion and subjective views of which party ought to 
win.981 Proprietary estoppel arguably flies in the face of such judicial dicta.  
 
Further, the provisions of the Land Registration Act, 2002 do not expressly create 
rights by proprietary estoppel. Section 116 of the Act relates that for the avoidance of 
doubt and in relation to registered land, an equity by estoppel and a mere equity has 
effect from the time the equity arises as an interest capable of binding successors in 
title.982 Whereas the title of Section 116 is stated to be “Proprietary estoppel and mere 
equities”, subsections (a and b) do not expressly state the term proprietary estoppel 
but only relates to an equity by estoppel and a mere equity. The section does not 
define what is meant by “an equity by estoppel” which tends to create mere 
inferences and implied observations that it is intended to relate to proprietary 
estoppel.  
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Moreover, the Act does not define the term “mere equities”, nor does it define what is 
meant by “for the avoidance of doubt”. Further, the section does not define 
proprietary estoppel; does not state what constitutes proprietary estoppel; does not 
state what circumstances give rise to proprietary estoppel, and does not state what 
remedies are available in proprietary estoppel. The section begs the question of how 
can a party know whether the express provisions of Section 116 relate to proprietary 
estoppel at all?  
 
Twelfth, proprietary estoppel bypasses statutory legislation.  
Prorietary estoppel may override a testamentary disposition or deed ordinarily 
required to transfer or create an interest in land. Where a proprietary estoppel is 
proved, it is capable of giving rise to an equitable interest in land, which supersedes or 
binds the legal interest of the landowner. For example, where A promises B that A will 
bequeath A’s estate to B if B cares for A until death, then the court will grant a 
proprietary estoppel of A’s estate to B where A has failed to leave a will in B’s favour. 
In Pascoe v Turner983, the Court of Appeal held that where the defendant had 
promised the plaintiff that the house was hers and everything in it, the representation 
was sufficient to establish a proprietary estoppel against the defendant. Similarly, in 
Griffiths v Williams984, the Court of Appeal held there was a proprietary estoppel 
where a mother had assured her daughter who moved in with her to provide full-time 
care for her that she would be entitled to live in the house for the rest of her life. In 
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Lothian v Dixon985, the claimant was awarded the entire estate of the deceased by 
proprietary estoppel despite the deceased’s will for a half share.  
 
The informal nature of the doctrine contravenes Sections 1(2) and 52 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 which states that informal arrangements cannot create an interest 
in land. These sections state that all conveyances of land or any interest therein can 
only be conveyed or created by deed. Further, the equitable doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel also contravenes Section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1989 as it precludes the necessity for a written agreement when the criteria for 
proprietary estoppel are made out. Proprietary estoppel is the exception to these 
statutory provisions, as it operates on the basis of judicial discretion whereby the court 
grants a remedy when the estoppel is proved on the facts of a case. In Western Fish 
Products Ltd v Penwith District Council986 Megaw LJ expressed the same view as 
Harman LJ in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v Bridge987 that the creation of new rights and 
remedies is a matter for parliament, and not the judges. However, the courts have 
consistently applied the doctrine of proprietary estoppel which they and their 
predecessors have developed, whilst ensuring that they do not deviate from the 
intrinsic purpose of the concept.  
 
Thirteenth, the status of proprietary estoppel in English law remains undetermined.  
Proprietary estoppel is judge-made law, developed and applied by the courts. This 
invites scrutiny into whether the courts are usurping the function of parliament, and 
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whether proprietary estoppel is legitimately in violation of the maxim that “equity 
follows the law”.  
 
Parliament makes law and enacts legislation for the court to interpret. In Western Fish 
Products Ltd v Penwith District Council988 Megaw LJ expressed the same view as 
Harman LJ in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v Bridge989 that the creation of new rights and 
remedies is a matter for parliament, and not the judges. Likewise, in Actionstrength 
Ltd v International Glass Engineering SpA990, the House of Lords held that an estoppel 
is based on no more than an oral guarantee and could not displace the Statute of 
Frauds, where such guarantees are unenforceable. Although the Judicature Acts of 
1873 and 1875 bestowed a harmonized court system with the jurisdiction to give 
effect to both legal and equitable rights, claims, defences and remedies, this begs the 
question of whether it granted the courts the power to develop the equitable right of 
proprietary estoppel with the power to bypass legislation. The doctrine has been in 
operation by the courts for over a century, and yet no laws have been enacted by 
parliament for its legal status in law. However, the survival and flourishing role played 
by proprietary estoppel is testament to the courts’ consistent determination to 
prevent unconscionable behaviour, even in the absence of legislative assistance.  
 
Fourteenth, the judicial discretion within proprietary estoppel may create 
inconsistency and unpredictability.   
A remedy in proprietary estoppel is exclusively based on the judicial discretion of the 
court. Whilst the court is expected to apply the principles of equity in its discretion to 
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arrive at a decision, the decisions of judges can often be conflicting and inconsistent. 
For example, in Sledmore v Dalby991 where a proprietary estoppel had been 
established, the court held that its value was already satisfied by the free 
accommodation provided and no remedy was granted. By contrast, in Taylor v 
Dickens992, the court held there was no proprietary estoppel where an elderly lady 
who promised her estate to her gardener had changed her mind without telling him 
after he stopped charging her for his services. The court determined that the 
assurance did not give rise to an estoppel equity, because the elderly lady had not 
created or encouraged a belief that she would not exercise her right to change her will. 
This decision was widely criticized by academics993 and, the Court of Appeal in Gillett v 
Holt994, reiterated that the criticisms were well-founded.  
 
In Gillett995, Robert Walker LJ held that the inherent irrevocability of a will was 
irrelevant to the assurance made by the defendant to the plaintiff. This begs the 
question of whether the discretionary justice administered by the courts in proprietary 
estoppel is principled or is exercised arbitrarily. Different judges arrive at different 
decisions on the same facts leading to inconsistency and confusion in the law of 
proprietary estoppel. For example, in Thorner996, the Court of Appeal held there was 
no assurance for a proprietary estoppel, whereas the House of Lords overruled this 
decision and held that the representations made did amount to an assurance for a 
proprietary estoppel. Hence, whether a claim succeeds in proprietary estoppel 
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depends on the trial judge or court making the decision, and their particular 
interpretation of the facts and law can lead to much unpredictability in terms of the 
outcome reached.  
 
Further, although the criteria for establishing estoppel are bound by precedent, the 
court is nonetheless not bound by previous decisions, as each case turns on its own 
facts. This presents a category of cases which produce a level of unpredictability as to 
how the courts determine the nature and application of this equitable doctrine. It also 
begs the question of what factors will influence a court when considering how to 
exercise its discretion. Will the discretion be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously 
depending on the particular mood or spirit of the judge and how the judge perceives 
the case at hand? Or will it be shrouded by the judge’s particular values or beliefs and 
a subjective view of what is perceived as moral or ethical? It may arguably breed 
uncertainty, confusion, guesswork and risk-taking as to whether a judge will possibly 
find an estoppel in a particular case. If such discretion is to be exercised in a principled 
fashion, then the court ought to provide guidelines on what that means, and how it 
operates.   
 
In Cowcher v Cowcher997 Bagnall J stated that in the determination of rights, the only 
justice that could be attained by mortals who are fallible and not omniscient is the 
justice established by law. This begs the question of why is estoppel not enacted by 
statute but left only to the discretion of the court? Why are there no settled principles 
for the exercise of the court’s discretion in proprietary estoppel? Unless the court 
decides at its discretion in favour of proprietary estoppel, there will be no estoppel, 
                                                 
997
 [1972] 1 WLR 425 (Family Division)  
264 
 
leaving the claimant to appeal the court’s decision and perhaps never succeed in the 
ensuing litigation. Although, however, the courts necessarily have to interpret the facts 
giving rise to estoppel, this does not derogate from the soundness of the doctrine in 
terms of the courts’ determination to maintain correlation between its key purpose of 
redressing unconscionability and judicial enforcement of it.  
 
Fifteenth, litigation in proprietary estoppel is affected by unpredictability.  
A party may believe that he or she has a claim in proprietary estoppel, but that is left 
to be determined by the court. Only the court can determine if a proprietary estoppel 
arise on the facts pleaded, and it is often uncertain and unpredictable as to whether a 
party will succeed in a case. For example, in the case of Suggitt v Suggitt998, the 
testator had promised the claimant the farm upon his death, but instead left it to the 
defendant (claimant’s sister). Despite the will, the court awarded the farm to the 
claimant having suffered a detrimental reliance on the promise of the testator in 
working for low wages as a young child for many years in the expectation of inheriting 
the farm. Thus, although it could not be predicted in advance that the farm would be 
awarded to the claimant, the litigation proved successful.  Similarly, in Thorner v 
Major999, the testator had promised his estate to the claimant but died intestate, and 
his estate devolved by law. The claimant had relied on the testator’s representations 
for over thirty years and suffered a detriment in working long hours for no wages, and 
giving up alternative employment in the expectation of inheriting the farm. Although 
the outcome of the claim to the House of Lords following its rejection by the Court of 
Appeal, was unforeseeable, the litigation was successful.  These decisions create 
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unpredictability in the outcome of litigation for a proprietary estoppel, as there is no 
litmus test to ascertain whether or not the litigation will be successful.  
 
A party who believes they are entitled to proprietary estoppel relief takes a risk when 
deciding to initiate proceedings. Further, there is no strict formula for a successful 
claim in proprietary estoppel, except submitting a claim before the court to decide 
whether an estoppel has arisen in the particular facts. Unpredictability as to whether 
an estoppel is made out prevails until the determination of the court, and will continue 
at each stage of appeal thereafter in quest of a finding of proprietary estoppel. Very 
few cases will provide a remedy at first instance, and the majority continues to an 
appeal court. This begs the question of why proprietary estoppel is often dependent 
on a multiplicity of proceedings.  
 
Sixteenth, a remedy in proprietary estoppel lends to prolonged and costly litigation.  
Proprietary estoppel can only be established by the court. Therefore, proceedings have 
to be instituted for a claim in proprietary estoppel, and where the estoppel is not 
founded by the court of first instance, the matter may lead to further appeals. For 
example, in the case of Thorner v Major1000 the trial judge held that there was 
sufficient assurance given to find a proprietary estoppel. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeal overturned the decision on the ground that the assurance was not intended to 
be relied on and there was no material evidence on which the trial judge could have 
made a finding of proprietary estoppel. On further appeal to the House of Lords, the 
Court of Appeal’s decision was overturned and the decision of the trial judge was 
upheld. Estoppel often causes lengthy and costly litigation. A party may not have the 
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financial resources to undertake such a claim even where that party believes that a 
claim can be established. This begs the question of whether the remedy is available to 
only those who can afford the costs of litigation, and why estoppel is discoverable only 
by virtue of lengthy and costly litigation.1001  
 
9.3  Conclusion 
The challenges and controversies in the law of proprietary estoppel illustrate the 
problems in the operation of the doctrine by the courts, and the obstacles to its 
progress and future development. It is determined at the exclusive prerogative of the 
courts, and legal practitioners and litigants are at the mercy of the court for a 
favourable outcome. Hence, the propensity of the court to grant an estoppel in a 
particular case is left much to speculation as to whether the courts will be moved by 
the facts, and how the facts are interpreted. The case law is marred by unpredictability 
of outcome and litigation cannot be relied on for an automatic guarantee of the 
remedy sought by the claimant. Whilst the catalogue of jurisprudence developed by 
the courts proves that the doctrine is capable of producing an equitable or even legal 
interest in land, it is always left to the discretion and conscience of a particular judge 
to produce a finding of proprietary estoppel on the particular facts before the court.    
 
Although, the House of Lords in Thorner v Major1002 attempted to simplify the basis of 
proprietary estoppel, there is arguably still a great deal of residual and unnecessary 
complexity, confusion, and unpredictability in the court’s interpretation of any given 
set of facts. This lends a legal practitioner to draw inferences and conclusions about 
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proprietary estoppel from the case law established by the courts. Consequently, it 
begs the question of how a legal practitioner or litigant can be confident in drawing 
the correct inference or conclusion for his or her case from the numerous case law 
developed by the courts. Does a legal practitioner or litigant have to engage in a 
proprietary estoppel guessing-game to discover if the facts of his or her case will 
match a previously decided case by the court? How can a legal practitioner or litigant 
accurately predict that their circumstances will merit a claim in proprietary estoppel 
from the decided cases? Although each case is to be determined by its own facts, how 
likely is it that the court will interpret the facts in the same way as a legal practitioner 
and litigant?  
 
As cases of proprietary estoppel arise, the courts will continue to encounter the 
type of challenges and controversies detailed above. The same challenges of the 
past are likely to proliferate in the future. Arguably, some of the principles 
developed by the House of Lords in Thorner1003 such as an assurance constituting 
an implied intention, and a mere inference or indirect statement, have added more 
complexity and controversy in the law, as well as their Lordships approving the 
elements of the estoppel but failing to define what each means. However, the 
challenges articulated in this chapter serve only to highlight the vagaries of judicial 
discretion in interpreting the facts giving rise to a finding of estoppel but do not 
impinge on the courts’ determination to curtail unconscionable behaviour on the 
landowner’s part, consistent with the intrinsic purpose of the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel.  
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The next chapter will present a holistic evaluation of proprietary estoppel from the 
past to the present.  
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Chapter Ten: A Holistic Evaluation of Proprietary Estoppel from the Past to the 
Present 
 
 
10.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides a holistic evaluation of proprietary estoppel from its formative 
years to the present day. It considers the metamorphosis of proprietary estoppel via 
case law before and following Thorner v Major1004. Drawing upon the historical review 
conducted in Chapter 2 of the thesis, it focuses on pervasive aspects such as the socio-
economic context against which it developed, and the extent to which it has 
influenced judicial attitudes towards the evolution and operation of the doctrine and 
its application.  
 
The discussion presented in this chapter is exclusive, as it considers the application and 
operation of the doctrine in a holistic fashion, and the extent to which non-legal 
factors have moulded the concept of proprietary estoppel and refined the doctrine to 
produce the current incarnation of the criteria applied today. Legal scholars1005 tend to 
consider the strictly legal aspects of the doctrine and its requirements, with less focus 
on   historical and socio-economic factors.  
 
This chapter will draw upon the historical background of proprietary estoppel, judicial 
approaches and application, the remedies awarded by the court, the progression of 
the doctrine and the modern day cases in proprietary estoppel. Other legal scholars1006 
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have not critically examined the doctrine from the past to the present to formulate 
conclusions or perspectives on the same issues. There is more descriptive discourse 
about the case law rather than extensive review of its progression from the past to the 
modern day.  
 
The chapter links to the other chapters of the thesis to provide an overall perspective 
on how far the doctrine has developed and progressed from the past to the present.  
 
10.2  The Historical Background of Proprietary Estoppel 
Proprietary estoppel evolved from the historical incidents of society that created the 
impetus for the development of equity to overcome the rigours of the common law. 
For example, changes in society arising from the Black Death (1348-51), Peasants 
Revolt (1381), the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), and the industrialization of society 
(1760-1840) created a vital catalyst for the evolution of sophisticated equitable 
remedies. These in turn created the momentum for the development of remedies 
unique to equity, including proprietary estoppel.  
 
Equity introduced notions of fairness and good conscience into the law, as the conduct 
of parties was judged by the yardstick of unconscionability. Via these natural law 
principles, manifested through the operation of equity, proprietary estoppel, as the 
offspring of equity, engages natural law principles to achieve the objective of equity – 
to prevent inequitable conduct between parties.  
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10.3  Judicial Approach and Application 
Estoppel is applied in diverse circumstances such as: estoppel prevented reliance on 
strict legal rights where the claimant relied on a defendant’s assurance that turned out 
to be false1007; as an estoppel against the defendant where the claimant expended 
monies in the land with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landowner1008; as an 
equitable estoppel where a landowner encouraged or created an expectation for an 
interest in land, and the claimant had expended monies in furtherance of that 
expectation1009; and as a proprietary estoppel against a landowner where the claimant 
relied on the assurances of a landowner for an interest in land and thereby suffered a 
detriment1010. Judicial readiness to utilize the concept of proprietary estoppel to create 
a proprietary interest in land emanated from equity’s intervention in the common law 
from the Earl of Oxford’s Case1011 onwards.  
 
The varying circumstances, in which equity is applied via estoppel, also illustrates the 
court’s flexible approach to protect the claimant from the unconscionable conduct of 
the defendant. The approach underlies the basis of equity to mitigate the rigours of 
strict law and to prohibit unconscionable conduct. Further, the flexible approach is 
reflected from the wide range of cases in which the courts have determined a 
proprietary estoppel including: a freehold interest in land1012; a licence to remain on 
land1013; an easement1014 or right of way on land1015; or a proprietary interest in the 
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land1016. This flexible approach promotes the availability of estoppel, as every case is 
judged on its particular facts and circumstances.  
 
10.4  The Socio-economic Context of the Case Law  
The early cases1017 in estoppel developed around family and domestic situations, 
commercial, and local authority disputes. They focused on the encouragement by the 
landowner for an interest in land1018, the expenditure on land with the encouragement 
and acquiescence of the landowner1019, or relying on a landowner’s promise for an 
interest in land and suffering a detriment thereby1020. In all these cases, the courts 
applied equity to prevent unconscionable conduct. The courts were more inclined to 
protect the rights of the claimant where the claimant had expended monies on land, 
or suffered a detriment in reliance of a promise for an interest in land. For example, in 
Crab v Arun District Council1021 had the court not granted the easement to the 
claimant against the local authority, then the claimant’s land would have remained 
landlocked. Similarly, in Ives v High1022, if the court had not granted a right of way, 
then the claimant would have no access to his garage. Therefore, estoppel was applied 
to remedy the detriment suffered by the claimant, and the expectation created or 
encouraged for an interest in land.  
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Many of the modern cases1023 seem to be in the farming context where the claimant’s 
livelihood depends on income from the farm1024, or they have worked on the farm for 
their entire life in the expectation of owning it one day1025. They also revolve around 
the context of family relationships to ensure that the farming legacy continues after 
the landowner’s death. These cases show that the claimant is more likely to succeed in 
establishing estoppel where the land itself is a key attribute to their ability to derive an 
income on which to live. The land is more likely to be significant to the claimant who is 
still alive than the disappointed beneficiaries of the deceased’s will.  
 
Further, where the claimant has spent his or her whole livelihood expecting to inherit 
the land, the courts are more likely to secure the promised inheritance for the 
claimant. For example, in Thorner1026, the claimant had spent his livelihood working for 
no wages and long hours in the expectation of inheriting the farm promised by the 
deceased. The court awarded the claimant a proprietary estoppel based on his 
detrimental reliance on the assurances of the deceased. Similarly, in Suggitt v 
Suggitt1027, the court granted the claimant the farm which had been promised to him 
at an early age and he had worked for no wages for many years in the expectation of 
inheriting the farm. The claimant’s father bequeathed the farm to the claimant’s sister 
instead and disinherited the claimant. The court granted the claimant a proprietary 
estoppel based on his detrimental reliance on the promises of the deceased.  
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There are also similar family and domestic cases1028, and other local authority dispute 
cases1029 in the modern day, which illustrate that the type of cases determined from 
the early times to the present day continue to take place in the same socio-economic 
context. Thus, the recurring theme in those cases is the detriment suffered by the 
claimant in reliance of a promise for an inheritance. The court intervenes in equity to 
secure the promised inheritance to the claimant.  The law on proprietary estoppel is 
also more settled since Thorner1030 and the courts are more open-minded to the 
doctrine which accounts for the success of many cases in proprietary estoppel.  
 
Both the early cases and modern cases show the common purpose of equity to 
perform the exact function described by Lord Ellesmere in the Earl of Oxford’s Case1031 
– that equity “corrects men’s consciences for frauds, breach of trust, wrongs and 
oppressions of what nature soever they be and to soften and mollify the extremity of 
the law”1032. Thus, the unconscionable conduct of the defendant causes the court to 
invoke equity for the claimant. Further, the principle that equity will not suffer a wrong 
to be without a remedy invokes the equitable jurisdiction of the court to ensure an 
equitable outcome in a case. Therefore, equity is the defining factor in the case law on 
proprietary estoppel as its object is to prohibit the unconscionable conduct of the 
defendant.  
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10.5  Remedies Awarded by the Court 
The remedies in proprietary estoppel are both personal and proprietary. The early 
cases show the courts were more disposed to granting a proprietary remedy on the 
basis of the detrimental reliance suffered on a promise or representation. For 
example, in Dillwyn1033, the court granted a freehold interest in the land, in Inwards v 
Baker1034 the court granted a licence to remain on the land, and an easement in Crab v 
Arun District Council1035 or a right of way in Ives v High1036, and compensation in 
Jennings v Rice1037. In Gillett v Holt1038, the court awarded a combination of a personal 
remedy in compensation, and a proprietary remedy by an interest in the property. 
Thus, the principle that equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy, 
dominates the court’s discretion for a remedy, as it enforces the promise made to the 
promisee.   
 
In the modern day cases, the courts continue to grant a proprietary interest in land on 
the same criteria of assurance, reliance and detriment. Unless the claimant can prove 
the assurance was made and that he or she had suffered a detriment in reliance 
thereon, then no remedy will be awarded. For example, in James v James1039, the 
claim in proprietary estoppel failed as the claimant had failed to prove the assurance 
that was relied on to cause a detriment. Conversely, the elements of assurance, 
reliance and detriment were proved in similar cases like Thorner v Major1040, Suggitt v 
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Suggitt1041 and Haberfield v Haberfield1042 and a proprietary estoppel was granted in 
the land. The modern day cases often involve a substantial monetary interest in land 
worth millions of pounds, compared to the establishment of a third party right over 
the land of another in the early cases, such as a right of way or easement. The 
common requirement for a remedy in proprietary estoppel in both the early and 
modern cases, is the detriment suffered in reliance on a promise. Also, both the early 
and modern cases show the court’s remedy is proportionate to the expectation 
created or encouraged by the defendant.  
 
10.6  The Operation of Proprietary Estoppel by the Courts 
The early cases in the Earl of Oxford’s Case1043, Hunt v Carew1044 and Huning v 
Ferrers1045 show that the courts applied equity to prevent the strict reliance on legal 
rights where it was inequitable to do so. Equity was applied as an estoppel to prohibit 
unconscionable conduct.  
 
Following these cases, in Dillwyn1046, equity was applied as an estoppel against the 
claimant because the claimant had acquired an equitable interest in the land and was 
granted a freehold interest. In Plimmer v Wellington1047, the court adopted an 
equitable estoppel against a land owner where a party had established an equity in the 
land. The cases following Plimmer1048 including Inwards v Baker1049 and Crab v 
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Arun1050 show the court’s intervention of equitable estoppel for a claimant’s 
detrimental reliance on a promise for an interest in land.  
 
Owing to its proprietary nature, equitable estoppel was renamed “proprietary 
estoppel” in Ives v High1051 and the succession of cases following adopted that 
terminology. Arguably, the climax of proprietary estoppel in the early cases was in 
Taylor Fashions1052 where Oliver J had simplified the requirements of the doctrine to 
include an assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability. These requirements 
were approved and affirmed by their Lordships in Thorner v Major1053, which case 
represents the leading authority in proprietary estoppel.  
 
The requirements of assurance, reliance and detriment for estoppel was implied in the 
early cases, and gradually developed into express terms in Taylor Fashions1054. This 
characterizes proprietary estoppel as a historical doctrine of equity which the courts 
developed to enforce the principles of equity to produce an equitable outcome where 
the common law could not.  
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10.7  The Progression of Proprietary Estoppel 
Considering the genesis of the doctrine from Ramsden v Dyson1055 to Thorner v 
Major1056, the doctrine followed a very slow trajectory in the courts. There were about 
six cases dealing with proprietary estoppel including the Privy Council case of Plimmer 
v Wellington1057, Inwards v Baker1058, Ives v High1059, Crab v Arun District Council1060, 
Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Ltd1061, Gillett v Holt1062 before its 
elevation to the House of Lords in Thorner v Major1063. These cases all contributed to 
the development of the doctrine and its principles of operation. Further, they 
facilitated the transition of the doctrine from a traditional to a modern approach by 
the courts. For example, in Ives v High1064, Danckwerks L.J. had coined the term 
“proprietary estoppel” which was a major transformation from the original term 
“equitable estoppel” by which it was referred to in the earlier decisions. Proprietary 
estoppel distinguished the proprietary nature of the doctrine, and gave primacy to its 
status as creating an interest in land. Likewise, in Taylor Fashions1065, Oliver J 
formulated the requirements of the doctrine into an assurance, reliance and detriment 
which was later approved by the House of Lords in Thorner1066.  
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Following Thorner1067, the doctrine surged into a repertoire of cases including Henry v 
Henry1068, Lothian v Dixon1069, Moore v Moore1070, Bradbury v Taylor1071, Suggitt v 
Suggitt1072, Southwell v Blackburn1073, Hoyl Group Ltd v Cromer Town Council1074, 
Davies v Davies1075, Burton V Liden1076, James v James1077 and Haberfield v 
Haberfield1078, Thompson v Thompson1079, Gee v Gee1080. These cases illustrate the 
impetus created by Thorner1081 in the sphere of proprietary estoppel. There is more 
transparency in the courts and a willingness to consider proprietary estoppel, and to 
apply the principles explained, consolidated and modified in Thorner1082. For example, 
with the exception of James v James1083, each of the decided cases was determined on 
the basis of proprietary estoppel in the claimant’s favour, thereby demonstrating the 
flexibility of the courts in their application of the concept. Further, these cases display 
the willingness of both legal practitioners and litigants to pursue a claim in proprietary 
estoppel, as they are more confident in pleading the doctrine, in the expectation of 
securing an appropriate remedy. Hence, Thorner1084 created the impetus for the 
further development of proprietary estoppel. 
 
                                                 
1067
 [2009] UKHL 18 
1068
 [2010] UKPC 3 
1069
 [2014] 11 WLUK 851   
1070
 [2016] EWHC 2202 (Ch) 
1071
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1208 
1072
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1140 
1073
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 
1074
 [2015] EWCA Civ 782 
1075
 [2016] EWCA Civ 463 
1076
 [2016] EWCA Civ 275 
1077
 [2018] EWHC 43 (Ch) 
1078
 [2018] EWHC 317 (Ch) 
1079
 [2018] EWHC 1338 (Ch) 
1080
 [2018] EWHC 1393 (Ch) 
1081
 [2009] UKHL 18 
1082
 [2009] UKHL 18 
1083
 [2018] EWHC 43 (Ch) 
1084
 [2009] UKHL 18 
280 
 
10.8  Perspective on the Modern Day Cases in Proprietary Estoppel 
The socio-economic context of the modern day cases reflect that proprietary estoppel 
is frequent in a family context involving contesting relatives within a family. For 
example, the majority cases decided following Thorner including Lothian v Dixon1085, 
Suggitt v Suggitt1086, Davies v Davies1087, Henry v Henry1088, Moore v Moore1089, 
Bradbury v Taylor1090,  James v James1091, Haberfield v Haberfield1092, Thompson v 
Thompson1093 and Gee v Gee1094 evolved in a family context of a promised inheritance. 
This indicates that the doctrine is more prevalent within the family context. 
 
Another significant factor in the modern cases entails the interrelationship between 
the parties. Most concern family relationships where parents or other relations 
reneged on a promised inheritance to their son, daughter or relative.  For example, in 
Davies v Davies1095, the parents promised their daughter the farm upon their death, 
but later reneged on their promise; in Suggitt v Suggitt1096, a father promised his son 
the farm at death, but instead bequeathed it to his daughter; in Lothian v Dixon1097, a 
cousin promised her estate to another cousin, but left no will in her favour; in Moore v 
Moore1098, a son was promised the farm and farming business by his father, but was 
instead disinherited. Thus, the repeated pattern of ‘broken promises’ and willful 
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betrayal or deception of parents and relatives against their own family have arguably 
influenced the court’s deployment of proprietary estoppel. Equity does not permit a 
landowner to lead another to suffer a detriment in reliance on his or her promise, and 
the courts have vigorously and consistently utilized proprietary estoppel to redress 
such unconscionable behaviour.  
 
Entwined with this is disruption of the anticipated economic arrangements between 
the parties with the attendant capacity to impact seriously upon the claimant’s life and 
livelihood. In each case, the latter depended on the promise made, which, in turn, was 
undermined by the landowner reneging on his or her promise. For example, in Davies 
v Davies1099, the claimant devoted her life working for low wages and long hours on 
the farm which became her sole livelihood, and was assured of economic security by 
inheriting the farm to continue the farming legacy of her parents; in Suggitt v 
Suggitt1100, the son worked for no wages on the farm as a young boy, because of his 
father’s assurance of having a secure livelihood in inheriting the farm upon his death, 
and in Lothian v Dixon1101, the cousin had given up her family, livelihood and business, 
on the promise of a secure livelihood in inheriting the deceased’s entire estate at 
death. 
 
Similarly, in Haberfield v Haberfield1102, the claimant at 16 years of age had given up 
further education, and devoted her entire life to the farm which became her sole 
livelihood, and the father’s assurance of taking over the farm one day upon his death 
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provided a reliable source of income for the future; in Moore v Moore1103, the son had 
devoted his whole life to the farm, which was his sole livelihood, and the promise of 
inheriting it was to provide financial security in the future; and in Thorner v Major1104, 
the claimant had worked for thirty years on the farm without pay and for long hours 
on the promise of inheriting the farm to provide his livelihood upon the death of the 
landowner.  
 
In each of the above authorities, the landowner reneging on his or her promise had 
caused a substantial detriment to the claimant, in being deprived of their livelihood 
and, upon which basis, they had organized their entire lives. The substantial detriment 
of the loss of livelihood, and the financial safeguards accorded by the acquisition of 
title to the land promised, have influenced the courts’ perception and willingness to 
invoke equity to enforce the promise of the landowner. The courts have demonstrated 
a readiness and, indeed seemingly an imperative to intervene with equity to prevent 
the loss of livelihood by the claimant because of his or her detrimental reliance on the 
deceased’s promise. Thus, the ‘bait and switch’ posture of parents and relatives to 
deprive family members of their livelihood, and the economic guarantee of inheriting 
the land is effectively redressed by the courts via the invocation and application of the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel. Hence, the social relationships and economic 
arrangements between parties have seemingly underpinned and contributed to the 
current prevalence of proprietary estoppel, as manifested in the previously discussed 
array of modern cases.  
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In the economic context, land has been a prominent feature in each of the proprietary 
estoppel cases. This reflects the importance of land as a source of livelihood to the 
parties involved. The modern line of authority relates to promises of a landowner to 
his or her family to preserve a farming legacy for the future.  For example, in 
Haberfield v Haberfield1105, Davies v Davies1106, Suggitt v Suggitt1107, Moore v 
Moore1108, and Thompson v Thompson1109, a proprietary estoppel was granted 
because of a detrimental reliance on a promise to inherit the farm.  
 
It is clear therefore, that the judiciary has demonstrated a readiness to exercise 
equitable discretion where the claimant is being deprived of his or her livelihood from 
the land. Often a landowner reneges on his or her promise to share the inheritance 
promised to other family members. For example, in Thompson v Thompson1110, 
Haberfield v Haberfield1111, Davies v Davies1112, Suggitt v Suggitt1113 and Moore v 
Moore1114, landowners had reneged on their promise to share the inheritance with the 
landowner’s wife or other siblings. In every case, the court has been true to the 
essence of equity by enforcing the promise made to the claimant via the concept of 
proprietary estoppel. If a claimant is deprived of the land to which he or she has 
devoted their whole life farming, in expectation of the promise of owning that land 
upon the landowner’s death, then the claimant will not have only lost his or her 
livelihood, but also has to start his life afresh, having forfeited his education or other 
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form of employment because of the landowner’s promise. The deprivation of a 
claimant’s livelihood, and the opportunities forgone on the promise of inheriting the 
farm, have significantly influenced the courts’ decision-making process. The claimant 
cannot go back in time to start his whole life again. Thus, the court’s predilection to 
preserve a secure livelihood for the claimant, in the context of the “farming” cases, has 
contributed to the modern incidence of the principles of proprietary estoppel, itself a 
paradigm for the embodiment and practical application of equity’s insistence on the 
prevention of unconscionable conduct.  
 
In the political context, there are no policy regulations or legislation to impede or 
restrict the doctrine of proprietary estoppel within the aegis of the courts. Despite the 
growing number of proprietary estoppel cases, the decisions of the courts - however 
controversial they may be perceived to be – have not thus far been considered an 
issue for legislative intervention. For example, the decisions in Lothian v Dixon1115 and 
Suggitt v Suggitt1116 where the courts decided to invoke proprietary estoppel in 
contravention of the contents of the deceased landowner’s will, do not appear to have 
sparked political disapprobation or acted as a catalyst for the delimitation of estoppel. 
In the event of a clash between common law and equity, the latter has prevailed since 
the Earl of Oxford’s Case1117, as subsequently ratified by section 25(11) Judicature Acts 
of 1873 and 1875 and more latterly by section 49 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.  
 
‘Political” influence has, therefore, endorsed rather than impeded the supremacy of 
equity over the common law where the courts discern that equitable principles and, 
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with them, proprietary estoppel, should be applied to address unconscionability.  
Equity’s insistence on providing a remedy to deal with unconscionable behavior has 
comprised an enduring and consistent thread, from its initial inception in feudal 
England to the modern day deployment of the concept of proprietary estoppel. 
Underpinning both are clear examples of the courts’ readiness to utilize equitable 
principles to accord a measure of economic security to claimants who implicitly invoke 
the maxim that “equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy”.  
 
10.9  Conclusion 
The Earl of Oxford’s Case1118 established that where common law and equity clashed, 
the latter should prevail. It characterized equity’s determination to apply principles of 
“fairness” to correct men’s consciences and to mitigate the rigour of the common law. 
This landmark decision laid the foundation for the exercise of judicial discretion based 
upon equitable principles, enabling equity to intervene to provide remedies where the 
common law was inadequate.  
 
The line of cases between the Earl of Oxford’s Case1119 and the House of Lords 
decision in Thorner v Major1120 and subsequently, those following, highlight the 
court’s predilection to apply the concept of estoppel. The courts have consistently 
invoked equity, via estoppel to prevent reliance on strict legal rights where it is 
unconscionable to do so, and where the claimant has suffered a detrimental reliance 
on a promise for an interest in land. Thus, equity acts against the conscience of a 
defendant who has acted unconscionably towards the claimant.  
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The socio-economic context in which estoppel cases have occurred is diverse, 
involving, for example family and domestic disputes contesting an interest in land1121, 
commercial dealings involving a lease1122, local authority dealings relating to an 
easement1123, and neighbour disputes for a right of way1124.  
 
The remedies granted in proprietary estoppel varied from the early cases to the 
modern  day cases, as each case was determined on its own facts. However, in each 
case the court sought to award to the claimant the expectation that was created or 
encouraged. Although the modern day cases tend to involve multi-million pound farm 
estates that were not a feature of the earlier cases, the issues in dispute in the earlier 
cases were significant to the claimant in other ways. Historically, the remedy granted 
in proprietary estoppel was not contingent on precedent, but on the nature of the 
assurance made and the detrimental reliance thereby. This principle continues to be 
reflected in the modern day cases.  
 
The operation of proprietary estoppel from the early cases to the modern day cases is 
dominated by the principles of assurance, reliance and detriment. Although these 
principles are implicit in the early decisions of the courts, it was nonetheless expressly 
established as the basis for a proprietary estoppel in Taylor Fashions1125 and later 
approved by the House of Lords in Thorner v Major1126. Thus, the rationale for the 
determination of a proprietary estoppel has remained consistent from its inception to 
                                                 
1121
 Southwell v Blackburn [2014] EWCA Civ 1347, Moore v Moore [2016] EWHC 2202 (Ch), Lothian v 
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the modern day. Proprietary estoppel is a long established doctrine of the courts, 
which seeks to protect those who have suffered a detriment in consequence of their 
reliance on the promise, assurance or representation of another.  
 
The next chapter will focus on a comparison of proprietary estoppel with the similar 
equitable doctrine of constructive trusts.  
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Chapter Eleven: Proprietary Estoppel versus Constructive Trusts 
 
11.1  Introduction 
This chapter seeks to compare and contrast the doctrine of proprietary estoppel with 
constructive trusts to illustrate its benefits and limitations over a similar equitable 
doctrine. It highlights the essential features, application and operation of proprietary 
estoppel as a distinct equitable remedy in contradistinction to the constructive trust. It 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the court’s approach to both doctrines and 
describes the rationale underpinning the selective application of the constructive trust 
and proprietary estoppel respectively.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is distinct, as it involves a thorough investigation of both 
doctrines including their nature and purpose; similarities and differences; the inherent 
flexibility of each concept; whether they can be assimilated as a single doctrine; the 
overlap of the two doctrines by the court, and the problems confronted by legal 
practitioners in pleading both doctrines on the same facts. It examines these issues 
through the lens of decided cases so as to draw conclusions on the validity and viability 
of the two doctrines to establish which doctrine is more frequently adopted by the 
courts and which provides the more appropriate remedy or relief. Other legal 
scholars1127 have discussed some of the differences between the two doctrines, but 
have not examined them to the same extent and depth as this thesis, and neither have 
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contrasted the doctrines by the analysis of case law to determine their validity and 
viability.  
 
The chapter further considers the question on whether the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel is sound in terms of its nature, application, strengths and weaknesses, and 
benefits and limitations in contrast to the similar equitable doctrine of constructive 
trusts. Other legal scholars1128 have discussed some of their differences in nature, but 
have not presented a holistic analysis via case law as presented by this thesis.  
 
This chapter links to the other chapters of the thesis in demonstrating the efficacy and 
effectiveness of proprietary estoppel over the similar equitable remedy of constructive 
trusts.  
 
11.2  What is Constructive Trusts?  
A constructive trust is an equitable doctrine which determines proprietary interests 
where a claimant has acted to his or her detriment upon a promise of ownership to 
property.1129 The effect of a constructive trust is that the legal owner of the property 
will be subject to a role as trustee to the extent of the claimant’s beneficial interest.1130 
The justification for a constructive trust is premised on the original common intention 
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 Elizabeth Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (OUP 2003); Holker Meggison, A Treatise of the 
Administration of Assets in Equity (Saunders and Benning 1832); Mark P. Thompson, Modern Land Law 
(OUP 2009); Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts(9
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 Rupert Butler & Thomas Horton, ‘Legal Update Commercial – Constructive Feedback’ (NLJ, 09 May 
2014) 
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accessed 12 October 2017 
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of the parties that is subsequently denied or reneged, and equity deems the 
defendant’s repudiation to be unconscionable.1131 The foundation of constructive 
trusts emanated from the House of Lords decisions in Pettitt v Pettitt1132, Gissing v 
Gissing1133 and Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset1134 which established that a constructive trust 
arose only where it was the common intention of the parties that the plaintiff would 
obtain the beneficial interest in the property, and the plaintiff had acted upon that 
common intention to his or her detriment.1135  
 
The recent case of Agarwala v Agarwala1136 illustrates how a constructive trust 
establishes a beneficial interest in property. J was S’s sister-in-law who had persuaded 
S to purchase a property to convert to a bed and breakfast. The legal title to the 
property and mortgage was put in J’s name as S had a poor credit rating. The parties 
agreed that S would operate the running of the business and undertake any works on 
the property. The parties fell out and J and her husband took over the business and 
changed the locks to prevent S’s access. S issued proceedings claiming beneficial 
ownership of the property.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that a constructive trust had arose in S’s favour. The Court 
decided that this was a business venture where the parties had agreed on the terms by 
which the property was to be bought, held and used. Although, the mortgage was in 
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 Rupert Butler & Thomas Horton, ‘Legal Update Commercial – Constructive Feedback’ (NLJ, 09 May 
2014) <https://www.3harecourt.com/assets/asset-store/file/articles/090514-nlj-commercial-
butler.pdf> accessed 12 October 2017 
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 [1970] AC 777 (HL) 
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J’s name and she paid the installments, this did not decide the issue of beneficial 
ownership as the mortgage installments were paid from the profits of the business 
venture. S had acted to his detriment on the common agreement between the parties 
in buying, converting and running the business. J made no financial contribution to the 
business venture, but S suffered a detriment following the agreement which was 
sufficient to establish that J held the property in trust for S, who had the beneficial 
interest in the property.   
 
An alternative remedy in the case of Agarwala1137 is the resulting trust1138, which 
focuses on the financial contribution of the parties to determine beneficial ownership. 
S provided the finance for purchasing and developing the property, including the 
mortgage repayments. J made no financial contribution but merely facilitated the 
operation of the business for S. Therefore, the application of a resulting trust could 
have determined the beneficial interest of S as the constructive trust. Accordingly, 
Lady Hale and Lord Walker in Jones v Kernott1139 asserted that: 
 … the decision in Agarwala1140 suggests a dwindling application of the 
resulting trust in favour of the constructive trust as the norm in acquisition 
cases (rather than quantification cases, such as Stack v Dowden1141), and 
which has permeated through the Privy Council’s decision in Abbott v 
Abbott1142 […] and more recently witnessed in Aspden v Elvy1143…1144  
                                                 
1137
 [2013] EWCA Civ 1763 
1138
 See Rupert Butler and Thomas Horton, ‘A constructive trust establishes beneficial interest in 
property’ (NLJ, 09 May 2014) <https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/constructive-feedback> 
accessed 30 September 2017 
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Arguably, the constructive trust approach was more appropriate as the issue decided 
was the detrimental reliance on the agreement by S for the beneficial ownership of the 
property. J made no contribution towards the acquisition of the property, and there 
was no agreement, arrangement or understanding for the property to be shared 
beneficially, hence J’s retention of the property would be unconscionable or 
inequitable. S could rely on constructive trust having acted upon the shared agreement 
to his detriment as per Lloyds Bank v Rosset1145. Following Lloyd’s Bank1146, a party 
whose name did not appear on the legal title could prove the common intention 
constructive trust by evidence of express discussions of the financial contribution 
towards the purchase price of the property. Hence, the constructive trust approach 
was more suitable based on the facts of the case.  
 
In sharp contrast to constructive trusts is proprietary estoppel. Panesar1147 asserts that 
the principle behind proprietary estoppel is to prevent a legal owner of land from 
denying a proprietary right in land which he or she had promised to another. The 
principle of proprietary estoppel is explained by Gray and Gray as follows: 
In particular, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel gives expression to a 
general judicial distaste for any attempt by a legal owner unconscientiously 
to resile from assumptions which were previously understood, and acted 
upon, as the basis for relevant dealings in respect of his land. In curtailing 
the unconscionable disclaimer of such underlying assumption, the estoppel 
principle is ultimately directed against the abuse of power.1148 
 
Constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel are distinct categories of equitable relief 
in their application by the Courts. The principle behind the two doctrines varies as well 
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 [1991] 1 AC 107 (HL) 
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as their objective in that, whereas constructive trusts recognizes an existing right, if 
necessary, with retrospective effect, proprietary estoppel establishes that right anew 
with prospective effect. Also, whereas constructive trusts is based on the common 
intention between the parties, proprietary estoppel is founded on a unilateral 
representation.1149 This distinction was patently described by Pawlowski1150 as follows: 
..the common intention constructive trust involves a “bilateral 
understanding or agreement” whereas, for a successful claim based on 
proprietary estoppel, the claimant need only show “unilateral conduct” by 
the legal owner which leads the former to believe that he or she has or will 
acquire an interest in the latter’s property.1151 
 
Thus, constructive trusts involves a bilateral agreement or understanding between two 
parties, whereas proprietary estoppel involves a unilateral conduct from the 
landowner.  
 
Further, whereas constructive trusts always recognizes an equitable proprietary 
interest in land as it is the only remedy, proprietary estoppel is capable of not only 
creating an equitable proprietary interest in land, but the court can also award other 
remedies such as damages. Both doctrines operate to provide a proprietary interest in 
land and are directed at prohibiting unconscionable conduct in the dealings of parties. 
Further, both constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel are exceptions to the need 
for ‘formality’ in land transactions, as they are a means of enforcing an informal 
promise by a landowner in favour of a claimant.1152  
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11.3  What are the Similarities between Proprietary Estoppel and Constructive Trusts?  
Pawlowski1153 pointed out that there are judicial dicta which favour the view that 
constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel are largely indistinguishable. For example, 
in Grant v Edwards1154 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. “opined that the principles 
underlying the law of proprietary estoppel were “closely akin” to those laid down for 
the establishment of a constructive trust”1155.  
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that: 
In both, the claimant must to the knowledge of the legal owner have acted 
in the belief that the claimant has or will obtain an interest in the property. 
In both, the claimant must have acted to his or her detriment in reliance 
on such belief. In both, equity acts on the conscience of the legal owner to 
prevent him from acting in an unconscionable manner by defeating the 
common intention. The two principles have been developed separately 
without cross-fertilisation between them, but they rest on the same 
foundation and have on all other matters reached the same 
conclusions.1156 
 
Similarly, in Lloyd’s Bank plc v Rossett1157 Lord Bridge established the criteria for 
the beneficial interest in property of a non-owning co-habitee in both 
constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel without drawing any difference 
between the two concepts.1158 His Lordship stated that: 
…it will only be necessary … to show that [the claimant] has acted to his or 
her detriment … in reliance on the agreement in order to give rise to a 
constructive trust or a proprietary estoppel.1159 
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In Austin v Keele1160, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton (delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council) asserted that a common intention constructive trust was an application of the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel1161; and in Re Basham (dec’d)1162 Mr. Edward Nugee 
Q.C. (sitting as High Court judge) was of the view that the principle of proprietary 
estoppel, where the claimant’s belief is that he is going to be given a right in the 
future, was to be regarded as giving rise to a species of constructive trust.1163 
 
In Sen v Headley1164, Nourse L.J. posited that where the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel gives the promisee a right to call for a conveyance of the land, it equally gives 
rise to a constructive trust.1165  
Nourse L.J. stated thus: 
….no doubt it could be said … that that right is the consequence of an 
implied and constructive trust which arises once all the requirements of 
the doctrine have been satisfied.1166  
 
In Yaxley v Gotts1167, the courts articulated that the circumstances which give rise to a 
proprietary estoppel will also support a finding of constructive trust. In Yaxley1168, it 
was held that the two doctrines ‘coincide’ and ‘are clearly akin to each other’ whereas 
in Kinane v Mackie-Conteh1169, estoppel was said to ‘overlap’ or ‘amount to’ a 
constructive trust.  
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According to Professor David Hayton1170, “any distinction between proprietary 
estoppel and constructive trusts is illusory and the principle of unconscionability 
underlies both concepts”1171.  
 
Therefore, the similarities between the two doctrines emerge in their mode of 
operation. For example, both doctrines are equitable remedies and apply in land 
transactions. They provide an informal means whereby a person may acquire an 
interest in property, except that for a constructive trust, a common intention is 
needed. They are based on the common principles of reliance and detriment and 
require a person to have suffered a detrimental reliance to obtain the remedy or relief. 
Each case is determined on their particular facts, and the courts apply the test of 
unconscionability to determine whether relief should be granted in all the 
circumstances of the case. Ultimately, they can both create a proprietary interest in 
land in the absence of a formal declaration of trust compliant with Section 53(1)(b) of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, or deed of transfer compliant with Section 52(1) of the 
Law of Property Act 1925. Also, the criterion for equity’s intervention in both doctrines 
is unconscionability on the part of the landowner that determines when and how the 
court intervenes in a given case. 
 
11.4  What are the Differences between Proprietary Estoppel and Constructive Trusts? 
According to Hayton1172, the two doctrines vary by the type of agreement involved. 
The common intention constructive trust involves a bilateral understanding or 
agreement, whereas proprietary estoppel requires the unilateral conduct of a 
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landowner to lead another to believe that he or she has, or will acquire, an interest in 
the latter’s property. For example, where A leads B to believe that B will inherit A’s 
land and B undertakes improvements to A’s land in reliance of A’s promise, then the 
circumstances will give rise to proprietary estoppel and not a constructive trust as 
there is no common intention between the parties.  
  
Pawlowski1173 maintains that a major difference between the two doctrines is the time 
at which the interest arises. An interest arising under a constructive trust exists from 
the date of its creation, whereas a proprietary estoppel arises only from the date that 
it is declared by the court.1174 For example, where A had promised to bequeath A’s 
property to B at death if B had worked on A’s farm but failed to leave the property to B 
at death, then the court may find a proprietary estoppel for B where B makes a claim. 
However, with the constructive trust the court does not decide whether the property 
should be subject to a trust, as the constructive trust does not arise from the judgment 
of the court. The court merely enforces the beneficiary’s pre-existing proprietary 
interest in the property.  
 
According to Ferguson1175, the element of discretion distinguishes proprietary estoppel 
from constructive trusts. In proprietary estoppel, the court exercises a broad discretion 
on what remedy is appropriate, and may award damages, or a share of the property, 
or a proprietary interest in land.1176 There is no discretion in constructive trusts as it is 
founded on a common intention, and the parties are entitled to the particular share 
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that they intended.1177 For example, in Southwell v Blackburn1178 the remedy for the 
estoppel was a monetary award, and in Sledmore v Dalby1179 the claim to a life 
interest was denied notwithstanding there had been the necessary assurances, as the 
court held the claimant had by the date of the hearing received all that he could have 
expected to receive. In contrast, the remedy in Arif v Anwar1180 was a 25 % share of 
the equitable interest under a constructive trust.  
 
Pawlowski1181 advocated that a significant difference between the two doctrines is 
that the evidentiary requirements for a constructive trust are more stringent than for 
proprietary estoppel. For example, in the absence of an express agreement between 
the parties, then direct financial contributions to the purchase price by the non-
owning partner (either initially or by payment of the mortgage instalments) are 
required to raise the inference for the creation of a constructive trust.1182 By contrast, 
the detrimental reliance necessary to support a proprietary estoppel claim need not 
necessarily take the form of financial contributions,1183 but may take the form of 
working for over thirty years without pay as in Thorner v Major1184; the sale of land on 
a promise of an easement as in Crab v Arun District Council1185; building a garage on 
adjoining land on a promise of a right of way as in Ives v High1186; expending monies 
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on land on a promise to remain there as long as desired in Inwards v Baker1187 or 
providing long term care as in Campbell v Griffin1188 and Jennings v Rice1189.  
 
Another potential distinction lies in the location of the onus of proof1190. In proprietary 
estoppel cases, the decision in Greasley v Cooke1191 establishes that there is a 
presumption of reliance once an assurance on the part of the legal owner has been 
shown.1192 Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the court would infer that 
the claimant’s conduct was induced by the assurances given to him or her.1193 
Contrariwise, in constructive trust cases, no such presumption applies.1194 This is 
because there is no suggestion in constructive trust cases that, once the requisite 
representation and detrimental conduct have been proven, the court will infer the 
requisite link between the two.1195  
 
The distinction between the common intention constructive trust and estoppel is also 
evident in the remedy they each provide. A claim for constructive trust requires the 
court to be satisfied that it will be unconscionable if the defendant is permitted to 
deny a common intention which the claimant has relied upon to his or her 
detriment.1196 The focus is on the proof of the elements of common intention and 
detrimental reliance.1197 In contrast, with estoppel, the court must be satisfied that the 
evidence supports the finding of an estoppel before it exercises its discretion to satisfy 
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the equity raised by that estoppel.1198 Consequently, proprietary estoppel is a remedial 
institution operating at the discretion of the court to award a personal remedy such as 
a sum of money, or a proprietary remedy such as an interest in land or both.1199 For 
example, in Gillett v Holt1200 the claimant received both money and property to 
prevent the unconscionable detriment suffered.1201 Constructive trusts, on the other 
hand is institutional as it recognizes retrospectively the pre-existing equitable property 
rights.1202 Hence, proprietary estoppel operates at the remedial discretion of the court, 
and does not command an institutional response like the trust.1203 
 
Thus, the distinctions between the doctrines of constructive trusts and proprietary 
estoppel arguably override their potential similarities and reflect a wide gap of 
opposing variables. The distinctions are particularly significant in the judicial 
application and operation of the respective doctrines. The particular facts of a case 
determine which doctrine will be applied by the Courts, as well as the type of 
equitable relief sought by the claimant. Neither doctrine is superior to the other, as 
the Court’s determination is based on which doctrine best fits the given facts. Of 
paramount significance is the nature of the right that is created by the two doctrines. 
Whereas constructive trusts is backward looking to the time of creation of the 
proprietary right by the agreement of the parties, proprietary estoppel on the other 
hand is forward looking to the possible creation of the proprietary right by the Court. 
Hence, the ultimate thrust of the doctrines is the agreement of the parties in 
constructive trusts versus the court’s decision for a remedy arising from proprietary 
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estoppel. However, whichever of the doctrines apply in a given case is left to be 
determined by the Court.   
 
11.5  Is Proprietary Estoppel more flexible than Constructive Trusts? 
The application of the two doctrines varies widely. Whereas constructive trusts applies 
in family and commercial cases, it is far more difficult to rely on proprietary estoppel in 
a commercial context per Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe1204.1205 Lord Scott 
explained that it is because the factual matrix in Yeoman’s Row1206 involved a 
commercial transaction where the parties are expected to have completed a contract 
before investing in a future opportunity. Lord Walker also emphasized that commercial 
parties engage with sufficient certainty in their transactions that preclude the need for 
proprietary estoppel. Lord Walker further illustrated why proprietary estoppel is likely 
to arise in a domestic rather than a commercial transaction as follows:  
In the commercial context, the Claimant is typically a business person with 
access to legal advice and what he or she is expecting to get is a contract. 
In the domestic or family context, the typical Claimant is not a business 
person and is not receiving legal advice. What he or she wants is and 
expects to get is an interest in immovable property, often for long-term 
occupation as a home. The focus is not on intangible legal rights but on the 
tangible property which he or she expects to get. The typical domestic 
Claimant does not stop to reflect (until disappointed expectations lead to 
litigation) whether some further legal transaction (such as a grant by deed, 
or the making of a will or codicil) is necessary to complete the promised 
title.1207  
 
Hence, a proprietary estoppel is more likely to arise in a domestic context because the 
claimant is not a business person with the benefit of obtaining legal advice, and whose 
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expectation is focused on obtaining tangible property rather than intangible legal 
rights to property.  
 
Another difference in the application of the two doctrines is that constructive trusts 
relates to present interests, whereas proprietary estoppel deals with future 
interest.1208 Thus, an interest in constructive trusts exists from the date of its creation, 
so that the court is confirming an existing right which has retrospective effect. In 
contrast, proprietary estoppel provides more of a remedy than a right, and comes into 
existence when it is declared by the court and thus has prospective effect.  
 
A constructive trust is also exempt from the operation of Section 2 (5) of the Law of 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, which provides that an agreement 
lacking the requisite formalities can create an interest under a constructive trust,1209 
whereas this exception does not specifically extend to an interest by proprietary 
estoppel per Yaxley v Gotts.1210 
 
The flexibility of proprietary estoppel over constructive trust was explicated by 
Etherton J in the Court of Appeal case of Yeoman’s Row Management Limited & 
Another v Cobbe1211. His Lordship articulated that the traditional requirements of 
proprietary estoppel, including a clear representation, detriment or change of position 
and its remedy being the minimum equity to do justice, is considered to be a more 
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reliable and certain instrument for remedying unconscionable conduct rather than 
constructive trusts.1212 Justice Etherton also stated that the attractiveness of 
proprietary estoppel is enhanced by the wide discretion of the Court on the choice of 
actual remedy, whether proprietary or personal, which makes it appropriate for 
achieving justice.1213 However, proprietary estoppel by its principle to apply the 
minimum equity to do justice may give rise to a lesser remedy than a constructive trust 
which satisfies the expectation of the claimant.1214  
 
According to Smith1215, proprietary estoppel is a more flexible doctrine to be applied 
by the courts rather the constructive trust. He stated thus: 
Proprietary estoppel with its traditional requirements of a clear 
representation and detriment or change of position and the remedy 
restricted to the minimum to do justice has usually been considered a 
more reliable and certain instrument for remedying unconscionable 
conduct than the rather fluid concept of the constructive trust.1216  
 
Hayward1217 argues that proprietary estoppel will always be available as a remedy 
when constructive trusts is not. He stated that proprietary estoppel: 
…should be preferred for it will always be available where a common 
intention constructive trust is available, there is no need to search for an 
artificial intention and the remedy can be adjusted to fit the circumstances 
of the case.1218 
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For example, in Arif v Anwar1219 and Southwell v Blackburn1220 the Court held that 
proprietary estoppel was established as there was insufficient common intention to 
support a constructive trust.  
 
However, Alison Dunn1221 argues there are clear difficulties with a proprietary estoppel 
approach. Whereas proprietary estoppel may be a better way forward in obviating the 
artificial search for a common intention, the search for an assurance will equally lead 
the courts to make similar fictional presumptions.1222 Also, although proprietary 
estoppel may be easier to establish, it may be less predictable in outcome as satisfying 
the estoppel will not automatically lead to a proprietary interest in land.1223  
 
Irrespective of the disparities of application in the two doctrines and the approach 
adopted by the courts, estoppel does show equity at its most flexible in providing a 
proprietary remedy or a personal remedy to a successful claimant, since a constructive 
trust will grant no greater benefit than what was actually agreed between the parties. 
Although proprietary estoppel only gives the minimum amount required to do justice, 
which may not meet the claimant’s expectation, there must be proportionality 
between the expectation created or encouraged and the detriment suffered per 
Jennings v Rice1224.  
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11.6  The Overlap of Proprietary Estoppel and Constructive Trusts by the Courts 
A number of decided cases show that both constructive trusts and proprietary 
estoppel may arise on the same facts. For example, in Ghazaani v Rowshan1225 which 
involved a dispute over an exchange of property, the Court of Appeal held that a 
proprietary estoppel and/or constructive trusts had arisen since the parties had orally 
agreed to transfer their properties, and R had in breach of the agreement failed to 
transfer his property to G. G and R had made an oral agreement to exchange a 
property in Leeds owned by R with an apartment in Tehran owned by G. The Leeds 
property was at the time of the agreement being rented out to B who paid rent to G, 
whereas the Tehran property was subject to a tenancy agreement, whereby the tenant 
J was entitled to a refund of a deposit totaling Iranian Rial (IR) 400m (£9,800 
approximately per 2015 exchange rate). G had given R the IR400m, but R had refused 
to complete the exchange of the Leeds property to G, and so G commenced 
proceedings.  
 
G argued that a constructive trust/proprietary estoppel had arisen on the facts as R 
had agreed to sell the Leeds property to G by way of the exchange of the Tehran 
apartment and in Iranian Riels. The Court held it was unconscionable for R to refuse to 
complete the transfer to G in the circumstances of the case, and decided to put the 
parties in the position in which they would have been, if the contract had been 
concluded. The Court ruled that both proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts had 
arisen on the facts of the case to enforce the contract between the parties.  
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Similarly, in Matchmove Limited v Dowding and Church1226 the Court held that there 
was an overlap of constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel such that it was 
irrelevant which label was applied. 
 
In Matchmove1227, the parties were former friends and reached a common 
understanding and an oral agreement for the purchase of a plot of land and a 
meadow. The claimants had paid a third of the purchase price for the plot and the 
meadow. A draft conveyance for the sale of the plot and meadow was drafted but was 
not executed. The defendant had permitted the claimants to commence building on 
the plot of land. Later, the defendant’s solicitor informed the claimants’ solicitor that 
the defendant did not intend to proceed with the sale of the meadow until the right-
of-way dispute over the meadow was resolved. The parties therefore completed 
contracts for the purchase of the plot of land. Special condition 6 of the contract of 
sale for the plot provided that the claimants had entered into the contact solely on the 
terms thereof. Thereafter, the claimants made a series of payments for the meadow 
and contributed to the costs of the proceedings for the meadow. By the time the 
proceedings for the meadow were over, the parties were in dispute and the defendant 
wrote to the claimants informing them that they could have only have one half of the 
meadow and enclosed a refund cheque which the claimants did not cash. The 
claimants had sold their house and paid the full purchase price for the meadow, but no 
written contract for the sale or conveyance of the meadow was executed. The 
claimants sought a declaration that the defendant held the meadow on trust for them.  
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The trial judge held that this was a case where there was an overlap between the 
principles of proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts. The claimants were entitled 
in equity to the entire meadow on the basis of proprietary estoppel and constructive 
trusts, so the nature of the equitable remedy was irrelevant. The defendant held the 
meadow in trust for the claimants and the defendant was ordered to transfer the 
meadow to the claimants.  
 
On appeal, Etherton MR gave judgment that the meadow was held by the defendant 
on a common intention constructive trust for the claimants and dismissed the appeal. 
The Court established that on the facts of the case, the judge had correctly concluded 
that the claimants had established that, from the payment of the deposit, the meadow 
had been held by the defendant on a common intention constructive trust for them. 
The Court held that the parties’ agreement was clear as to the extent of the land in 
question, the claimant’s prospective interest and the price payable.  In reliance on the 
agreement, the claimants had acted to their detriment in paying the agreed sums for 
both the plot and the meadow and were entitled to the whole of the meadow on the 
basis of proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts. Special condition 6 of the written 
contract related only to the building plot and did not apply to the meadow. The 
meadow was held on constructive trusts for the claimants and was exempt from the 
need of a written contact. 
   
According to Martin Dixon1228, proprietary estoppel could defeat constructive trusts 
on the facts in Matchmove1229. The claimants could establish an assurance, reliance 
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and detriment and demonstrate that it would be unconscionable for Matchmove1230 
to go back on its promise.1231 The parties had undertaken business in the same manner 
before and the defendant was considered a man of his word and his handshake had 
affirmed their agreement.1232 In reliance on the agreement, the claimants paid the full 
purchase price for the meadow before the conveyance was finalized, and also 
contributed to the proceedings for the meadow which payments were accepted by the 
defendant.1233   
 
The claimants had suffered a detriment by the defendant’s refusal to convey the whole 
of the meadow that was already paid for in full.1234 It was therefore unconscionable for 
the defendant to rely on formality rules when the defendant had acted on the informal 
agreement.1235 An equity by estoppel arose as the defendant’s conduct had led the 
claimants to believe that the formality requirements were not necessary.1236 Dixon1237 
argues that proprietary estoppel does not in itself side-step the formality rules, but the 
essential ingredient of unconscionability integral to estoppel, overrides the formality 
rules by enforcing the informal agreement between the parties.  
 
In both cases of Ghazaani1238 and Matchmove1239, a proprietary estoppel had arisen 
on the facts because the claimant had paid the agreed price for the property which the 
other party had failed to transfer. With proprietary estoppel, the elements of 
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assurance, reliance and detriment were satisfied as the claimant had suffered a 
detriment in reliance on the claimant’s assurance in paying the agreed price of the 
property with the defendant refusing to transfer title. Therefore, the Court’s approach 
to determine both cases by a constructive trust analysis instead of proprietary 
estoppel is rather confusing, as neither case shows a common intention of the parties 
for the shared ownership of the property, nor for the acquisition of a beneficial 
interest in the property.  
 
In fact, both cases should suggest proprietary estoppel arising from the claimants’ 
assurances for an interest in land upon the payment of an agreed price. This begs the 
question of how does the court determine what amounts to a common intention or an 
assurance? The Court’s decision in both cases may be explicated by the fact that the 
claimant held the property on constructive trusts for the defendant, from the time that 
the agreed price had been paid rather than upon the determination of a proprietary 
estoppel by the Court. In this way, the common intention of the parties had been 
satisfied upon the payment of the agreed price, and the claimant held the property in 
trust for the defendants who were the beneficial owners, pending the transfer of title 
by the claimants to the defendants.  
 
The benefit of the Court’s ruling in constructive trusts is that the defendants’ 
ownership of the properties was established from the time that the agreed price had 
been paid rather than upon the determination of a proprietary estoppel against the 
claimant by the Court. Further, the Court’s decision in both cases illustrates a broad 
approach towards the determination of a party’s interest in land. According to 
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Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock1240, the law of constructive trusts has moved on since 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Drake v Whipp1241.1242 The Court is not restricted to 
the application of proprietary estoppel but on the facts of the case will apply 
constructive trusts to arrive at the same decision. This broad approach was advocated 
by Peter Gibson LJ in Drake v Whipp1243, where he “emphasized that all that was 
required for the creation of a constructive trust is a common intention and an act of 
detrimental reliance; and that once these things have been shown, the court can take 
a “broad brush approach” to determine the extent of the parties’ interest”1244.  
 
However, the limitation of the court’s ruling in constructive trusts is that it precludes 
the discretionary power of the Court to establish and award a proprietary interest in 
the land. Instead, it allows for the Court to enforce the agreement of the parties in 
constructive trusts based on the contribution of each party’s interest in the land.1245 As 
Lord Walker asserted in Stack v Dowden1246, the object of the constructive trust is to 
identify the true beneficial owner or owners, and the size of their beneficial interests; 
whereas proprietary estoppel seeks to enforce an equitable claim against the 
conscience of the true owner. Another limitation on the court’s ruling is that it 
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undermines the doctrine of proprietary estoppel as a remedy to be applied in last 
resort to constructive trusts.  
 
In relation to the decisions of Ghazaani1247 and Matchmove1248, the Court of Appeal 
had, in the previous case of Yaxley v Gotts1249, elucidated the overlap between the 
constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel. In Yaxley1250, Walker L.J. asserted that 
proprietary estoppel gave rise to a constructive trust because of the defendant’s 
unconscionable conduct. Lord Walker elucidated that the doctrines of proprietary 
estoppel and the common intention constructive trust are very similar as follows: 
A constructive trust of that sort is closely akin to, if not distinguishable 
from, proprietary estoppel. Equity enforces it because it would be 
unconscionable for the other party to disregard the claimant’s rights. 
Section 2(5) expressly saves the creation and operation of a constructive 
trust.1251 
 
According to Lionel Smith1252, the leading exposition of the overlap between common 
intention constructive trust and of proprietary estoppel was articulated by Robert 
Walker in Yaxley v Gotts1253 where he stated that:  
 At a high level of generality, there is much in common between the 
doctrines of proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust. […] in the area 
of joint enterprise for the acquisition of land which may be (but is not 
necessarily the matrimonial home) where the two concepts coincide.1254 
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Gwilym Owen and Oslan Rees1255, also articulate that “the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel and constructive trusts overlap in cases where section 2(1) of the 1989 Act is 
engaged”. 
 
In Herbert v Doyle1256, Arden LJ (with whom Jackson LJ and Morgan J agreed) 
commented on the overlap of proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts as follows:  
In my judgment, there is a common thread running through the speeches 
of Lord Scott and Lord Walker [ in the Cobbe case]. Applying what Lord 
Walker said in relation to proprietary estoppel to constructive trust, that 
common thread is that if the parties intend to make a formal agreement 
setting out the terms on which one or more of the parties is to acquire an 
interest in property, or if further terms for that acquisition remain to be 
agreed between them so that the interest in property is not clearly 
identified or if the parties did not expect their agreement to be 
immediately binding, neither party can rely on constructive trust as a 
means of enforcing their original agreement. In other words, at least in 
those situations, if their agreement, which does not comply with section 
2(1), is incomplete, they cannot utilize the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
or the doctrine of constructive trust to make their agreement binding on 
the other party by virtue of section 2(5) of the 1989 Act.1257  
 
Similarly, Lord Bridge explicated how the two doctrines overlap in the case of co-
habitees in Lloyd’s Bank v Rossett1258, as follows:   
The first and fundamental question … is whether independently of any 
interference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties in the course of 
sharing the house as their home and managing their joint affairs, there has 
at any time prior to acquisition or exceptionally at some later date, been 
any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between them 
that the property is to be shared beneficially. […] Once a finding to this 
effect is made it will only be necessary for the partner asserting a claim to 
a beneficial interest against the partner entitled to the legal estate to show 
that he or she has acted to his or her detriment or significantly altered his 
or her position in reliance on the agreement in order to give rise to a 
constructive trust or proprietary estoppel.1259  
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Martin Dixon1260, remains skeptical of the overlap between the two doctrines and 
states that: “….this conflation of constructive trust and estoppel claims is 
misplaced.”1261 Dixon1262 surmises that two questions arise on the facts of a case, “… is 
there a constructive trust? If not, is there an estoppel? They are independent 
claims.”1263   
 
Emerging from scrutiny of the two doctrines is that proprietary estoppel and 
constructive trusts are distinct and independent equitable remedies following 
unconscionable conduct by a landowner. Although the Courts recognize that there is 
an overlap between the two doctrines, does it exist in every case or in particular 
cases? In what circumstances will there be an overlap of the two doctrines? Is the 
overlap invoked in circumstances where a party has suffered a detriment in paying the 
agreed price for an interest in land and the landowner refuses to transfer title? Or 
does the Court prefer to deduce an artificial intention and a beneficial interest based 
on the party’s expenditure to acquire an agreed interest in land? Clearly, the Court has 
not defined how this overlap arises, and has not defined the circumstances by which it 
arises on the facts of a case.  
 
Whatever the rationale of the Courts may be in promoting an overlap of the two 
doctrines, it is clear that in the notable cases of Ghazaani1264 and Matchmove1265, the 
court was not minded to establish the beneficial interest of the parties by reference to 
their contributions nor to arrive at an arbitrary judgment on what would be a fair 
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share. The outcome of these cases reflects the Court’s willingness to enforce the 
beneficial interest in the property that was created by a party’s expenditure in a 
landowner’s agreement for an interest in land.  
 
Pertinently, the Court may be minded to rely on constructive trusts where a beneficial 
interest arises on the agreement between the parties, rather than seeking to 
determine the existence of a proprietary estoppel by the tripartite formula of 
assurance, reliance and detriment. In other words, the Court may elect to confirm an 
existing or pre-existing proprietary interest in the property by constructive trusts, 
rather than engage in a long process of establishing that future right by proprietary 
estoppel. With proprietary estoppel, the claimant’s equity (payment of the agreed 
price as in Ghazaani1266 and Matchmove1267) merely invokes the discretion of the 
court as it remains “inchoate” until the court decrees a specific interest or award in 
favour of the estoppel claimant. It is only at the date of the court’s order that the 
equity materializes into a full property right. Thus, whereas proprietary estoppel 
focuses on a remedy to potentially satisfy the equity arising in the land, constructive 
trusts actually enforces an existing or pre-existing proprietary interest in the land. 
Hence, the facts and circumstances of the case will determine whether a remedy of 
constructive trusts or proprietary estoppel is applied by the court.  
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11.7  Problems for the Legal Practitioner in Pleading Constructive Trusts in the Alternative 
to Proprietary Estoppel. 
Although constructive trusts provide an alternative remedy for proprietary estoppel, 
the onus of proving both doctrines on the facts lie with the legal practitioner. There 
may be conceptual difficulties and impediments to overcome. For example, if the facts 
support a finding of proprietary estoppel, then it seems unnecessary to prove that the 
facts also support a finding of constructive trusts.1268 However, the remedy provided 
by constructive trusts is more certain and well-defined, as estoppel does not 
guarantee an equitable interest in the land at all, which may be a potential risk for the 
claimant who only relies on estoppel. Also, because a constructive trust operates with 
retrospective effect, it will be enforceable against later created equitable proprietary 
interests in the land, and will also bind a trustee in bankruptcy of the landowner’s 
creditors if the landowner has for example, become bankrupt in the intervening 
period.1269 An estoppel does not have the same advantages because it has prospective 
effect only, even if it creates an equitable interest in the land at all.   
 
Another example, is that a constructive trust can result in legal practitioners delving 
deeper into the law to investigate whether or not a constructive trust is applicable to 
the facts.1270 This level of complexity can increase the cost of litigation.1271  
                                                 
1268
 Gwilym Owen & Osian Rees, ‘Section 2(5) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989: A misconceived approach?’ [2011] Conv 6:495 7 
1269
 See Re Sharpe [1980] 1 WLR 219 (Ch), where monies loaned was not considered as a gift and hence 
did not amount to a contribution for the purchase price of the property, and also did not equate to a 
trust for an interest in the property. However, since the loan agreement had stated the lender could 
remain in the property for as long as she liked, the lender had a contractual right of occupation in the 
property until the loan was repaid to her.  
1270
 Gwilym Owen & Osian Rees, “Section 2(5) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989: A misconceived approach? [2011] Conv 6:495  
1271
 Gwilym Owen & Osian Rees, ‘Section 2(5) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989: A misconceived approach?’ [2011] Conv 6:495 7 
317 
 
Therefore, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, the pleading of 
constructive trusts as an alternative remedy can prove to be costly to the potential 
litigant. Although the legal practitioner may advise the potential litigant that he or she 
has a case in proprietary estoppel or constructive trusts, the potential litigant may not 
possess the financial resources to pursue the case. Hence, the lack of financial 
resources by the potential litigant may be a bar to the remedy of proprietary estoppel 
or constructive trusts, whichever basis the claimant chose. Although estoppel is far less 
predictable than constructive trusts, its advantage is that there is no need to establish 
common intention.  
 
11.8  Should the two Doctrines of Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel be 
Assimilated?  
According to MacKenzie1272, many judicial decisions and dicta illustrate an aversion for 
the assimilation of the two doctrines. For example, Sir Andrew Park of the Chancery 
Division of the High Court in Lalani v Crump Holdings Ltd1273 argued that the two 
doctrines are widely distinguishable. He stated that: 
While there was an affinity between the two types of claim for beneficial 
interest, a common intention trust tended to focus upon the current state 
of affairs, whereas proprietary estoppel was concerned with promises to 
do something in the future that would change the pre-existing situation. 
Moreover, the remedies available to the court were different.1274  
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Lord Walker in Stack v Dowden1275 articulated although he had been given some 
encouragement about the similarities of the two doctrines in Yaxley v Gotts1276, he 
was now less enthusiastic of their assimilation as follows: 
I have to say that I am now rather less enthusiastic about the notion that 
proprietary estoppel and ‘common intention’ constructive trust can or 
should be completely assimilated. Proprietary estoppel typically consists of 
asserting an equitable claim against the conscience of the ‘true’ owner. 
The claim is a ‘mere equity’. It is to be satisfied by the minimum award 
necessary to do justice … which may sometimes lead to no more than a 
monetary award.1277 A ‘common intention’ constructive trust by contrast is 
identifying the true beneficial owner or owners, and the size of their 
beneficial interests.1278  
  
Lord Scott in Thorner v Major1279 advocated that each doctrine has a distinct role to 
play in the expectation of future rights. His Lordship wished: 
..to keep proprietary estoppel and constructive trust as distinct and 
separate remedies to confine proprietary estoppel to cases where the 
representation … on which the claimant has acted is unconditional and to 
address the cases where the representations are of future benefits, and 
subject to qualification on account of unforeseen future events, via the 
principle of remedial constructive trust .1280  
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which to satisfy the award or the defendant has been recently declared bankrupt, the claimant may be 
left without any remedy at all.  
1278
 Stack v Dowden [2007] AC 432 (HL) [37] (Lord Walker) 
1279
 [2009] UKHL 18  
1280
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 [20] (Lord Scott), The remedial constructive trust referred to 
by Lord Scott is innovatory, as English law does not recognize the remedial constructive trust 
unlike some other common law jurisdictions such as Canada. English law arguably uses estoppel 
similarly to how other jurisdictions utilizes the remedial constructive trust. The type of 
constructive trust discussed throughout this chapter is the ‘institutional constructive trust’ i.e. the 
type which has retrospective effect and which is supposed to recognize a pre-existing equitable 
interest rather than to create one out of nothing.  
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According to Pawlowski1281, “….under current English law the two concepts remain 
separate and distinct”1282. For example, a constructive trust requires proof of a 
common intention (whether express or implied) to be established, whereas 
proprietary estoppel requires a mere assurance to be proved. Pawlowski1283 also 
articulates that in many of the cases, a constructive trust and proprietary estoppel are 
pleaded in the alternative and are treated as distinct doctrines.1284 
 
Nourse LJ in Stokes v Anderson1285 articulated that the assimilation of the two 
doctrines is yet to be resolved by the Courts as follows: 
It is possible that the House of Lords will one day decide to solve the 
problem [presented by earlier decisions] either by assimilating the 
principles of Gissing v Gissing and those of proprietary estoppel, or even by 
following the recent trend in other (British) Commonwealth jurisdictions 
towards more generalized principles of unconscionability and unjust 
enrichment.1286 
 
Despite the above lack of clarity in adopting a unified doctrine, the fact remains that 
an equity arising by proprietary estoppel is not a constructive trust and it is difficult for 
the two doctrines to be successfully assimilated. Any assimilation would be artificial as 
both doctrines are distinct in terms of the remedies that each provide, and of the fact 
                                                 
1281
 Mark Pawlowski, The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel (Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 
1282
 Mark Pawlowski, The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel (Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 12 
1283
 Mark Pawlowski, The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel (Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 
1284
 See examples referred to by Pawlowski: Walker v Walker [1984] (CA) unreported; Warnes v Hedley 
[1984] (CA) unreported; Bristol and West Building Society v Henning [1985] 1 WLR 778 (CA); Philip Lowe 
(Chinese Restaurant) Ltd v Sau Man Lee [1985] (CA) unreported 
1285
 [1991] 1 FLR 391 (CA)  
1286
 Stokes v Anderson [1991] 1 FLR 391 (CA) 398-399 (Nourse LJ); The concept of unjust enrichment links 
with the idea of a remedial constructive trust referred to by Lord Scott in Thorner v Major at page 321. It 
is because English law does not have a fully developed concept of unjust enrichment that the notion of 
the remedial constructive trust has not been adopted. Hence the courts here have instead relied on 
proprietary estoppel to grant or create a remedy which may or may not be an equitable proprietary 
interest in the land.  
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that the constructive trust relates to trusts.1287 Further, the analogies drawn are more 
conceptual than pragmatic as the application and operation of the doctrines are vastly 
distinct and independent of each other. Since both doctrines can be established on the 
same facts as in the case of Ghazaani v Rowshan1288, then constructive trusts can be 
pleaded in the first option, with proprietary estoppel as the back-up claim if the 
constructive trusts claim fails.  
 
11.9  Conclusion 
Proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts are equitable doctrines that are designed 
to redress unconscionable dealings between parties. The pre-requisite common 
intention of constructive trusts creates a key distinction between the two doctrines. 
However, the particular facts of the case determine which doctrine is to be applied, 
whether it is a present or future interest, and in what context it ought to be applied, 
whether in domestic, commercial, personal or family cases. Both doctrines aim to 
provide a just outcome to address the detrimental reliance on informal agreements for 
an interest in property, and can be pleaded in the alternative on the same facts.  
 
The flexibility of equity in providing equitable relief by both doctrines is illustrated in 
the case of Eves v Eves1289 where Lord Denning stated: ‘Equity is not past the age of 
childbearing. One of her latest progeny is a constructive trust of a new model. Lord 
Diplock brought it into the world and we have nourished it.’’1290 Hence, the equitable 
principles underpinning the doctrines ensure that a party is not without a remedy or 
                                                 
1287
 Gwilym Owen & Osian Rees, ‘Section 2(5) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989: A misconceived approach?’ [2011] Conv 6:495  
1288
 [2015] All ER (D) 263 (Ch)  
1289
 [1975] 1 WLR 1338 (CA) 
1290
 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 (CA) 1341 (Lord Denning) 
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relief in terms of a shared agreement for an interest in property, or a promise by a 
landowner for an interest in land.  
 
Although the doctrines may arise on the same facts, they are distinct in application1291 
and the ultimate question before the Court is whether there is a constructive trust? Or 
whether there is a proprietary estoppel? Of course, the court will determine which 
doctrine best fit the facts so that a party is not left without a remedy.1292 However, 
confusion and uncertainty still prevail as to how the courts arrive at their decisions 
regarding either proprietary estoppel or constructive trusts or both.   
 
The next chapter will focus on the comparison between proprietary estoppel and 
unjust enrichment in the American1293 and English legal systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1291
 For example, where there is common intention followed by reliance, detriment and unconscionability 
the facts could equally support both a constructive trust and a remedy based on estoppel. Where there is 
a unilateral representation however, then estoppel is the only remedy available as the facts will not 
support a constructive trust.  
1292
 There could be situations where no remedy is available at all, for example in circumstances where 
detrimental reliance cannot be established, or where there is no proof of unconscionability.  
1293
 The word ‘American’ is used synonymously with ‘US’.  
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Chapter Twelve: Proprietary Estoppel versus the American and English Doctrine of 
Unjust Enrichment 
 
 
12.1  Introduction 
This chapter seeks to compare and contrast proprietary estoppel with the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment in the American and English legal systems. It illustrates the 
distinctive nature, features and application of proprietary estoppel against that of 
unjust enrichment, and considers which doctrine is a more suitable remedy. The 
chapter also examines whether proprietary estoppel can be applied in the United 
States, and compares the American and English systems of unjust enrichment. It 
defines the court’s approach to the two doctrines, and determines whether a claim in 
proprietary estoppel equates to a claim in unjust enrichment.  
 
The discussion adopted in this chapter is exclusive, as it compares the nature and 
purpose of the two doctrines, and their similarities and differences operating in the 
two jurisdictions. It draws further comparison between unjust enrichment in the two 
legal systems, and considers whether proprietary estoppel can be applied in the 
United States. Other legal scholars1294 have not investigated unjust enrichment 
between the two jurisdictions to the same extent and depth as this thesis. These legal 
                                                 
1294
 C. Scott Pryor, ‘Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy’ [2013] 40 Pepperdine Law Review 4; James S. Rogers, ‘Restitution 
for Wrongs and The Restatement Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ [2007] Wake 
Forest Law Review 42, 55; Edwin W. Patterson, ‘The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ [1936] 
The Missouri Law Rwview Vol.1:3; Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge 
University Press 2004); Douglas Laycock, ‘Restoring Restitution to the Canon’ [2012] Michigan Law 
Review Vol.110:929; Learned Hand, ‘Restitution or Unjust Enrichment’ [1897] Harvard Law Review 
Vol.11:4 249; Howard O. Hunter, ‘Measuring Unjust Enrichment’ [1989] Sydney Law Review Vol.12:1 76; 
Douglas Laycock, ‘The Scope and Significance of Restitution’ [1989] Texas Law Review Vol.67:1277; 
Graham Virgo, The Principles of Equity  & Trusts (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2018); Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts 
(9
th
 edn, Routledge 2017); Gary Watt, Trusts & Equity (8
th
 edn, OUP 2018); Mohamed Ramjohn, 
Unlocking Equity and Trusts (6
th
 edn, Routledge 2017; Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law (10
th
 edn, 
Routledge 2016) Elizabeth Cooke, Land Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2012); Judith-Anne MacKenzie & Aruna Nair, 
Textbook on Land Law (17
th
 edn, OUP 2016) 
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scholars1295 tend to focus on theoretical aspects of restitution and unjust enrichment, 
and have not explicitly compared and contrasted the American and English system of 
unjust enrichment with proprietary estoppel, and neither explored the influence of 
English proprietary estoppel in America. Further, they have not drawn a comparison of 
proprietary estoppel with the English system of unjust enrichment, and neither have 
contrasted the American and English systems of unjust enrichment.  
 
This chapter further considers the question of whether the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel is sound in terms of its nature, application, strengths and weaknesses, benefit 
and limitations in comparison to the similar equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. 
Other legal scholars1296 have not explicitly investigated the two doctrines in the two 
differing jurisdictions on the same issues, and neither through the analysis of case law 
as presented in this thesis.   
                                                 
1295
 C. Scott Pryor, ‘Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy’ [2013] 40 Pepperdine Law Review 4; James S. Rogers, ‘Restitution 
for Wrongs and The Restatement Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ [2007] Wake 
Forest Law Review 42, 55; Edwin W. Patterson, ‘The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ [1936] 
The Missouri Law Rwview Vol.1:3; Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge 
University Press 2004); Douglas Laycock, ‘Restoring Restitution to the Canon’ [2012] Michigan Law 
Review Vol.110:929; Learned Hand, ‘Restitution or Unjust Enrichment’ [1897] Harvard Law Review 
Vol.11:4 249; Howard O. Hunter, ‘Measuring Unjust Enrichment’ [1989] Sydney Law Review Vol.12:1 76; 
Douglas Laycock, ‘The Scope and Significance of Restitution’ [1989] Texas Law Review Vol.67:1277; 
Graham Virgo, The Principles of Equity  & Trusts (3
rd
 edn, OUP 2018); Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts 
(9
th
 edn, Routledge 2017); Gary Watt, Trusts & Equity (8
th
 edn, OUP 2018); Mohamed Ramjohn, 
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th
 edn, Routledge 2017; Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law (10
th
 edn, 
Routledge 2016) Elizabeth Cooke, Land Law (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2012); Judith-Anne MacKenzie & Aruna Nair, 
Textbook on Land Law (17
th
 edn, OUP 2016) 
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 C. Scott Pryor, ‘Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy’ [2013] 40 Pepperdine Law Review 4; James S. Rogers, ‘Restitution 
for Wrongs and The Restatement Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ [2007] Wake 
Forest Law Review 42, 55; Edwin W. Patterson, ‘The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’ [1936] 
The Missouri Law Rwview Vol.1:3; Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge 
University Press 2004); Douglas Laycock, ‘Restoring Restitution to the Canon’ [2012] Michigan Law 
Review Vol.110:929; Learned Hand, ‘Restitution or Unjust Enrichment’ [1897] Harvard Law Review 
Vol.11:4 249; Howard O. Hunter, ‘Measuring Unjust Enrichment’ [1989] Sydney Law Review Vol.12:1 76; 
Douglas Laycock, ‘The Scope and Significance of Restitution’ [1989] Texas Law Review Vol.67:1277; 
Graham Virgo, The Principles of Equity  & Trusts (3
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Routledge 2016) Elizabeth Cooke, Land Law (2
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The chapter links to the other chapters of the thesis in illustrating a broad perspective 
of the nature, purpose and efficacy of proprietary estoppel in comparison to the 
similar equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.  
 
12.2  Proprietary estoppel and Unjust Enrichment in the United States 
In the United States, the law of unjust enrichment arguably fulfils some aspects of the 
role played by the English law of proprietary estoppel. The American doctrine of unjust 
enrichment maintains that a person who receives benefits unjustly should make 
restitution for those benefits. It embraces the principle whereby a plaintiff recovers a 
defendant’s unjust enrichment arising from a violation of a legally protected right 
without the plaintiff having to establish or prove any further harm.1297 For example, a 
person is considered unjustly enriched where he or she obtains a benefit from another 
under such circumstances that give rise to an implied or quasi- contract to repay.1298 
An implied or quasi-contract imposes an obligation by law to do justice 
notwithstanding no promise was made and/or intended; or that the defendant is 
holding money or property that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff.1299  
 
The case of Olwell v Nye & Nissen1300 illustrates the pervasive principle of unjust 
enrichment and restitution. Olwell (O) transferred his interest in an egg-packing 
corporation to Nye & Nissen (N & N) but retained ownership of an egg-washing 
machine. O stored the machine on property adjacent to the premises occupied by N & 
                                                 
1297
 C. Scott Pryor, ‘Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy’ [2013] 40 Pepperdine Law Review 4 
<https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2308&context=plr> accessed 14 
October 2017 
1298
 Allen v Berry [1982] Tex. App. San Antonio 645 S.W.2d 550,553  
1299
 Allen v Berry [1982] Tex. App. San Antonio 645 S.W.2d 550,553  
1300
 [1946] 173 P.2d 652 (Wash.)   
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N. Without O’s knowledge and consent, N & N took the egg-washing machine out of 
storage and put it to use in their business. O did not suffer any material damage as the 
egg-washing machine was in good condition and O never claimed title to it. O sued N & 
N in quasi-contract to recover the profits procured by N & N in its unauthorized use of 
the machine. The Supreme Court of Washington held that although no material harm 
was done to O, N & N was nonetheless liable for the benefit it obtained by O’s 
machine. Hence, unjust enrichment focuses on the benefit obtained by the defendant 
to the loss of the plaintiff.  
 
Although restitution is of the common law1301, the courts tend to consider restitution 
and unjust enrichment as equitable in nature.1302 Sherwin1303 asserts that although 
quasi-contract remedies were originally granted by the law courts from which 
restitution developed, both “restitution and unjust enrichment have been associated 
with equity in a broader sense”1304. For example1305, in Kossian v American National 
                                                 
1301
 Steve Hedley, ‘Unjust Enrichment’ [1995] CLJ 54(3) 578 
1302
 See Michael Traynor, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: Some 
Introductory Suggestions’ [2011] 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, who asserts that the Restatement 
explicates that restitution may be legal or equitable or both 
<https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsr
edir=1&article=3315&context=wlulr> accessed 14 October 2017 
1303
 Emily Sherwin, ‘Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment’ [2001] 
Texas Law Review Vol.79:2083 
<https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&context=facpub> accessed 14 
October 2017 
1304
 See Emily Sherwin, ‘Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment’ [2001] 
Texas Law Review Vol.79:2083, 2086-2087 
<https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&context=facpub> accessed 14 
October 2017 
However, see Colleen P. Murphy, ‘Recognizing Restitutionary Causes of Action and Remedies Under 
Rhode Island Law’ [2015] Roger Williams University Law Review Vol.20:3 429, 436 
<http://rogerwilliamslawreview.org/files/2014/02/CMurphy.pdf> accessed 14 October 2017 which 
states that as a historical and technical matter, some strands of restitution are equitable while others 
are legal. For example, a legal remedy include a money judgment for the value of a benefit obtained by 
the defendant, or a monetary restitution of a defendant’s unjust gain of money. In contrast, the 
remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien are technically equitable remedies; See also Michael 
Traynor, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: Some Introductory Suggestions’ 
[2011] 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899  
<https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsr
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Insurance Co.1306, a portion of a hotel was destroyed by fire. The property was subject 
to a deed of trust in which the defendant was the beneficiary. The hotel owner hired 
the plaintiff to clean up the debris after the fire, but the plaintiff was never paid for his 
services. The hotel owner defaulted on the mortgage and filed for bankruptcy. The 
defendant took possession of the hotel premises that was cleaned of the debris, and 
also benefited from the insurance policy for the mortgage. The plaintiff instituted a 
restitution claim against the defendant for a monetary remedy from the insurance 
proceeds for the debris removal. The court allowed the claim despite the fact that the 
defendant had not hired the plaintiff, and the insurance payment emanated from the 
independent contract between the hotel owner and the insurer. The court decided 
that by the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment the defendant should not “be 
indemnified twice for the same loss, once in labor and materials and again in money, 
to the detriment (forfeiture) of the party who furnished the labor and materials”.1307 
Hence, unjust enrichment is considered as an equitable doctrine for a remedy in 
restitution.  
 
In Sharp v Kosmalski1308, the court also applied equitable principles for a finding of 
unjust enrichment.1309 The plaintiff was a fifty-six year old farmer and the defendant 
was a forty-year old school teacher who became co-habitees following the death of 
                                                                                                                                               
edir=1&article=3315&context=wlulr> accessed 14 October 2017 who asserts that the Restatement 
explicates that restitution may be legal or equitable or both. 
1305
 See Emily Sherwin, ‘Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 
Texas Law Review Vol. 79:2083, 2089 
<https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&context=facpub> accessed 14 
October 2017 
1306
 2[1967] 54 Cal. App. 2d 647  
1307
 [1967] 54 Cal. App. 2d 647, 651 
1308
 [1976] 351 N.E. 2d 721 
1309
 See Emily Sherwin, ‘Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment’ [2001] 
Texas Law Review Vol.79(2083) 
<https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&context=facpub> accessed 14 
October 2017 
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the plaintiff’s wife. The defendant refused the plaintiff’s repeated marriage proposals 
despite their courtship over several years, and in giving numerous gifts to the 
defendant. The plaintiff ultimately gifted his principal asset being the farm to the 
defendant who evicted the plaintiff off the farm after their relationship broke down 
and they split. The plaintiff claimed for a remedy in constructive trust to obtain the 
title to his farm. The trial court’s decision was reversed by the New York Court of 
Appeals which held that an unjust enrichment had occurred. The court held that the 
“purpose of the constructive trust remedy is to prevent unjust enrichment,” and that 
unjust enrichment is determined “through the application of the principles of 
equity”.1310 Further, the court maintained that the facts presented “the classic 
example of a situation where equity should intervene to scrutinize a transaction 
pregnant with opportunity for abuse and unfairness”1311. Thus, unjust enrichment was 
considered as a principle of equity.  
 
In the case of Scrushy v Taylor1312, the Alabama Supreme Court asserted that the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy that prevents a party from being 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another.1313 The Court affirmed as follows: 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an old equitable remedy permitting 
the court in equity and good conscience to disallow one to be unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another … A claim for restitution is equitable in 
nature, and permits a trial court to balance the equities and to take into 
account competing principles to determine if the defendant was unjustly 
enriched. Consequently, the success of a claim for unjust enrichment 
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.1314  
                                                 
1310
 [1976] 351 N.E. 2d 721, 2090 
1311
 [1976] 351 N.E. 2d 721, 724 
1312
 [2006] No. 1050564, WL 2458818 
1313
See Chaim Saiman, ‘Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law Conceptualism’ 
[2007] 52 Villanova Law Review Vol.52:487, 494 
<https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&htt
psredir=1&article=1143&context=vlr> accessed 14 October 2017 
1314
 [2006] No. 1050564, WL 2458818 [11] 
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Thus, equity provides the balancing scale for unjust enrichment and restitution.  
 
The major similarity between proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment is the 
application of equity to provide remedies and cause of action for inequitable or 
unconscionable conduct of parties. However, these two doctrines are distinct in terms 
of approach, principle, application and operation. They illustrate the varying 
circumstances for the intervention of equity to remedy unconscionable conduct, and 
the unjust retention of a benefit at the claimant’s expense. 
 
Whereas proprietary estoppel gives rise to a remedy bestowed by the courts, the 
remedies of unjust enrichment are entrenched by statute1315. The law of unjust 
enrichment is enshrined in the Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment (R3RUE) which provides that every unjust enrichment gives a right in 
restitution. It provides that “A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of 
another is subject to liability in restitution.”1316 The Restatement also advocates that 
the liability in restitution arises from the economic benefit derived in circumstances 
where its retention without payment would result in the unjust enrichment of 
defendant at the expense of the claimant.1317 The R3RUE defines the terms “at the 
expense of another” as a violation of another’s “legally protected rights” without proof 
that the claimant has suffered a loss.1318 Thus, the enrichment must be unjustified 
under the law, and not unjust because a party may think so.  
 
                                                 
1315
 See Chapter Seven of the Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE) 
for the remedies in unjust enrichment. 
1316
 Restatement of Restitution (1937), s. 1; Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 1 
(2011) 
1317
 Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge University Press 2004) 
1318
 Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2(1)  
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The Restatement provides remedies, apart from compensatory damages (based on the 
plaintiff’s loss), that focus on what the defendant has received rather than what the 
plaintiff has lost.1319 It includes remedies enforceable against identifiable property 
such as rescission and restitution, constructive trust, equitable lien and 
subrogation.1320  The Restatement also defines categories of liability such as “a 
recipient who obtains a benefit without payment does not establish that the recipient 
has been unjustly enriched; or a valid contract which defines the obligations of the 
parties on matters within its scope, displaces to that extent any inquiry into unjust 
enrichment; that no liability in restitution arises for an unrequested benefit that is 
voluntarily conferred, unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimants’ 
intervention in the absence of contract; and that liability in restitution may not subject 
an innocent recipient to a forced exchange meaning an obligation to pay for a benefit 
that the recipient should have been free to refuse”.1321   
 
The principles of application vary for both doctrines. Whereas proprietary estoppel 
requires the fulfilment of the criteria of assurance, reliance and detriment, 
underpinned by unconscionability, unjust enrichment considers the gain to the 
defendant in relation to the loss of the plaintiff. Also, whereas proprietary estoppel 
affords both a cause of action and a defence to a claim, unjust enrichment provides 
only a cause of action as it is strictly a gains theory doctrine – based on the defendant’s 
                                                 
1319
 Michael Traynor, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: Some Introductory 
Suggestions’ [2011] 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 
<https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsr
edir=1&article=3315&context=wlulr> accessed 14 October 2017 
1320
 Michael Traynor, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: Some Introductory 
Suggestions’ [2011] 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 
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edir=1&article=3315&context=wlulr> accessed 14 October 2017 
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 Douglas Laycock, ‘Restoring Restitution to the Canon’ [2012] Michigan Law Review Vol.110:929 
<https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=mlr> accessed 14 
October 2017 
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gain and not the claimant’s loss. It follows that proprietary estoppel is about promise 
or representation versus detrimental reliance, whereas unjust enrichment is about 
gain versus loss. 
 
For example, in Everhart v Miles1322 restitution was awarded to the plaintiff where the 
defendant had unjustly benefited by labour and improvements to the defendant’s 
property that were willingly accepted by the defendant. In that case, Bruce and Sharon 
Miles (plaintiffs) had negotiated the purchase of rural land including a farm from 
Edwin Everhart (the defendant) for the total sum of USD$279, 000. The plaintiffs had 
travelled to the farm to take possession thereof. The Plaintiffs made a down payment 
to execute the contract of sale, but the contract was not executed and negotiations 
continued. During the negotiations, the plaintiffs lived on the farm and undertook 
numerous improvements including taking over the farm’s dairy business, fixing the 
barn roof, renovating the farmhouse and installing a septic system. The plaintiffs later 
reduced their offered price which the defendant rejected, at which the plaintiffs left 
the property. The plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant in restitution. The trial 
court determined that the plaintiffs had lived on the farm with the defendant’s 
blessing, and awarded restitution to the plaintiffs on the ground that the defendant 
had been unjustly enriched by the plaintiffs actions.  
 
The defendant appealed but the appeal court upheld the trial court’s decision. Justice 
Weant affirmed that the defendant knew of the plaintiffs presence, had approved of 
their presence, had accepted the benefits of their work and expenditures and had 
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 [1980] Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 422 A 2d 28  
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made no attempt to stop or remove them. Hence, restitution was awarded to the 
plaintiffs.  
 
The above case reflects the principle of unjust enrichment whereby restitution is 
awarded where one party is enriched at the expense of another, and the enriched 
party will disgorge the benefit to the other party instead of retaining the benefit. Since 
fixtures and improvements in real property cannot be disgorged as these benefits are 
affixed to the property, then restitution is awarded by compensation for the fixtures 
and improvements.  
 
The basis of liability of the two doctrines is distinct. Whereas proprietary estoppel 
requires the claimant to prove that he or she has suffered a detrimental reliance on a 
promise, an unjust enrichment on the other hand requires the plaintiff to show that he 
or she is the source of defendant’s enrichment, either by the loss suffered that ensued 
to the defendant’s gain, or the defendant’s gain was acquired by a violation of the 
plaintiff’s rights. Hence, unjust enrichment has no regard to the change of position for 
a promise as in proprietary estoppel, but concerns a legally protected right of the 
plaintiff that is “acquired or retained in a manner that the law regards as 
unjustified.”1323  
 
In the case of University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid 
Company1324, two university professors conducted studies on a prenatal supplement 
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 C. Scott Pryor, ‘Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy’ [2013] 40 Pepperdine Law Review 4 
<https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2308&context=plr> accessed 14 
October 2017 
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for the defendant. The professors disclosed the results in a confidential memoranda to 
the defendant. However, the defendant invented a reformulated supplement based on 
the memoranda and obtained a patent for the product. The professors claimed for 
relief including unjust enrichment against the defendant. The court held that the 
defendant claimed the benefit of the professor’s studies to obtain the patent, and also 
benefited from the monopoly profits of the patent. It was inequitable for the 
defendant to enjoy the profits without compensating the plaintiffs. The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the professors were entitled to recover on the 
unjust enrichment principle.  
 
In contradistinction to proprietary estoppel, the law of restitution in R3RUE addresses 
both liabilities and remedies for unjust enrichment. The Restatement explicates that 
restitution may be legal or equitable or both.1325 For example, a monetary award for 
the benefit obtained by the defendant is a legal remedy; and equitable remedies such 
as equitable lien and constructive trust are granted in respect of property.1326 Whereas 
a remedy in proprietary estoppel lies in the discretion of the court, unjust enrichment 
is granted in accordance with the recognizable claims defined in the R3RUE. 
Restitutionary relief for unjust enrichment is classified in two forms as the recovery of 
the value of benefits transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant; or the 
disgorgement of profits by wrongful conduct where a claimant recovers more than a 
provable loss from the defendant’s gain. The recovery under unjust enrichment is an 
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 Michael Traynor, ‘The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment: Some Introductory 
Suggestions’ [2011] 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 
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edir=1&article=3315&context=wlulr> accessed 14 October 2017 
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equitable right and is not dependent on the existence of a wrong.1327 It provides a right 
of restitution to a plaintiff who is unfairly deprived of his or her property. 
 
For example, in the case of City of Hastings v Jerry Spady1328, a purchaser who knew 
he was acquiring property under suspicious circumstances arising from a breach of 
fiduciary duty was made subject to a constructive trust. In that case, around 1977 and 
1978, the City of Hastings (plaintiff) sought to purchase an abandoned railway right of 
way (the property) owned by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MPRC). Duane 
Stromer, the attorney for the plaintiff was also the attorney for Jerry Spady 
(defendant).  Stromer made a written offer to MPRC to purchase the property, and 
also falsely informed MPRC that the plaintiff was not interested in purchasing the 
property. Later, Stromer contracted with MPRC to purchase the property for 
USD$10,900 and informed the plaintiff that he had acquired the property and would 
sell it to the plaintiff for USD$20,000. The mayor had a meeting with Stromer by which 
Stomer agreed to withdraw from the contract to allow the plaintiff to purchase the 
property, and informed MPRC of his decision. However, Stromer advised MPRC by 
telephone that the deed should be issued to a corporation owned by the defendant. 
Stromer sent the check of USD$10,900 from Spady to MPRC and requested the 
property be deeded directly to the defendant. The property was deeded to Spady and 
the deed was mailed to Stromer. Meanwhile, the plaintiff had completed appraisals on 
the property in the expectation of purchasing it, and had passed a motion to offer 
USD$18,000 for the property. The plaintiff never authorized Stromer to negotiate on 
its behalf, nor did the plaintiff know that Stromer was dealing with the property. The 
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plaintiff sought restitution in equity for a constructive trust on the property, and the 
district court imposed a constructive trust on the property for the plaintiff.  
 
The defendant appealed, but the appeal court upheld the decision of the district court. 
The court determined that the Stromer’s participation in acquiring the property, 
knowing that the plaintiff was interested, was a breach of fiduciary duty. The 
defendant was not a bona fide purchaser for value as Stromer’s knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s interest in the property was imputed to the defendant, as notice to an 
attorney was notice to his client. The court held that the defendant had actual or 
constructive notice of Stromer’s breach of fiduciary duty in transferring the property to 
the defendant, and the defendant was subject to a constructive trust to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  
 
The equitable remedy of constructive trust was thereby applied to prevent the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant. Stromer was in breach of his fiduciary duty to the 
plaintiff and consequently his breach and knowledge of the plaintiff’s interest in the 
property led to the defendant being unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff. 
Hence, unjust enrichment provided a proprietary remedy in restitution by way of 
constructive trust to the plaintiff against the defendant.   
 
In sharp contrast to the tripartite formula of assurance, reliance and detriment in 
proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment embraces a much broader formulae for proof 
as a cause of action such as: “(1) that party (A) conferred a benefit upon party (B) from 
whom relief is sought; (2) that the recipient (B) appreciated the benefit; and (3) that 
the recipient (B) accepted the benefit under such circumstances that it would be 
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inequitable for (B) to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof.”1329 Hence, 
unjust enrichment deals with the defendant’s gain rather than the claimant’s loss. It 
does not require proof of harm, except a violation of a plaintiff’s legal right and the 
defendant obtains a benefit whether by money, property, service or some other 
means. The recovery under unjust enrichment is a right in restitution to a plaintiff who 
is unfairly deprived of his or her property. 
 
In contrast  to proprietary estoppel which relates to an interest in land and intellectual 
property1330, the scope of unjust enrichment extends beyond land to include chattels 
(tangible property), intellectual property rights such as copyrights, trademarks and 
patents; contracts and quasi-contracts such as contractual relations and performances, 
precontractual expectations, trade secrets, individual reputation and dignity, 
commercial attributes of personality, and identity and physical integrity.1331 Hence, the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment is all encompassing to personal property, commercial, 
real property, contracts and reputation so long as the principle of gain is acquired in 
the violation of another’s rights.  
 
Unlike proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment is a predictable doctrine as it gives a 
right to a restitutionary remedy under the R3RUE. Whether an unjust enrichment is 
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 C. Scott Pryor, ‘Third Time's the Charm: The Coming Impact of the Restatement (Third) Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment in Bankruptcy’ 40 Pepperdine Law Review 4 
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that proprietary estoppel applies to intellectual property rights and not only for an interest in land.  
1331
 James Steven Rogers, ‘Restitution for wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the law of restitution 
and unjust enrichment’ [2007] Wake Forest Law Review Vol. 42(55) 
<https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir
=1&article=1163&context=lsfp> accessed 10 October 2017 
336 
 
founded depends on whether the defendant’s act falls within the prescribed 
circumstances or categories established in the R3RUE. Further, the claimant can only 
proceed with the claim for unjust enrichment if he or she has a legal right to the 
property by which the defendant has become unjust enriched. In sharp contrast, 
proprietary estoppel is an unpredictable doctrine that is determined solely by the 
court in exercise of its discretion. Unless the court makes a favourable determination 
of the facts and circumstances of a case, it is not possible to predict in advance 
whether a proprietary estoppel exist. Also, unless the claimant in proprietary estoppel 
can prove that he or she has suffered a detrimental reliance on a promise for an 
interest in land, then there can be no finding of an estoppel, and the court cannot 
grant a remedy.   
 
12.3  Does a Claim in Proprietary Estoppel Equate to a Claim in Unjust Enrichment? 
It is arguable that in proprietary estoppel, the defendant is enriched at the expense of 
the claimant as the defendant obtains the benefit of the claimant’s services such as: 
working without pay or for low wages1332; or giving up paid employment or education 
in reliance and expectation of the defendant’s promise1333. However, the claimant 
could not enforce a claim in unjust enrichment as he or she has no pre-existing legal 
right in the defendant’s land to enforce a claim. Thus, the equitable doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel intervenes to prohibit the defendant’s enforcement and reliance 
on strict legal rights where the claimant has suffered a detriment in reliance on the 
defendant’s promise of an interest in land. Therefore, unlike unjust enrichment the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel protects a claimant who suffers a detrimental reliance 
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on the defendant’s promise of an interest in land notwithstanding that the claimant 
has no legal interest in the defendant’s land.  
 
Another factor which illustrate that a claim in proprietary estoppel does not equate to 
a claim in unjust enrichment is the scope of the two doctrines. Proprietary estoppel 
does not apply to contracts or quasi contracts as established in Yeoman’s Row 
Management Ltd v Cobbe1334, but arises from the informal arrangements of parties 
that involve the making of an assurance or representation to which another relies 
thereon to their detriment. Unjust enrichment on the other hand, applies where a 
person is unjustly enriched in obtaining a benefit from another under such 
circumstances that give rise to an implied or quasi- contract to repay.1335 Thus, the 
implied or quasi-contract in unjust enrichment imposes an obligation by law to do 
restitution where no promise was made and/or intended1336. Hence, unjust 
enrichment does not require a promise or representation as in proprietary estoppel, as 
it provides a right of restitution to a plaintiff who is unfairly deprived of his or her 
property by implying a contract or quasi-contract. Thus, the question on whether 
proprietary estoppel equates to the American system of unjust enrichment is to be 
answered in the negative. 
 
12.4  Can the Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel be Applied in the US?  
It is arguable that proprietary estoppel can be applied in the United States. Proprietary 
estoppel applies equity, which is pervasively applied in the doctrine of unjust 
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enrichment. Hence, the introduction of the equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
would not be a novel equitable remedy. Also, in England, proprietary estoppel is more 
prominent in the farming cases1337, which is adaptable to the United States which have 
similarly large farms. Thus, the creation of informal arrangements in exchange for low 
wages1338 or in forfeiting education1339 or other employment1340 to work on a farm 
may not be uncommon in the US as in England. Further, the application of proprietary 
estoppel in intellectual property1341 in England may also apply in the US jurisdiction 
that also deal with intellectual property rights.  
 
The tripartite formula of assurance, reliance and detriment in proprietary estoppel 
may also be applied in the informal relations of parties in the domestic or family 
context, to land or other property such as a home, or in intellectual property. It 
prevents the enforcement of strict legal rights, or the prohibition of unconscionable 
conduct where a party had induced another to rely on a state of affairs and that other 
party suffered a detriment thereby. So long as the requirements of the estoppel is 
satisfied, then an estoppel can arise on the facts to create a personal or proprietary 
remedy. Hence, the flexibility and practicality of proprietary estoppel and of equity 
allows it to be applied in the US.   
 
The tenor of proprietary estoppel to redress unconscionable conduct in acting against 
the conscience of the defendant, and to provide the minimum equity to do justice in a 
particular case produces a rational system of rights in personam that may be applied in 
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the US. Since proprietary estoppel is a judicial doctrine and not a creature of statute, 
then it can be developed by the courts if they can show a willingness to adopt its 
doctrinal principles. Thus, the question on whether proprietary estoppel can be 
applied in the US is to be answered in the positive.  
 
12.5  Proprietary Estoppel versus Unjust Enrichment in English Law 
Proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment are two distinct and independent 
doctrines in English law. Unjust enrichment is a newly recognized subject, accepted 
into English law by the House of Lords in 1991, in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd1342,1343 
which established the foundation of unjust enrichment.1344 Proprietary estoppel, in 
contrast is a more longstanding doctrine that originated in English law from the House 
of Lords decision of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson1345 in 1866. Just as 
proprietary estoppel was approved by the House of Lords in Thorner v Major1346, the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment was likewise approved in limited contexts by the House 
of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd1347 and Woolich Equitable Building Society v 
IRC (No.2)1348.  
 
The case of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd1349 involved the recovery of money stolen 
from a gaming club. The plaintiffs/appellants were a firm of solicitors which had a 
partner who was addicted to gambling, and was an authorized signatory to the firm’s 
client account. The partner took large sums of money from the client account and 
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gambled all away at the defendants’/respondents’ club. It was unknown to the club 
that the partner was using money to which he was not entitled. The 
plaintiffs/appellants argued that the gaming contracts were void by law1350, and since 
the club had given no consideration for the money given, then the partner could not 
have passed title to the stolen money under the equitable tracing rules, even if the 
club was an innocent party. The club argued that they had given consideration for the 
chips, and were an innocent recipient, and also that the money could not be traced as 
it had been mixed with other money. 
 
Their Lordships gave judgment for the plaintiffs/appellants. The gaming contract was 
declared void by section 18 of the Gaming Act 1945, and the chips used were not 
purchased by the partner as they were used to facilitate gambling. The club had given 
no consideration for the money given, and was a mere donee or volunteer having 
received the solicitors’ money without their consent. Also, under the equitable tracing 
rules, an innocent person receiving money had to repay the owner if no consideration 
was given for it. The club established a defence of ‘change of position’1351 for a 
reduction in the measure of its liability to reflect the money paid out on occasions 
when the gambler won, against the common law restitutionary claim of the firm. Their 
Lordships held that the club was unjustly enriched at the expense of the solicitors from 
whom the money had been stolen, and the club had to repay the monies to the extent 
it had been “enriched” i.e. after making deduction of the winnings paid to the partner, 
and the gambling taxes paid to the Government. Thus, their Lordships established that 
it is right for English law to recognize a claim in restitution based on unjust enrichment.  
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Similarly, in Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC1352 their Lordships determined 
whether the payment of taxes demanded under ultra vires regulations were 
recoverable as of right. The defendant had issued a demand to the claimant for the 
payment of tax, to which the claimant submitted payment and commenced action by 
way of judicial review disputing the regulations. The claimant succeeded in the judicial 
proceedings to have the regulations quashed, but the defendants refused to pay any 
interest on the sums paid. The defendants challenged the demand for interest by 
judicial review.  
 
Their Lordships ruled in favour of the plaintiff by the principle of unjust enrichment. 
They maintained that the tax was demanded but not due, and there was no 
consideration for the money paid. Their Lordships held that at common law, taxes 
extracted ultra vires statute were recoverable as of right without the need to invoke a 
mistake of law by the payer.1353 Thus, at common law there was a general 
restitutionary principle that payment to an unlawful demand for tax for which there 
was no basis in law, acquired a right to be repaid.  
 
Proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment vary by nature, application and operation 
by the courts. Whereas proprietary estoppel deals with an assurance or representation 
to a party for an interest in land or in intellectual property1354, and that party relies 
thereon to his or her detriment; unjust enrichment in contrast deals with the “receipt 
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of an enrichment at the expense of another in circumstances which call for that 
enrichment to be given up to that other”1355.   
 
For example, in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe1356 Lord Scott determined 
that the value of the property had been increased by the grant of planning permission, 
obtained at the expense of the respondent. The respondent was awarded a quantum 
meruit payment for his services in obtaining the planning permission, because he had 
earned it, and not because he was unjustly enriched in this regard. However, since the 
respondent had “unlocked” the development potential of the property, the property 
owner was unjustly enriched by obtaining the value of the respondent’s professional 
services without payment. The remedy for unjust enrichment overlapped with the   
respondent’s entitlement to the quantum meruit payment. Thus, unjust enrichment 
focuses on a party being unjustly enriched at the expense of another, but proprietary 
estoppel focuses on the detrimental reliance on a representation. 
 
In terms of application, proprietary estoppel involves a tripartite system of assurance, 
reliance and detriment to prove the estoppel, but unjust enrichment invokes a fourfold  
formula1357 by which the claimant must prove that the defendant has been enriched, 
that the enrichment is at the claimant’s expense, that the enrichment is unjust and 
that no recognized defence applies. Thus, the requirement of proof varies between the 
two doctrines. 
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The operation of the two doctrines varies widely. Whilst proprietary estoppel seeks to 
remedy unconscionable conduct based on the prior dealings of the parties, unjust 
enrichment conversely seeks to reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment or benefit 
that arise from the claimant’s expense1358. Further, whereas the change of position is 
available as a defence in unjust enrichment, it is conversely available as a claim in 
proprietary estoppel whereby the claimant has altered his or her position in reliance of 
the defendant’s representation. Hence, the purpose and rationale of operation varies 
between the two doctrines.  
 
The similarities between the two doctrines arise by their nature and the remedy 
proffered. Both proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment are equitable1359 in 
nature, and both provide a personal remedy by way of compensation, or proprietary 
remedy for an interest in property such as a constructive trust in unjust enrichment1360 
or a freehold interest1361 in proprietary estoppel.   
 
The disparity between proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment largely outweighs 
the similarities. Therefore, the two doctrines are autonomous in English law and 
neither influences the other. If unjust enrichment is introduced on a wholesale basis, it 
is likely to encroach into many of the areas currently occupied by equitable remedies. 
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Proprietary estoppel is a longstanding doctrine that has arguably gained in utility and 
prevalence following Thorner v Major1362, and subsequent cases1363.  
 
12.6  Unjust Enrichment in the US and England 
Unjust enrichment comprises a cause of action in restitution in both the above 
jurisdictions, and tenders both legal1364 and equitable1365 remedies. The distinguishing 
feature between the two jurisdictions is that unjust enrichment and restitution are 
operative under the R3RUE in the US, whereas unjust enrichment in the English system 
such as it has been accepted is a product of case law. The common bond between the 
two doctrines in the differing jurisdictions is that unjust enrichment gives a right to 
restitution against the defendant who is unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense.  
 
12.7  Conclusion 
Unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel are not synonymous. Whereas proprietary 
estoppel deals with the claimant’s loss, unjust enrichment deals with the defendant’s 
gain. Further, whereas unjust enrichment provides an equitable remedy for an 
unjustified wrong by restitution to a plaintiff who is unfairly deprived of his or her 
property, proprietary estoppel requires proof of the factual circumstances of a 
detrimental reliance on a promise or representation for an interest in land. The major 
similarity between proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment is that both embrace 
equity to provide remedies and causes of action to deal effectively with inequitable or 
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unconscionable behavior in proprietary estoppel, and to provide restitution where a 
party is unjustly enriched at the expense of another in unjust enrichment1366. 
 
This chapter leads to a conclusion of the thesis on whether or not, or to what extent 
proprietary estoppel is sound in theory and practice.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Equity evolved to address the deficiencies inherent within the common law, and 
emerged as a distinct and independent conscience-based doctrine in English law. It 
operates as a gloss on the common law and is frequently invoked to overcome its 
frailties. Without the intervention of equity, the common law would have continued to 
operate in an overly-rigorous manner creating undue hardship and injustice to 
aggrieved parties.  
 
The intervention of equity has not been linear, but rather as an ad hoc response to the 
perceived problems of the common law. The courts continue to apply the historical 
doctrine of equity to instill fairness and conscience in the prohibition of inequitable 
conduct, as imbued by a range of political, social, cultural and economic factors 
referred to in this thesis. A judgment in proprietary estoppel is a judgment of 
conscience, based on all the facts and circumstances of a case, and should be founded 
on principle rather than personal decision. The progression of equitable estoppel since 
the Earl of Oxford’s Case1367 reflects the primacy of equity over the common law 
wherever the two jurisdictions clashed. Integral and pivotal to the development of 
proprietary estoppel has been its role in consistently seeking to overcome the formal 
strictures of the common law, for the purpose of preventing unconscionable 
behaviour. Over the years, the realization of this purpose by the courts has elevated its 
doctrinal status by unwavering adherence to the imperative of redressing 
unconscionability on the part of a legal owner of land who seeks to renege from 
informal assurances upon which claimants have relied to their detriment.  
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Proprietary estoppel is not thwarted by the technical rules of formality as it seeks to 
prevent unconscionability and inequity in the dealings of parties. It demonstrates the 
court’s jurisdiction to arrive at broad equitable solutions based on the oral agreements 
of parties for an interest in land that would otherwise be unenforceable under Section 
2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions Act) 1989. As a judicial doctrine, it 
provides a fashion of remedial justice for informal or formally defective dealings in 
land transactions.  
 
The ultimate question on whether or not or to what extent proprietary estoppel is 
‘sound’ in theory and in practice, is best answered by a judicious review of chapters 
one to twelve of the thesis, specifically to consider whether the purpose of the 
doctrine in seeking to prevent and redress unconscionable behaviour has been upheld 
and fulfilled by the courts. The thorough investigation into the historical and 
contemporary development of the doctrine, and its progression in the courts over the 
years present a clear perspective and insight on its status in English law today.   
 
First, in considering the nature, purpose and benefits of proprietary estoppel,1368 the 
questions which arise are: Is the doctrine complex in nature? Do the benefits of 
proprietary estoppel have contradictory or ambiguous implications? Does it operate to 
deprive a party of their strict legal rights? The answer to these questions is in the 
negative and positive. The nature of the doctrine is widely described by notable 
scholars1369 and case law1370 as a sword and a shield, and its attributes are stated 
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clearly without contradictions or ambiguity. The purpose of the doctrine is likewise 
illustrated by case law, and the courts have explicated its precepts in a consistent 
manner to prevent a party from enforcing their strict legal rights where he or she has 
caused another to suffer a detriment in reliance of a promise for an interest in land. 
The benefits of proprietary estoppel also portray how broadly the doctrine is being 
applied by the courts, and that such categories are not exhaustive, with each case 
being determined on its particular facts. Further, proprietary estoppel is applied by the 
courts in fulfilment of its intrinsic purpose that enables an equitable outcome to be 
achieved. It does not operate to automatically deprive a party of their strict rights, 
except in circumstances where that party has behaved unconscionably towards 
another. Notably, the attitude of the courts towards the nature, purpose and benefits 
of the doctrine has been consistently upheld throughout the centuries. It is this 
cohesive implementation of the underlying rationale of proprietary estoppel which has 
rendered it an indispensable instrument of equitable discretion.  
 
Second, in pondering on the influence of social change and the development of 
common law and equity,1371 the questions that arise are: Is the doctrine based on a 
vague and uncertain foundation? Does it comprise internal contradictions or 
ambiguity? Are there any latent defects in its development? Does it operate in 
conflict with the common law? The answer to these questions is in the negative. 
The development of equity to remedy the defects of the common law ascertain its 
firm and definitive foundation in English law. The flexibility of equity enabled it to 
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progress to a formulation of equitable estoppel and then proprietary estoppel in 
asserting its primacy and efficacy over the common law. Whilst the 
interrelationship of social change and the evolution of the common law and equity 
illustrate that law is not static but evolves with the social events that transpire in 
society, equity’s invocation of conscience against inequitable conduct 
demonstrates that proprietary estoppel is neither contradictory nor ambiguous, as 
its fundamental purpose together with its consistent adherence by the courts have 
remained consistent, and, therefore, certain since the original genesis of the 
doctrine in the courts of equity.  
 
Third, in considering the theoretical underpinning of proprietary estoppel,1372 the 
questions that arise are: Is the theoretical perspective of the doctrine ambiguous? Is it 
complex and confusing? Does it exert any influence on the decisions of the court? How 
significant is the rationale for a decision in proprietary estoppel?  The answer to these 
questions is both in the affirmative and negative. The doctrinal foundation of estoppel 
is not confusing, and its purpose is pivotal. Proprietary estoppel is founded in natural 
law theory which reflects the moral character of equity. The doctrine imputes 
conscience in judicial decision making to prevent reliance on formality, and the 
enforcement of strict legal rights. Further, it gives the court a discretion to do what is 
deemed equitable on the particular facts and circumstances of a case. It permits equity 
to act against the conscience of the defendant to prevent him or her from retaining 
that which was promised to the claimant.  
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Fourth, in reflection on the evolution of proprietary estoppel,1373 the questions that 
arise are: Is it established on a certain or vague foundation? Did it develop haphazardly 
or at the insistence of the court? Are the cases tracing its evolution consistent or 
unclear? Did the courts establish a clear path for the doctrine? Do the early decisions 
of the court reflect the purpose of the doctrine? The answer to these questions is in 
the affirmative. Proprietary estoppel has a firm foundation rooted in equity which is 
embedded in case law such as the Earl of Oxford’s Case1374. It did not evolve 
haphazardly but at the insistence of the court, because the early cases such as Hunt v 
Carew1375 and Hunning v Ferrers1376 illustrate the court’s intervention of equity as an 
estoppel against the inequitable conduct of the defendant. Further, its evolution is 
consistent and clear as the trail of cases following the Earl of Oxford’s Case1377 in 
Dillwyn v Llewelyn1378, Plimmer v Wellington1379, Crab v Arun District Council1380, Ives 
v High1381, Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Ltd1382 and Gillett v Holt1383 
demonstrate the invariable objective of the court in invoking equity against a 
defendant’s unconscionable conduct. Thus, this clear path traversed by the doctrine 
prevailed to the House of Lords in Thorner v Major1384 where the Lordships approved 
and affirmed the backbone of proprietary estoppel, to impede the unconscionable 
conduct of the defendant, and to grant the interest that was promised to the claimant.  
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Hence, the essence of every case in proprietary estoppel decided by the court today, is 
founded on the longstanding principle of protecting the claimant from the 
unconscionable dealings of the defendant. Consistent adherence to fulfilment of the 
purpose for which proprietary estoppel was conceived, encapsulates the soundness of 
the doctrine.  
 
Fifth, assessing the transition of proprietary estoppel from a traditional approach 
to a modern approach in the courts,1385 gives rise to the following questions: Is the 
doctrine complicated by the transition from one approach to another? Did the 
transition create any inconsistency in the law? Are there internal contradictions or 
ambiguity in the modern approach? Has the modern approach altered the 
substantive application and operation of the doctrine? Does the case law 
throughout these phases fulfill the purpose of the doctrine? The transition from the 
traditional to a modern approach in proprietary estoppel did not complicate the 
law, but in fact infused more clarity and simplicity in the law of proprietary 
estoppel. It was through this transition process that the term “proprietary 
estoppel” emerged, and the application and operation of the doctrine was 
simplified with the requirements of an assurance, reliance and detriment.  
 
Neither of the approaches presented any internal contradictions, or ambiguity, or 
inconsistency in the law of proprietary estoppel, as they merely facilitated a more 
methodological or systematic process by which the courts could determine the 
estoppel. Further, neither approaches altered the substantive application and 
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operation of the doctrine, as its object, requirements and purpose remained 
consistent in the case law throughout the years. The transition process imputed a 
holistic approach in the determination of proprietary estoppel, and gave 
recognition to its proprietary nature by the name “proprietary estoppel” which the 
courts apply today. The case by case development of the doctrine in both the 
traditional and modern approach apply and reaffirm its purpose of preventing 
inequitable or unconscionable conduct.  
 
Sixth, in considering the House of Lords decision in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v 
Cobbe1386,1387 the questions that arise are: Was the doctrine approved by their 
Lordships? Did their Lordships highlight any issues with the application of the 
doctrine? Did they alter the application of doctrine before the court? Did they 
influence the operation of the doctrine? The answer to these questions is both in the 
affirmative and negative. Their Lordships approved the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel as applied by the lower courts, and noted its underlying principles of 
operation. Although their Lordships did not alter the requirements of the doctrine 
applied by the courts, they nonetheless pointed to the limitations whereby it would 
not apply to pre-contractual arrangements, and to a similar commercial transaction as 
in Yeoman’s Row1388. The decision in Yeoman’s Row1389 created an impact on the law 
of proprietary estoppel in so far as emphasizing that the character of the doctrine is 
principled in nature, and relates to a “certain interest in land”. The limitations of the 
doctrine highlighted by their Lordships is novel as the decided cases had not 
thoroughly examined the application of the doctrine in a purely commercial “arm’s 
                                                 
1386
 [2008] UKHL 55 
1387
 See Chapter six dealing with Yeoman’s Row [2008] UKHL 55 
1388
 [2008] UKHL 55 
1389
 [2008] UKHL 55 
353 
 
length” transaction.1390. Therefore, Yeoman’s Row1391 clarified the extent of the 
application and operation of the doctrine by the courts, whilst reasserting its primary 
role in redressing unconscionable behaviour in contexts other than those arising on 
the specific facts of Yeoman’s Row1392 itself.   
 
Seventh, in assessing the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) decision in Thorner v 
Major1393,1394 the questions that arise are: Did their Lordships approve the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel? Did they alter the application of the doctrine? Did they change 
the course of the doctrine operated by the lower courts? Did they identify and redress 
any latent defects with the application and operation of the doctrine? Did they make 
the law more complicated or did they simplify the law? The answer to these questions 
is both in the affirmative and negative. Their Lordships approved the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel, and asserted its tenacity in being able to create a proprietary 
interest in land. Although their Lordships approved the requirements of the doctrine 
as developed by the lower courts they did, however seek to introduce more clarity in 
its application and operation by the courts. For example, their Lordships elaborated on 
the nature of the assurance as comprising indirect statements, mere inferences or 
implied statements that an assurance must be assessed in the particular context in 
which it was made, and that an assurance is a finding of fact by the trial judge. Thus, 
their Lordships sought to simplify the finding of an assurance.   
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Further, their Lordships introduced a “clear enough” test for proprietary estoppel that 
is novel for the determination of the estoppel. In presenting a new approach to the 
determination of an assurance, and the “clear enough” test for a proprietary estoppel, 
their Lordships identified and addressed pre-existing latent defects which they 
observed in the application and operation of the doctrine. Their Lordships simplified 
the process of finding a proprietary estoppel, and therefore eliminated possible 
ambiguities, contradictions or complications which they observed in the law at the 
time. Thus, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) decision, in Thorner1395, is crucial 
ratification of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, as it both affirmed the traditional 
approach adopted in the decided cases and also imported additional clarity into the 
operation of the elements required for the determination of an estoppel. In so doing, 
their Lordships never lost sight of the original and enduring purpose of proprietary 
estoppel, that is, to prevent a legal owner of land from relying on the enforcement of 
his or her common law rights where it would be unconscionable to permit them to do 
so.  
 
Eighth, in considering the critical review of the case law following Thorner v 
Major1396,1397 the questions that arise are: Is the case law contradictory? Do the 
cases follow the principles established in Thorner1398? Has their Lordships decision 
in Thorner1399 influenced the decisions of the courts in the cases that follow? Has 
the law developed further following Thorner1400? Does the case law following 
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Thorner1401 augment the purpose of the doctrine? The answer to these questions is 
in the affirmative. The case law following Thorner1402 is consistent with the 
previously decided cases, including the principles propounded by their Lordships in 
Thorner1403. To a greater extent, Thorner1404 represents the pinnacle of proprietary 
estoppel, by introducing clarity into the application and operation of the doctrine. 
Each finding of proprietary estoppel is a conscience-based decision consistent with 
the intrinsic purpose for which the doctrine was conceived and developed.  
 
Following Thorner1405, a number of cases have succeeded in proprietary estoppel 
before the courts, which indicate that Thorner1406 has influenced the court’s 
perception on proprietary estoppel. The courts consider the law of proprietary 
estoppel to be settled by Thorner1407, and readily apply the principles of Thorner1408 in 
the determination of the estoppel. Whilst the empirical outcome of each case is 
dependent on the facts before the court, the post-Thorner case law has remained 
faithful to the unequivocal rationale underpinning the concept of estoppel. 
Pertinently, no other cases have proceeded to the House of Lords following 
Thorner1409, and hence there has been no further development in the law.  
 
Ninth, in evaluating the challenges to proprietary estoppel,1410 the questions that arise 
are: Is the doctrine operating in line with equity or has the court created its own path 
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for the doctrine? Is it achieving its purpose? Do the challenges affect the effectiveness 
of the doctrine? Do the challenges outweigh the benefits of the doctrine? Can the 
challenges be resolved? Since the genesis of the doctrine and its progression through 
the courts, proprietary estoppel has focused upon the unconscionable behaviour of 
the defendant, and the need to prevent it. The courts have not devised arbitrary 
pathways for the application of the doctrine, but have invoked equity to respond to 
the particular facts and circumstances of a case. Pivotally, the doctrine developed in 
response to the intervention of equity against the unconscionable acts of a defendant, 
and it is to this enduring ethos that the courts still subscribe when dealing with a claim 
founded on proprietary estoppel.   
 
Given the recent increase in cases following Thorner1411, it is evident that the doctrine 
is achieving its purpose, and is operating on the same principles as the decided cases. 
The objective of the doctrine to prohibit unconscionable conduct and the enforcement 
of strict legal rights, as established in the decided cases, is clearly pervasive in each 
case decided by the courts following Thorner1412. It is arguable that the benefits of 
proprietary estoppel outweigh the challenges, as a successful case can produce a 
personal or proprietary remedy or both. If a claimant does not pursue a claim in 
proprietary estoppel, then he or she will not obtain a remedy to which he or she may 
be entitled. Conversely, from a purely outcome-based perspective, if a claimant does 
not succeed in a claim for proprietary estoppel, monies will have been unnecessarily 
expended on ultimately unsuccessful litigation. It is, therefore, left to the claimant to 
                                                 
1411
 [2009] UKHL 18 
1412
 [2009] UKHL 18 
357 
 
decide whether or not to proceed with a claim in proprietary estoppel, and to accept 
the consequences of success or failure.  
 
Because, however, many of the challenges identified relate to the fact-based nature of 
estoppel, these do not impair the soundness of the doctrine in terms of the correlation 
between its intrinsic purpose and the extent to which this has been upheld by the 
courts. Unless the facts support a finding of proprietary estoppel, the intervention of 
equity will not be invoked. Undoubtedly, proprietary estoppel is determined by the 
factual matrix of a case, which means that there is no litmus test for the courts to 
decide whether an assurance was made indirectly, or inferred or implied to give rise to 
the other elements of reliance and detriment. Further, there is no litmus test for the 
courts to decide the context of an assurance, and thus the circumstances whereby an 
assurance can arise can be problematic. Therefore, these challenges do inevitably 
present some unpredictability in relation to the outcome of a claim based on 
proprietary estoppel. Whether these challenges can be resolved completely is open to 
speculation. However, the cases following Thorner1413 continue to increase, which 
suggests that litigants recognize that proprietary estoppel represents their best, and in 
many instances their only chance of a remedy. Without the courts’ steadfast 
determination to uphold the intrinsic purpose of estoppel, that of it preventing 
unconscionability, such hope would be misplaced.  
 
Tenth, in considering the holistic evaluation of proprietary estoppel from the past 
to the present,1414 the questions that arise are: Is the doctrine of proprietary 
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estoppel still traditional in nature? Has it progressed over the years? Is there a 
future for proprietary estoppel? Has the purpose of the doctrine been consistently 
upheld from the past to the present? These questions are answered in the 
affirmative. Proprietary estoppel is still the traditional doctrine developed over the 
centuries, and has not lost its traditional roots as the developing case law continues 
to cite the early decisions such as Dillwyn v Llewelyn1415, Plimmer v Wellington1416, 
Inwards v Baker1417, Crab v Arun District Council1418. The doctrine was consigned to 
the lower courts for over forty years, until it proceeded to the House of Lords (now 
Supreme Court) in Thorner v Major1419. The litany of successful cases following 
Thorner1420, illustrate that the doctrine is extremely viable, and that its future is 
assured as a range of varying circumstances occur to which estoppel is able to 
apply. Further, the courts have adopted a modern trend of using estoppel to grant 
a proprietary interest in land to those who rely on it for their livelihood, in 
preference to the beneficiaries of the legal owner’s will who do not need the land 
to sustain their financial security. This modern trend remains wholly consistent 
with the purpose of the doctrine, that of redressing unconscionable behaviour on 
the part of a legal owner of land who seeks to defeat the “rights” of a claimant 
pursuing a remedy via the avenue of proprietary estoppel.  
 
Eleventh, in comparing proprietary estoppel and constructive trust,1421 the questions 
that arise are: Do the two doctrines follow the same principles? Do they provide the 
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same remedy? Do they operate differently? Is one doctrine superior to the other? The 
answer to these questions is answered both in the affirmative and negative. The two 
doctrines are distinct genres of equitable relief, and vary by their nature, purpose, 
application and operation by the courts. The principles behind the two doctrines vary 
as well as the remedy they provide. For example, whereas proprietary estoppel is 
based on a unilateral representation, constructive trust is based on a bilateral 
agreement. Further, whereas proprietary estoppel recognizes a right anew with 
prospective effect, constructive trust recognizes an existing right with retrospective 
effect. Neither doctrine is superior to the other, as each is determined on the 
particular facts of a case. Although, the doctrines can be pleaded in the alternative on 
the same facts, it is always in the discretion of the court to determine which remedy 
best fits the facts of a case. Notwithstanding the differences of both doctrines, they 
redress unconscionable conduct between parties, and the detriment suffered in 
reliance on an informal agreement for an interest in land. Thus, the disparities 
between the two doctrines are more diverse than the similarities, but both are applied 
by the courts to remedy inequitable conduct.  
 
Twelfth, in comparing proprietary estoppel with the American system of unjust 
enrichment,1422 the questions that arise are: Do the two doctrines share the same 
principles? Do they achieve the same objective? Do they provide the same remedy? Is 
one doctrine superior to the other? The answer to those questions is both in the 
affirmative and negative. Proprietary estoppel does not follow the same principles as 
unjust enrichment in the American system. Whereas proprietary estoppel prevents a 
party from asserting their strict legal rights where it is inequitable to do so, unjust 
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enrichment on the other hand provides that a party who is unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another, should make restitution for those benefits.  
 
The two doctrines vary widely in nature, purpose, approach by the courts, principles of 
application and operation, and the remedy granted by the courts. For example, 
whereas proprietary estoppel requires the satisfaction of the criteria of assurance, 
reliance and detriment for an estoppel, unjust enrichment in contrast considers the 
defendant’s gain in relation to the plaintiff’s loss. Further, whereas proprietary 
estoppel requires the claimant to prove the detrimental reliance on a promise, unjust 
enrichment in contrast requires the claimant to show that he or she is the source of 
the defendant’s enrichment.  
 
Further, the doctrines do not provide the same remedy, and the basis of liability differs 
between them. Whereas the courts determine the remedy in proprietary estoppel, on 
the other hand a remedy in unjust enrichment is entrenched by statute per the 
Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment which provides that 
every unjust enrichment gives a right in restitution. Neither doctrine is superior to the 
other, as both are distinct doctrines that only share the common bond of equity to 
provide remedies for inequitable conduct. Therefore, both doctrines are categorically 
independent.   
 
Similar comparisons between proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment in the 
English system illustrate that they are two distinct and independent doctrines. They 
vary in nature, purpose and by their application and operation by the courts. For 
example, whilst proprietary estoppel deals with the detrimental reliance on a promise 
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for an interest in land, unjust enrichment in contrast deals with a party being unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another. However, both doctrines are equitable in nature, 
and both are capable of providing a proprietary or a personal remedy.  
 
Proprietary estoppel is a judicial doctrine that is and remains distinct and independent 
of unjust enrichment. Any similarity is outweighed by the broad disparity that exists 
between the two doctrines. They are best defined as equitable doctrines to remedy 
inequitable conduct between parties.  
 
Therefore, having considered all the issues in the thesis, and when assessed against 
the previously articulated benchmark it can be concluded that proprietary estoppel 
is ‘sound’ in theory and in practice. Since its genesis in English law, the doctrine has 
embattled rigorous scrutiny by the courts and survived to be elevated to the status 
of a modern doctrine in Thorner v Major1423. The recent increase in cases involving 
proprietary estoppel demonstrate that its application and operation by the courts 
is more settled since Thorner1424, and it has become a modern doctrine of 
significant influence for the future, rather than exclusively a doctrine of the past. 
The purpose of the doctrine is intended to protect a promisee “so that an injustice 
may not be perpetrated”1425 against him or her, and the courts have consistently 
evinced an insistence on preserving, upholding and applying this purpose, based on 
the equitable principle of “good conscience”.  
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Ultimately, the critical question which arises in proprietary estoppel is: Should a 
landowner approbate or reprobate; or change his or her mind willy-nilly; or act 
arbitrarily or with caprice where the landowner has promised an interest in his or her 
land to party, and that party has relied on the landowner’s promise to his or her 
detriment? Proprietary estoppel intervenes with equity to remedy the unconscionable 
acts of the landowner.  
 
According to Heward1426, “The great American judge, Benjamin Cardozo once said: the 
law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalities, when the precise word was the 
sovereign talisman and every slip was fatal!”1427 This, precept adequately sums up the 
intervention of equity and proprietary estoppel to overcome the rigours of common 
law. This is aptly summarized by Lord Atkin in United Australia Ltd v Barclay’s Bank 
Ltd1428, in his assertion that: “When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of 
justice, clanking their medieval chains the proper course for the judge is to pass 
through them undeterred”1429. Thus, equity permits the court to rule in conscience 
whenever justice requires it.1430  
 
The perennial hurdles of reliance on discretion, and the unpredictability and broad 
flexibility that pervade the doctrine of proprietary estoppel are attributable to the 
inherent nature of equity to determine each case on its own particular facts. In 
Bradbury v Taylor1431, Lloyd LJ asserted that a case in proprietary estoppel turns on its 
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own facts, and a legal practitioner cannot argue about the facts of one case in light of 
the previous cases. Therefore, the hurdles of proprietary estoppel are inescapable, and 
practical recommendations are proposed in the next chapter to deal with the 
drawbacks of proprietary estoppel, none of which materially impinge on the inherent 
soundness of the doctrine adjudged in accordance with the benchmark articulated in 
this thesis.   
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Proprietary estoppel has emerged as equity’s longstanding and enduring sabre against 
the unconscionable conduct of a defendant, and has gradually attained judicial status 
via the lower courts and now in the House of Lords (now Supreme Court). The 
application and operation of the doctrine is not without challenges and controversy. 
However, if suitable measures can be implemented, these challenges and 
controversies can be curtailed or lessened to produce more effectiveness in its 
application and operation. Some pertinent recommendations to address these issues 
include the following:  
 
First, is the protection of title to land by title insurance.  
This concept can be applied to protect a landowner’s title against claims in proprietary 
estoppel. Should a successful claim arise in proprietary estoppel, the insurance can 
compensate the insured for the loss of title, or compensate the successful party in 
proprietary estoppel. Title insurers usually conduct a search on public records before 
insuring the landowner. The landowner can be insured for the value of the land, as 
security and a guarantee against all claims to the landowner’s title. With title 
insurance, the landowner can therefore take free from an interest in proprietary 
estoppel.  
 
Second, is the protection against a claim in proprietary estoppel with proprietary 
estoppel insurance.  
This would be novel to protect a landowner against a successful claim in proprietary 
estoppel. Since proprietary estoppel can be a major obstacle to clear title, such 
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insurance will eliminate the risk of any loss from unknown or undiscovered interest 
upon the death of a testator, or of a successful claim in proprietary estoppel. This 
insurance will apply specifically against proprietary estoppel claims. Before issuing 
policy coverage, insurers can undertake a discovery process by the use of a standard 
form of disclosure inquiring whether there are any promises made for a future interest 
in the land. If the discovery test is satisfied, then the landowner can be insured for the 
value of the land, so that any future claims arising in proprietary estoppel can be 
compensated by the insurance. This may be particularly useful in the case of large 
farms, where a landowner often engages in family or domestic arrangements to 
ensure continuity of the farm after the landowner’s death. Thus, the insurance will 
guarantee the landowner’s title against a claim in proprietary estoppel.  
 
Third, is the purchase of the interest arising by proprietary estoppel.  
The successful claimant in proprietary estoppel can be approached by the defendant 
for the purchase of his or her interest in the land that is granted by the court. Further, 
if the claimant’s interest is discovered before a claim is made in proprietary estoppel, 
then the landowner’s heirs or successors can insist that the claimant sell his or her 
interest to them. In this way, the claimant’s interest is being acknowledged and sold 
rather than the claimant expending monies in extensive litigation and costs, and the 
possibility of not obtaining a remedy in proprietary estoppel from the court. Therefore, 
the purchase of the interest in proprietary estoppel can apply both before litigation, or 
following the litigation process.  
 
Fourth, the use of a standard questionnaire form for disclosure of an interest 
promised in land.  
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The standard form can be titled as follows:  
Section 116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 
Questionnaire Form  
The use of standard questionnaire forms by the Land Registry can be used to inquire of 
a landowner whether an interest in his or her property has been promised to another. 
The standard questionnaire form can likewise be used by any party to whom an 
interest in property has been promised. The Land Registry can require these forms to 
be completed annually and filed at the Land Registry. The form must be signed by the 
landowner, or other party to whom an interest is promised and contain a penal clause 
for a fine or imprisonment if the information provided is false. These forms can be 
used by a landowner, or the heirs or successors of the landowner to undertake 
periodic checks on any possible claims against the landowner’s title. Also, the form can 
be used to show when the interest was promised to a party, and how long it has 
continued in effect. It can also verify whether the promisee is in actual occupation of 
the land promised. This would help ascertain whether a promise was made by a 
landowner, and the party to whom it was made. This standard form will not erode the 
informality of proprietary estoppel, as the landowner or the promisee is not required 
to state the promise made. The form serves to inquire whether a promise was made to 
help the parties seek other avenues to resolve the matter before litigation.  
 
Fifth, is the use of a standard form for the discovery of a landowner’s promise for an 
interest in land. 
The standard form can be titled as follows:  
Section 116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 
Discovery Form  
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The use of a standard discovery form by the Land Registry can be used to report an 
interest promised in a landowner’s estate. Such promise does not have to remain 
unknown or undiscoverable until litigation ensues for a claim in proprietary estoppel. 
The form can be completed by the party to whom an interest in property is promised, 
and is to be filed at the Land Registry. It can require information on the names of the 
parties, and the land involved. It can also verify whether the promisee is in actual 
occupation of the land that is promised. The form must be signed by the party to 
whom an interest is promised, and contain a penal clause for a fine or imprisonment if 
the information provided is false. Therefore, both a landowner and his heirs or 
successors would know or discover any future interest against a landowner’s estate. 
This standard form will not erode the informality of proprietary estoppel, as the 
promisee is not required to state the promise made. The form serves to discover 
whether a promise was made to help the parties seek other avenues to resolve the 
matter before litigation. 
 
Sixth, is the execution of a last will and testament by a landowner.  
A landowner who promises his estate to a party, can execute a signed will in that 
party’s favour. A copy of the signed will can be furnished to the beneficiary party. 
Should the landowner change his or her will before death, then the beneficiary party 
can prove that the interest was promised in the lifetime of the landowner. Although, 
the landowner can revoke the will before death, the promisee may have acquired an 
equitable interest in the landowner’s land that may give rise to a proprietary interest 
by proprietary estoppel. Thus, a promisee’s interest can be secured by will against the 
landowner’s estate, to preclude a future claim in proprietary estoppel.  
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Seventh, is the entry of notice on the land register by the promisee.  
A party to whom an interest in land has been promised can enter a notice on the land 
register. A notice can be entered by virtue of Section 34 of the Land Registration Act 
2002. The notice can either be an agreed notice by the landowner and the party to 
whom the interest is promised, or a unilateral notice by the party who is the 
beneficiary of a promise. The notice will serve to inform of the party’s interest in the 
landowner’s estate. A notice will not erode the informality of proprietary estoppel, as 
the promisee is not required to state the promise made. The notice serves to inform 
that a promise was made to help the parties seek other avenues to resolve the matter 
before litigation. 
 
Eighth, is that the court can refer a claim in proprietary estoppel to mediation.  
The mediation of a claim in proprietary estoppel can save extensive costs and 
litigation. Further, it can eliminate the unpredictability that may arise as to whether 
the court will decide for or against the claimant. The court can refer a claim to 
mediation upon the filing of a claim. If the mediation process is not successful, then 
the parties still have the option of continuing to litigation.  
 
Ninth, is that a potential claimant can seek to settle a potential claim with the 
defendant at mediation before the filing of a claim.  
Mediation before the filing of a claim can save both parties time and costs. Before a 
potential claimant files a claim in proprietary estoppel, a notice can be sent to the 
defendant of the claimant’s intention to file the claim, and reference can be made to 
supporting documents such as the proposed Land Registry standard questionnaire 
form or disclosure form at numbers 4 and 5 above, along with a copy of a draft will if 
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any, or any documentation on promises made, or other notice on the land register. 
The potential claimant can propose that the parties seek to resolve the matter by 
mediation before the claim is filed. If the defendant agrees, and the mediation is 
successful, then both parties would have avoided a long and costly trial, and the 
attendant unpredictability in outcome that comes with it. If the defendant declines to 
proceed to mediation, then the potential claimant can file the claim in proprietary 
estoppel.  
 
Tenth, is the use of practice directions by the court. 
Practice directions by the court are profoundly necessary and useful to provide 
guidance and clarity on proceeding with a claim in proprietary estoppel. There are 
some terms applied in a claim in estoppel that are imprecisely defined. For example, 
the requirements of assurance, reliance and detriment for a proprietary estoppel 
ought to be further defined by the court so that a legal practitioner and litigant can 
know what is, and what constitutes these elements. Similarly, the court can define 
what is an implied assurance, an implied statement, a mere inference or an indirect 
statement for a proprietary estoppel and also clarify what circumstances constitute 
each for an assurance.  
 
Further definition and clarification are also required on what is and what constitutes 
the context in which an assurance is made. It would also be immensely beneficial if the 
court can define and elaborate on the “clear enough” test applied for an assurance. 
The definitions and guidelines provided by the court will be beneficial to both legal 
practitioners and litigants embarking on a claim in proprietary estoppel. It would not 
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only provide clarity on what is required by the court, but also save a party unnecessary 
litigation and costs if a claim does not satisfy the practice directions of the court.   
 
Eleventh, is the use of application rules by the court. 
The court can devise application rules to provide guidelines on how it arrives at a 
decision in proprietary estoppel. For example, the court can explicate how its 
discretion is applied for a remedy in proprietary estoppel. The court exercises a 
‘principled’ discretion for a remedy in proprietary estoppel, but it is sometimes unclear 
what is, and what constitutes that ‘principled’ discretion, and how it influences a 
remedy in proprietary estoppel. The court also grants the minimum equity to do 
justice in every case of proprietary estoppel, but it cannot forecast in advance what 
constitutes that minimum equity to do justice, and what factors are to be taken into 
consideration in assessing the minimum equity to do justice. Therefore, the use of 
application rules can introduce more clarity for the legal practitioner or litigant on the 
process engaged by the court in granting a remedy.  This may influence a litigant’s 
decision to file or not file a claim for proprietary estoppel. It will also help eliminate 
some of the unpredictability in the remedy granted by the court.  
 
Twelfth, is the documentation of promises made by the landowner and promisee. 
Both the landowner and the promisee can keep a diary of events transpiring on a farm, 
or other property. For example, the exact terms of a promise made to the claimant for 
an interest in the property of a landowner, and repeated over several years can be 
noted. Similarly, if a proposed will is drawn up in the name of a claimant, then the 
landowner’s reasons for the will in favour of the claimant can be noted, with the exact 
terms related by the landowner, together with a copy of the will, can be documented. 
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If a claimant works for low wages and low pay, then it should be so noted, and if any 
disagreements should ensue, then they should also be noted. The landowner can 
likewise keep a diary of the promise made to the claimant, can note whether a will was 
made in the claimant’s favour, and indicate whether or not the promise was revoked 
before death.  
 
Either party may have heard by television, or may have been told by friends or family, 
or may have read in the newspapers or the internet about the outcome of cases being 
determined in proprietary estoppel, and may have grasped the importance or 
necessity of keeping notes or records. The documentation of a promise will help bring 
more clarity to the nature of the promise made, and the context in which it was made.  
 
Further, the documentation process will not erode the informality of proprietary 
estoppel, as the court would still have to determine the facts on whether an assurance 
was made, the context in which it was made, and whether it was clear enough. 
However, it serves to inform what transpired between the parties, so other avenues 
such as mediation can be considered to resolve the matter before litigation. 
 
Thirteenth, is the promisee informing friends and family about the landowner’s 
promise and of their shared relationship.  
The promisee can inform friends and family about the relationship that he or she 
shares with the landowner, and what promises are made by the landowner. Written 
communication such as letters, cards, emails or texts can suffice, or oral 
communication by telephone, mobile, or by meeting in public places such as a 
restaurant. This may help the court ascertain the promise made by the landowner, and 
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the promisee’s reliance thereon. Thus, the promisee will have witnesses to support his 
or her evidence in a claim of proprietary estoppel.  
 
Fourteenth, is the establishment of a proprietary estoppel indemnity fund by 
landowners or property holders. 
A proprietary estoppel indemnity fund can be established by landowners and property 
holders to indemnify the loss from a claim in proprietary estoppel. The landowners 
and property holders can make payments into that fund based on the value of their 
property. Should a successful claim arise against a landowner or his estate, then the 
claimant can be indemnified by the fund. This process will help overcome the 
unpredictability of litigation, and also any loss to the landowner or his estate. Also, the 
fund can help indemnify the landowner or his estate if the parties decide to settle at 
mediation. Thus, the proprietary estoppel indemnity fund makes the mediation 
process more appealing to both legal practitioners and litigants.  
 
Fifteenth, the court can impanel a jury to decide a case in proprietary estoppel. 
Since proprietary estoppel is a question of fact to be decided by a trial judge, then a 
jury can be empanelled to decide whether a proprietary estoppel arises on the facts of 
a case. The court can give directions to the jury on what should be considered for the 
assurance, reliance and detriment in proprietary estoppel. Many of the cases on 
appeal turn on the facts of a case, and having a jury may reduce the number of cases 
that proceed to appeal. Further, the parties may perceive that a jury is likely to make a 
‘fairer’ determination on the facts, than a single judge.  
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Sixteenth, is the provision of legal aid for claims in proprietary estoppel. 
Since one of the greatest hurdles in a claim for proprietary estoppel, is the extensive 
litigation costs involved, then legal aid can be made available to those who lack the 
financial resources to proceed with a claim. Proprietary estoppel claims are often long 
and costly with the possibility of further appeals, and legal aid can help offset the legal 
costs that prevents litigants from pursuing a claim. Thus, legal aid can help eliminate 
the financial hardship of litigation costs in proprietary estoppel.  
 
Seventeenth, is the law reform of Section 116 of the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 
2002). 
Law reform is required to achieve more clarity. Reference is made to the terms, 
“proprietary estoppel” and “mere equities” without definition or amplification. Section 
116 of the LRA 2002, therefore, requires law reform to define the title of the section 
“proprietary estoppel and mere equities”, and to elaborate on the circumstances that 
give rise to each. Further, the terms in the section “for the avoidance of doubt’, “an 
equity by estoppel” and “a mere equity” are mentioned without explicating how each 
is defined, and what each constitutes or represents. The clarification of the provisions 
of law will help eliminate unnecessary confusion and complexity. 
 
Eighteenth, is to educate landowners about proprietary estoppel. 
With the recent spate of cases1432 in proprietary estoppel following Thorner1433, it is 
necessary for landowners to be educated about the law of proprietary estoppel. The 
                                                 
1432
 [2009] UKHL 18 
1433
 Henry v Henry [2010] UKPC 3, Suggitt v Suggitt [2012] EWCA Civ 1140, Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA 
Civ 463, Moore v Moore [2016] EWHC 2202 Ch, James v James [2018] EWHC 43 Ch; Haberfield v 
Haberfield [2018] EWHC 317 Ch, Thompson v Thompson [2018] EWHC 1338 Ch, Gee v Gee [2018] EWHC 
1393 Ch 
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Land Registry can take the bold initiative to help educate the landowners. They can 
hold town hall meetings, or send flyers or pamphlets in the mail to landowners about 
the law and implications of proprietary estoppel.  
 
Similarly, farming associations and groups can organize workshops, seminars or 
lectures and invite a legal practitioner or Land Registry personnel to educate their 
members on proprietary estoppel. This would help create an awareness of the 
doctrine, and landowners can likewise be sensitized on the importance or necessity to 
keep records of the conversations or events that transpire between the landowner and 
the promisee on the farm (at number 13 above), or the importance of executing a last 
will and testament for his or her estate (at number 6 above), or the importance of 
protecting their title to land by title insurance (at number 1 above), or the importance 
to have protection against claims in proprietary estoppel by undertaking proprietary 
estoppel insurance (at number 2 above), or the importance of being part of a 
proprietary estoppel indemnity fund to be indemnified against such claims (at number 
15 above).  
 
Nineteenth, is the presentation of a proprietary estoppel model to help resolve 
claims in proprietary estoppel.  
A claim in proprietary estoppel can lead to protracted litigation and costs. Further, it 
may present unpredictability in relation to the outcome of such proposed litigation.  
Moreover, it often involves family members, domestic relationships, or neighbour 
disputes that can lead to a breakdown in family and social relationships. It is capable of 
creating animosity and the loss of close personal or social friendships. Mediation 
represents a win-win situation where both parties can be winners, rather than 
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permitting the court to decide who wins or loses. The model presented below is 
intended to help both the claimant and defendant arrive at a solution in the interest of 
both parties.  
The proprietary estoppel model is as follows: 
 
Proprietary Estoppel Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Proprietary Estoppel Model 
 
Claimant or Potential 
Claimant 
In Proprietary Estoppel 
 Before filing claim in 
proprietary estoppel 
Filing of claim in 
proprietary estoppel 
Litigation 
Landowner’s Insurance 
Defendant compensated by title 
insurance or proprietary estoppel 
Insurance if claimant succeeds, or 
Landowner’s Indemnity fund 
Defendant indemnified from 
proprietary estoppel 
indemnity fund 
Court refers claim 
to mediation 
Parties settle 
at mediation 
Parties fail 
to settle at 
mediation 
Notice by claimant to 
Defendant of intention 
to file claim, with 
proposal for mediation. 
Defendant 
declines 
mediation 
Defendant 
agrees to 
mediation 
Parties failed to 
settle at 
mediation 
Parties settle 
at mediation 
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Mediation is proposed as the most suitable process to resolve claims in proprietary 
estoppel as the following presentation illustrates:  
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Mediation v Litigation for Proprietary Estoppel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Litigation?? 
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Figure 3 - Benefits and limitations of mediation and litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Judgment 
 
The above model and presentations illustrate that both the landowner or his or her 
estate, and the claimant can be winners in a claim of proprietary estoppel. Thus, these 
recommendations provide realistic solutions that are practical and feasible, to help 
overcome the challenges and controversies in the practical application and operation 
of the factual components integral to a successful claim founded on proprietary 
estoppel.  
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